2021年4月19日，欧盟理事会通过欧盟印太地区合作战略决议。该决议指出，欧盟在印太地区具有重大利益。欧盟重申对印太地区的兴趣和责任，显示世界经济的中心正在向印太地区转移。然而，该地区的地缘政治竞争也在激化，并给贸易、供应链、科技、政治和安全领域带来许多压力，这种压力不仅威胁地区的安全和稳定，也产生了溢出效应。

2019年以来，在欧盟几个主要国家中，法国、德国、荷兰相继制定了各自的印太战略文件。欧盟印太战略文件出台是预料中的结果，而中国无疑是欧盟制定这份文件的重要因素。这份欧版印太战略是对美国的战略追随，还是欧洲独立的战略考量？中国又应如何评估和应对？

“印太”作为区域概念包括太平洋和印度洋沿线地区，是由德国地理学家和地缘政治学家卡尔·豪斯霍费尔在上世纪20年代提出的，但直到近年才日渐纳入国际社会政策话语，并有逐步取代“亚太”概念的趋势。这自然与美国朝这一方向的一系列努力有关。美国的印太战略以安全为主导，有很明显的指向，其核心是在价值观旗帜下开展与地区国家的合作，制衡中国的崛起。美国对地区盟友和伙伴的选择标准是秉承基于“自由和开放的印太地区”的规则和价值观，强调的是“基于规则的地区秩序”。在价值观上，欧盟的印太文件与美国的印太战略是兼容的，然而欧盟文件中强调基于规则的国际秩序，这与美国的战略目标就有很大不同。也就是说，欧盟的印太战略更多是从促进欧盟作为全球行为体的能力出发来考虑问题的。

从最初的谨慎观望到自我定义为印太事务的参与者，欧盟对“印太”概念的接受也有一个逐步发展的过程。欧盟一直非常强调其作为规范性力量的作用，对美日印澳主导的印太战略和中国的“一带一路”倡议一直存在不同程度的担忧。随着中美在地区的竞争日趋激烈，欧盟认为，这不仅会削弱其发言权，甚至最终会危及它在印太地区的利益。此外欧盟认为，自己作为规范性力量的代表，可以在印太地区发挥独特作用，其中立的安全形象及与印太地区相关大国保持良好关系的优势，有助于为该地区日趋激烈的大国博弈带来稳定因素。

欧盟印太战略主要在欧盟整体及欧洲主要国家两个层面展开。欧盟层面主要规划自由贸易协定、首脑外交等一般性政策和执行机制；欧洲主要国家则通过外交对话、军事演习及港口互访等手段，将政策转化为实际执行力，以加强在印太地区的存在及影响力。

具体而言，欧盟主要通过以下途径构建欧盟版印太战略：

首先，以地区现有制度框架和双多边平台为依托谋求政治影响力。在现有印太地区多边合作机制中，欧盟是亚欧会议坚定的支持者，也是东盟地区论坛的支持方和南盟观察员，并与环印度洋地区合作联盟关系密切。这些多元化的沟通渠道和机制在欧盟与地区国家的交流合作中将发挥重要作用。在双边层面上，欧盟重视与印太地区有份量的地区国家——尤其是印度、日本、澳大利亚——开展密切的政策协调和互动。

第二，通过加强与重要区域协定的联系，如《跨太平洋伙伴关系全面和渐进协定》和《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》，来保证欧盟在贸易上的战略地位，维护印太地区现有多边贸易体系和开放的市场，创造公平竞争的环境。为促进贸易和投资自由，欧盟长期以来就与印太地区相关经济体进行贸易和投资协定谈判做了大量工作。欧盟已经完成与新加坡、越南、韩国等的自贸协定签署，与东盟、澳大利亚、新西兰的自贸协定谈判也在进行中，并力争同中国在《投资全面协定》上有更多进展。这些都有助于欧盟在印太经济格局中占据有利地位。

第三，在安全和防务领域深化合作，加强在印太地区的军事存在。在反恐、供应链安全、网络安全、军控以及航道安全方面，欧盟主要国家在该地区都有切身利益。法国是欧盟国家中唯一在印太地区拥有实质性军事战略部署的国家，在该地区共有七个海外领地，驻扎约7000名军事人员。因此，法国在防务方面有更强烈的需求，更倾向于与日印澳等印太地区国家建立有重点、有层次的防务合作。并且，欧盟已经占据印太军火市场相当大的份额，虽然目前军售以商业利益为主，尚未转化为对印太地区更大的军事影响力，但从长期看来，日益加剧的印太地区军备竞赛有可能促使欧盟调整武器出口策略。

第四，除了以上在多边、经济和防务领域的持续建设外，欧盟印太文件还列出了广泛的合作领域，包括互联互通、海洋治理、减灾、健康、数字经济、气候和生态保护、高等教育和科技、人权、促进两性平等，等等。总体来说，欧盟印太战略的内容和议题十分丰富，其目标全面而宏大，以长期接触为原则，与联合国可持续发展目标相一致，强调国际法和国际公约的重要性。同时，文件还涉及西印度洋地区的内容，也就是非洲东海岸国家，传统上欧洲与该地区国家的互动和联系也更为紧密。这些都是美国版印太战略所缺乏的。撇开价值观，欧盟文件更多谈及国际社会的功能，而在所列出的具体合作领域中，欧盟与中国的利益能找到许多契合点。

