刚刚结束的美国总统拜登对中东的访问，是他就任总统近一年半以来首次中东之行。值得指出的是，拜登这次中东行是“应急之作”，是在俄乌冲突背景下运作安排的，因此美国方面给访问“赋予太多的任务”，大大超出美国现有的影响和能力，因而注定是不会成功的。

根据拜登行前美国国务卿布林肯、国家安全事务助理沙利文以及总统本人在《华盛顿邮报》的发文看，拜登此次中东之行有以下五方面目标：

一是“催油”。俄乌冲突发生后，美国及其盟国对俄罗斯实施空前严厉的制裁，造成世界能源市场供需失衡，加之石油短缺的风险和心理影响加大，世界石油和天然气价格暴涨，美欧成品油价格创下纪录，通货膨胀高企。拜登支持率的一路走低，已经严重影响到民主党在即将到来的美国中期选举的选情。因此，拜登总统的中东行被认为是“为油而来”。

二是改善美国与沙特的关系。与特朗普不同，拜登的民主党政府处处高举人权大旗。拜登在竞选时就曾借卡舒吉事件严厉指责沙特，甚至声称要把沙特打入“贱民国家”。就任总统后，他一直拒绝与沙特实际掌握权力的王储穆罕默德亲王接触，既不见王储也不通电话，以至于俄乌冲突发生后，拜登需要沙特配合增产石油，给王储打电话时被拒接。

三是联合中东地区盟友向伊朗施压。拜登就任总统一年半来，一直在推动伊核问题谈判，力图恢复核协议。去年4月维也纳谈判恢复后，有关各方先后进行了八轮会谈，基本上就相关问题达成一致，但尚缺“临门一脚”，即伊朗提出的底线——解除对革命卫队的制裁。拜登受制于国内政治掣肘实难退让，因此试图向伊施加新的压力。

四是推动以色列深度融入中东地区，形成所谓“地区安全联盟”，在美国自己力不从心又不愿更多投入的情况下借“中东版北约”来维护美国在中东的主控地位。

五是遏制中国、俄罗斯在中东影响力的扩大。拜登行前在《华盛顿邮报》发文，特意把中国也“扯进来”，甚至在吉达举行的美国与海湾六国及埃及、约旦和伊拉克的峰会上声称，“美国不会离开中东，不会给中国、俄罗斯或伊朗留下真空”。

7月16日拜登结束了总统任上的中东首秀。盘点他此行的成果，可以总结为一句话：收获平平，难掩尴尬。

首先看他此行的“重头戏”——推动以沙特为首的OPEC产油国大幅增产石油。虽然在与沙特国王和王储的会谈中，拜登都重点提到了增产问题，但直至他离开，也没有得到沙特方面大幅度增产石油的明确承诺。实际上，从主客观两方面来说，沙特都对增产缺少热情。从客观上说，2014年之后世界石油价格曾经历长期低迷，导致全球范围内新油田的勘探开发大大滞后，目前重要产油国（包括沙特）的潜在生产能力是很有限的，所谓“地主家也没有余粮”。而从主观上来说，在油价长期低迷的背景下，以沙特为代表的OPEC产油国和以俄罗斯为代表的非OPEC产油国已经形成一套有效的合作机制（稳价机制），来维护产油国的利益，现在让沙特“自毁长城”显然是其内心不愿意的。而且，在拜登来访前，媒体还曝光沙特大幅增加从俄罗斯低价购买发电厂燃油，而把自产原油高价在石油市场出售。

其次，美国与沙特的关系表面上改善，但实质上有明显的隔阂。虽然拜登此行与沙特王储“碰了拳”，也进行了双边会谈，但拜登在会谈中和会谈后的记者会上一再提及卡舒吉事件和所谓人权，并遭到沙特王储的“回怼”。王储提到了美国在伊拉克的表现，并明确告诉拜登把自己的意识形态强加于人是不会有好结果的。

第三，推动建立所谓“地区安全联盟”存在两个结构性障碍。一是除以色列和美国外，中东地区国家（包括沙特）并不愿意公开与伊朗为敌，更不用说去针对俄罗斯和中国了。二是以巴关系的僵局大大制约着美国“让以色列深度融入中东地区”的努力。拜登此行不仅使那些期待沙特与以色列建交的人大失所望，而且沙特还公开表示“此次峰会没有讨论与以色列建立任何防务联盟，也不存在所谓的阿拉伯北约”。

第四，拜登此次中东之行引起伊朗和俄罗斯的高度警惕，伊俄也作出一些反制举动。伊朗高调亮相新成立的“无人机师”并进行演习，宣布对美国诸多人员进行制裁，并与俄罗斯、土耳其举行“阿斯塔纳”进程峰会。俄罗斯总统普京于7月19日访问伊朗并出席俄、伊、土三国峰会，与土耳其总统埃尔多安也举行了双边会谈。普京在拜登之后接踵而至，明显有唱对台戏的味道，也在一定程度上抵消了拜登首访中东的影响。

第五，拜登试图阻止中国扩大在中东影响力的图谋更是不可能如愿。在中东，没有一个国家（包括以色列）愿意“拿中国说事”，没有一个国家接美国所谓“中国填补真空”的茬。多年来，中国推进“一带一路”建设，阿拉伯国家、中东国家深受其益，怎么可能随美国的指挥棒起舞呢？沙特政府就明确表示，沙特与美国的关系丝毫不会影响沙特与中国的关系。

Joe Biden's recently concluded trip to the Middle East was his first as U.S. president. It's worth noticing that, against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this trip was "improvised," leading the U.S. to attempt to stretch beyond its present influences and capabilities. It was thus destined to be unsuccessful.

