2022年2月12日，拜登政府出台首份印太战略报告。该报告出台之前，拜登政府曾展开广泛的国内外协调，如国会两党的协调、各部门协调以及与盟友和伙伴的协调。这反映了拜登政府对报告的高度重视，也是该份战略报告比预期更晚出台的原因之一。

相较于特朗普政府在2019年发布的64页印太战略报告，拜登政府的这份报告大幅缩减至19页，但历史脉络、主要目标与实施方案等关键内容均清晰呈现。报告首先回顾了美国参与印太地区事务的历史，分析了该地区的经济重要性与战略挑战，说明了美国继续加大对该地区投入的必要性与重要性。

其次，报告阐述了美国印太战略的五大支柱，也就是五大目标，包括：

自由开放

集体能力

共享繁荣

增进安全

建立韧性。

具体而言，其总体目标是维护印太地区的自由开放，这一点与美国传统的“门户开放”政策以及全球公域（如海洋、天空、网络等）开放相一致。其核心路径是推进集体行动，形成合力——“这一战略的核心重点是与该地区内外的盟友、合作伙伴和机构进行持续和创造性的合作”，主要措施涵盖经济、安全、外交等方面。

最后，报告提出未来12-24个月的行动方案，这也是对上述主要措施的具体化，包括：

1）向印太地区投入更多资源，如强化在东南亚和太平洋岛国的外交存在，以及增强该地区的海上执法力量等；

2）在2022年上半年发起“印太经济框架”；

3）强化军事威慑，包括尽快落实美英澳三边安全伙伴关系（AUKUS）；

4）支持东盟中心地位；

5）支持印度的地区领导地位，突出印度作为地区安全净提供者的新角色；

6）推动美日印澳“四边对话”机制（QUAD），将其打造成印太地区的首要集团；

7）拓展美日韩三国合作；

8）与盟友一道共同推进太平洋岛国开发；

9）支持印太地区良治与问责；

10）在印太地区构建可信、安全的数字基础设施网络等。

拜登政府印太战略报告具有如下特点：

一是目标更清晰，领域更全面，操作性较强。拜登政府对于美国印太战略目标的界定更为精细化，不仅强调“自由、开放”这一特朗普政府印太战略的核心目标，还增加了其他四项目标，尤其是突出了印太地区发展中国家关注的基础设施建设、气候变化等问题，因而更能引起域内相关国家的共鸣。从领域上来说，特朗普政府主要侧重于从安全层面强化美国在该地区的战略存在，但对经济层面、非传统安全层面的关注甚少。某种程度上说，特朗普政府的印太战略更像是美国的印太安全战略，而拜登政府的印太战略在议题与领域上则要丰富完备得多。从操作性上看，拜登执政一年的政策实践显示，这些行动方案已经或正在推进，特别是在联盟现代化与伙伴关系构建方面取得了较大进展，如美日韩、美日澳三边关系的提升，以及QUAD的升级、AUKUS的建立，等等。可见，拜登政府印太战略要比特朗普政府时期的印太战略更为高效。

二是拜登政府将印太地区的重要性提高到关乎地区与国际秩序形态的层次，并将中国的挑战视为最核心挑战。该文件指出：“中国将经济、外交、军事和技术力量结合起来，在印太建立势力范围，试图成为全球最具影响力的大国……我们在未来10年的共同努力，将决定中国能否成功改变使印太和全球受惠的规则和规范。”拜登政府印太战略虽提及气候变化、疫情防控等挑战，但主要还是着眼于应对中国挑战，尽管美方否认印太战略是专门针对中国的。该战略重申了拜登政府对华战略的基调，即与中国更有效地展开竞争，同时负责任地管理竞争，使其不至于引发冲突。在诸如气候变化、核不扩散等全球性问题上，美国积极寻求与中国的合作。

台湾问题是中美关系中最核心、最敏感的问题。拜登政府在这一问题上的政策表述依然如旧，如强调保持台湾海峡稳定和平，重申“‘一个中国’政策以及在《与台湾关系法》、‘三个联合公报’、‘六项保证’之下的长期承诺”等原则立场。然而，该报告在具体措施方面除了一以贯之地表示要增强台湾的自卫能力之外，还特别强调“美国将捍卫我们的利益，阻止对我们国家、盟友和伙伴的军事侵略，包括台湾海峡，并通过发展新的能力、作战概念、军事活动、国防工业计划和更有弹性的军力态势来促进地区安全”。这是否暗示美国有意将台湾海峡纳入其防卫圈？是否意味着在防卫台湾问题上的传统“战略模糊”政策正渐进转向？值得注意的是，这一政策立场与特朗普政府2020年初提前解密的印太战略框架中所表达的政策立场基本一致。特朗普政府在那份报告中宣称要“保卫第一岛链国家，包括台湾”。这是否说明美国两党政府在提升台湾防卫能力，甚至在协防台湾方面达成了某种默契或共识？这些问题值得认真研究与高度关注。

三是高度重视发挥联盟与伙伴关系作用，尤其是突出发挥美日印澳“四边对话”的功能，以及抬升印度的战略制衡作用。该报告并未提及巴基斯坦，一定程度上也是关照到印度的需求。拜登政府更为积极地促进欧洲盟友介入印太地区，意图打造印太地区-欧洲大西洋的更紧密联系。由于域内盟友与伙伴在地缘政治、经济、文化等多层面与中国有复杂联系，在诸多问题上难以有效发挥制衡中国的作用，通过引入欧洲盟友力量，美国可以在更广泛议题上获得对华施压的国际支持，同时令该地区本已错综复杂的局势更加复杂化，从而有助于美国构建“影响力均势”来塑造中国崛起的战略环境。

拜登政府印太战略的推进具有很大的外部依赖性。换言之，这项战略的实施不仅依托于美国的战略能力与意志，而且还仰赖于其盟友与伙伴的战略能力与意志。拜登反复强调加强国际合作、形成集体能力的重要性，但这种合作的有效性与持久性是存疑的：一方面与中国战略竞争并不是美国盟友和伙伴的优先任务；另一方面美国行政部门存在稳定性问题，如果再出现特朗普式的政府，那么国际合作就更加困难。

此外，拜登政府的可用资源有限，无论是经济层面的倡议，还是安全层面的构想，都体现出其战略目标与实施能力的不对称性。美国的国际战线太过广大，超出了其资源承受力，尽管拜登政府试图收缩，但恐难如愿。这种广泛的战线以及全球利益的存在，使得美国无法将有限资源大幅度转移到印太地区。印太地区是美国的重点关注，但并非唯一关注。正如一位美国高级官员在印太战略报告发布的背景介绍中所表示的：“本届政府意识到持续在该地区保持接触的重要性，也认识到美国无法享有在一时仅仅聚焦于一个地区或一个问题的奢侈” 。由是观之，拜登政府印太战略的前景具有显著的不确定性。

The Biden administration released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy report in early February, after extensive coordination with all stakeholders involved, including both parties in Congress, federal executive departments and the country's allies and partners. The full coordination shows that Biden attaches great importance to the document and partly explains why it came later than expected.

At just 19 pages, the document is much shorter and more condensed than the Trump version published in 2019, which had 64 pages. But it doesn't fall short of any elements regarding the U.S. engagement history, major goals and action plans in the region. It first looks back at the country's engagement in the Indo-Pacific, analyzes the economic significance and strategic challenges of the region and concludes that continuing to make big investments in the region is indispensable.

Then it outlines five primary objectives:

• Advance a free and open Indo-Pacific

• Build connections within and beyond the region

• Drive regional prosperity

• Bolster Indo-Pacific security

• Build regional resilience to transnational threats.

In general, the major goal of the strategy is to defend the freedom and openness of the Indo-Pacific, which is in line with the traditional U.S. open-door policy and open access to the global commons. It aims to expand sustained cooperation with allies and regional institutions in economy, security and diplomacy through collective efforts.

The document ends with an action plan to be implemented in the next 12 to 24 months. The 10 core lines are listed as follows:

1. Drive new resources to the Indo-Pacific, including opening new embassies and consulates in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and expand the U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands;

2. Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in early 2022;

3. Reinforce military deterrence, in particular through the AUKUS partnership;

4. Strengthen an empowered and unified ASEAN;

5. Support India's continued regional leadership and recognize India as a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean;

6. Deliver on the Quad and make it play a leading regional role;

7. Expand U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation;

8. Partner to build resilience in the Pacific islands;

9. Support good government and accountability;

10. Promote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure.

The strategy features clearer objectives and increased feasibility in more fields.

In addition to its emphasis on a “free and open Indo-Pacific” — the core of Trump's version — it adds four more objectives. With climate change and infrastructure involved, it will strike a chord with Indo-Pacific countries. In contrast, the Trump administration emphasized enhancing the strategic presence of the U.S. in the region but gave little notice to the region's economic concerns and non-traditional security threats.In terms of feasibility, the Biden administration has been pressing forward relevant regional plans for the past year or so, especially in the modernization of U.S. alliances and partnerships. Washington has promoted trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea, upgraded the Quad and launched AUKUS.

Moreover, with the release of the strategy, Biden gives more gravity to the Indo-Pacific, while reiterating that America sees the People's Republic of China as the core threat. It reads:“The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world's most influential power. … Our collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefited the Indo-Pacific and the world.”Though the document mentions challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, its eye is clearly on China, despite denials from the Biden administration. It reiterates the administration's China policy: engage in responsible competition and prevent a downward spiral to conflict. Washington seeks cooperation with Beijing on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and other global issues.

The Taiwan question has been the central and most sensitive conundrum in China-U.S. ties. The Biden administration remains consistent in its Taiwan policy in the document:“We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. … Our approach remains consistent with our One-China policy and our longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.”However, apart from supporting Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, the strategy goes further:“The United States will defend our interests, deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners — including across the Taiwan Strait — and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture.”Does this mean that the U.S. intends to include the Taiwan Strait in its national defense strategy? Or is the U.S. gradually veering away from its strategic ambiguity on Taiwan? Note that this position is in line with the declassified Indo-Pacific document released by the Trump administration in early 2020, which stated that island chain countries and regions, including Taiwan, should be safeguarded. To some degree it's an indication that Republicans and Democrats have consensus on defending Taiwan.

In addition, the strategy puts a premium on the role of alliances and partnerships, in particular the Quad. In a way, it also elevates India's role in regional strategic deterrence. The Biden administration is increasingly prompting America's European allies to engage in the Indo-Pacific, bringing their relationship closer.But many of its Indo-Pacific allies and partners have complex connections with China in geopolitics, economy and culture, so it will be hard for them to play an effective role in containing China. Bringing in its European allies, Washington can acquire international support to counter China, further complicating the already sophisticated situation in the region.

The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy relies heavily on the capacity and willingness of U.S. allies. Biden has repeatedly underscored the importance of international cooperation in collective efforts, but the effectiveness and sustainability of such cooperation is thrown into question. Furthermore, the Biden administration has few available resources to fulfill its objectives, despite working its way through a strategic contraction, as the country's omnipresence around the world impedes it from committing more resources to the Indo-Pacific. The region is a key focus of the U.S. but not the only one.

As a senior official put it during the background press call previewing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: “The administration recognizes the importance of sustained engagement in the region. It also recognizes that the United States doesn't have the luxury to only focus on one region or one problem at a time.”Hence, the prospects for Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy are highly uncertain.