According to U.S. State Secretary Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and the U.S. president's own article published in the Washington Post, the trip had five goals:

First was to urge for oil. The U.S. and allies have imposed unprecedentedly harsh sanctions against Russia since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, resulting in imbalance between supply and demand in world energy market. Combined with the risk and expectation of a global oil shortage, petroleum and natural gas prices surged worldwide; refined oil prices set historical records, inflation escalated, and Biden's approval ratings continued to slide, seriously dampening the Democratic Party's prospect in the upcoming midterm elections. Biden's Middle East trip was thus believed to be targeted at oil.

Second was to improve ties with Saudi Arabia. Different from Trump, Biden's Democratic administration holds high the human rights banner everywhere. Biden lambasted Saudi Arabia on the campaign trail for Jamal Khashoggi's murder, even vowing to make the oil-rich country a "pariah state." Biden had refused to contact Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who wields actual power in the country, since coming into office, neither meeting him nor talking to him on the phone. So when the Russia-Ukraine crisis broke out and the U.S. wanted Saudi Arabia to cooperate and increase oil output, Biden made a call to the crown prince, but the latter refused to answer.

Third was to pressure Iran via U.S. allies in the Middle East. Biden had been pushing for negotiations on the Iran nuclear issue over his past year and half in office, striving to restore the nuclear agreement. Since negotiations were restarted in Vienna in April 2021, related parties have had eight rounds of talks, and basically reached consensuses on related issues, except that Biden couldn't take a step back on Iran's bottom line - lifting sanctions on the Revolutionary Guards - owing to domestic political resistance. So he attempted to mount new pressures on Iran.

Fourth was to urge Israel to integrate into the so-called "regional security alliance" in the Middle East, so that the U.S. can preserve its dominance in the region with such a "Middle East-edition of NATO" when it is unable or unwilling to invest more.

Fifth was to contain the expansion of Chinese and Russian influences in the Middle East. Biden dragged China in with his Washington Post article, even claimed at the summit with six Gulf countries and Egypt, Jordan and Iraq that the U.S. won't leave the region and leave a vacuum for China and Russia to fill.

Biden's first trip to the Middle East as U.S. president, which ended on July 16, can be summed up as mediocre and embarrassing.

First let's look at the priority goal - urging major OPEC members led by Saudi Arabia to increase oil output. Though Biden highlighted an output increase in his meeting with the king and talks with the crown prince, he had not received any clear Saudi promise to do so until his departure. In fact, Saudi Arabia demonstrated little interest in doing so. Objectively, world petroleum prices have long undergone stagnation since 2014, as a result, exploration and development of new oil fields have lagged far behind worldwide, and the potential productive capacities of major oil-producing nations, including Saudi Arabia, are limited. Subjectively, against the backdrop of longstanding low prices, OPEC members represented by Saudi Arabia and non-OPEC oil producing nations like Russia have built a set of effective price-stabilizing mechanisms for cooperation to preserve their interests. Therefore it is difficult to persuade Saudi Arabia to stray from its own interests. Prior to Biden's visit, there were reports that Saudi Arabia would greatly increase imports of cheap fuel oil for power plants, while it sells its own products at high prices in the market.

Second, despite the apparent improvement in U.S.-Saudi ties, there still are obvious obstacles between them. Though Biden had a "fist bump" with the crown prince and had bilateral talks, Biden had to repeatedly mention the Khashoggi murder and human rights during the talks and the news conference afterward, which invited refutation from the crown prince. The crown prince mentioned the U.S.' performance in Iraq, and explicitly told Biden there won't be good outcomes when one side imposes its own ideology on the other.

Third, there are two structural obstacles to forming the so-called "regional security alliance": one is, except Israel and the U.S., Middle East countries including Saudi Arabia don't want to openly take Iran as an enemy, not least to target Russia and China; the other is the impasse between Israel and Palestine greatly constrains U.S. efforts to make Israel integrate deeper into the Middle East. Biden's trip not only greatly disappointed those who had anticipated Saudi Arabia and Israel would establish diplomatic relations, but Saudi Arabia openly stated the summit didn't discuss establishing any defense alliance with Israel, nor would there be a so-called "Arabian NATO".

Fourth, Biden's trip also triggered high alert in Iran and Russia, causing them to take some countermoves. Iran debuted its newly formed "drone division" and conducted a corresponding exercise, announced sanctions against multiple U.S. personnel, and held an "Astana Process" summit with Russia and Turkey. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iran on July 19, participated in the Russia-Iran-Turkey summit, and held bilateral talks with Turkey President Recep Erdoğan. That Putin visited the region on Biden's heels certainly had a taste of rivalry, which to some extent offset the influences of Biden's trip.

Fifth, Biden's attempt to prevent greater Chinese influences in the Middle East will be an impossible mission. In the Middle East, not a single country, including Israel, is willing to find fault with China, not a single country accepts the U.S. rhetoric about China filling in a "vacuum" there. China has been proceeding with the Belt and Road projects in the region for years, which has benefited Arabian and Middle East countries tremendously. How can they dance to the U.S.' tune? The Saudi government has made it clear Saudi Arabia's relations with the U.S. would in no way affect its relations with China.