对政策制定者而言，概念是重要的，但概念下的具体内容更为关键。 “印太”作为一个日渐流行的政策概念，不同国家都会根据自身利益以及所面临的政策环境制定各自的印太战略。即使美印日澳的“四方对话”有更多制衡中国的因素，但各国的立场也有诸多不一致。因此，美国想用所谓“印太战略”来统一盟友的思想很难成功，而多元化的印太战略则会在一定程度上削弱美版印太战略的指向。

中国是地区经济的火车头，同时也是多边主义、国际合作的提倡者，不论是欧盟还是其他国家，仍会以实际且弹性的方式与中国开展各个领域的合作。对于各个国家相继出台的印太战略，我们需要认真解读不同版本，以平常心看待，并从中寻找与中方在责任和利益上的共同点。如果能更多地从“印太”地理和区域层面看待印太战略，而不仅仅把视野局限在安全和防务层面，那么对于消解美版印太战略的安全指向，深化具体的地区合作议程，发展建设性的地区伙伴关系，都具有十分积极的意义。

本文为国家社科基金重大项目《引导美欧国家参与“一带一路”建设对策和展望研究》（项目批准号18VDL008）阶段性成果。

On April 19, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which laid out significant interests of the EU in the region. This reaffirmation of European concern and responsibility demonstrates that the center of the world economy has already shifted to the Indo-Pacific, along with intensified geopolitical competition and great pressure in trade, supply chains, technology and politics. These will not only threaten regional security and stability but also lead to negative spillover effects.

In view of the successive India-Pacific strategic documents from France, Germany and the Netherlands since 2019, the introduction of EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific should come as no surprise. And China undoubtedly serves as an important factor in the whole picture. From here, two questions emerge: Is the European version of the Indo-Pacific strategy a follow-up to the United States or an independent strategic consideration? How should China evaluate it and respond?

Proposed by German officer and political geographer Karl Haushofer in the 1920s, the concept of the Indo-Pacific comprises areas along the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It has been adopted by the United States with new geopolitical and strategic meaning that replaces “Asia-Pacific,” which seems unsuited to its current strategic consideration: competition with China. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is tied to its own security and that of regional allies under the banner of values.The core idea is to counterbalance China by reinforcing alliances and strengthening cooperation — particularly with India, Japan and Australia — by invoking rules and values that underpin a free and open Indo-Pacific. This version emphasizes a rules-based regional order under U.S. leadership.On values the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy is compatible with the U.S. version, yet the EU has attached great importance to a “rules-based international order,” showing that the fundamental purpose is to promote Europe as a global actor. This varies greatly from the strategic goal of the United States in the region.

Moving from cautious onlooker to participant in Indo-Pacific affairs, the EU has undergone a gradual process of understanding and acceptance of the term Indo-Pacific. The EU has always highlighted its unique role as a normative power. In recent years it has expressed varying degrees of concern over the Indo-Pacific Strategy led by the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, as well as China's Belt and Road Initiative.As competition between China and the United States intensifies, the EU believes this will not only weaken its position in international affairs but will also eventually endanger its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. As a normative power it believes it has a unique role to play: The neutral image in security and the good relationships with relevant regional powers enable the EU to become an indispensable player in maintaining regional balance and stability.

The EU's Indo-Pacific strategy is laid out in two main parts: overall planning and the specific policies of major countries. General policy and implementation mechanisms, such as free trade agreements and summit diplomacy, are brought under a plan at the EU level. Member states are expected to demonstrate executive ability through diplomatic dialogue, military exercises and port visits, whereby the EU may achieve a heightened presence and greater influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Specifically, this version of the Indo-Pacific strategy can be constructed in the following ways:

The first relies on current regional institutional frameworks and bilateral multilateral platforms, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum and South Asian Association Regional Cooperation, in the interest of political influence. At present, the EU is an observer of SAARC and a staunch supporter of ASEM and ARF. Meanwhile, it maintains a close relationship with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation.These diverse channels of communication and mechanisms are playing an increasingly important role in exchanges and cooperation between Brussels and relevant countries. At the bilateral level, Europe places high value on close policy coordination and interaction with major Indo-Pacific countries, especially China, India, Japan and Australia.

The second advances its presence in key regional agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, to ensure a strategic position in trade, to preserve and improve the existing multilateral system of trade and open markets and to create a level playing field. The EU has long devoted a tremendous amount of effort to conducting FTA negotiations with concerned economies.In concrete terms, the signing of free trade agreements with Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea and other countries has been completed as negotiations with ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand were underway. Brussel also seeks profound achievements in the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, or CAI, which will contribute to a favorable economic position for Europeans in the region.

The third, deepens cooperation in the field of security, to strengthen the military presence in thee Indo-Pacific area on account of European countries' vital interests in counterterrorism, cybersecurity, arms control and the eesecurity of maritime and aviation routes. Considering the fact that France is the only EU country that has deployed substantial military in this region, it has a stronger demand for defense and it is more inclined to establish defense cooperation system along with Japan, India, Australia and other countries. Moreover, the EU has already occupied a significant share of the Indo-Pacific weapons market though commercial arms sales. The accelerating arms race in the region may boost arms exports of the EU and increase its impact on security and defense.

Fourth, the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy lists a wide range of areas of cooperation, including connectivity, ocean governance, research, technology, health, climate change, disaster reduction and ecological protection, apart from the above-mentioned constructions in the fields of multilateral cooperation, economy and defense. In general, this strategy covers substantial content and topics that indicate the EU has ambitious, comprehensive goals in the Indo-Pacific region.If the issue of values is set aside, there has been a convergence between the EU and China in areas of cooperation and multilateralism. Different from the American version, the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy follows the principle of long-term engagement that is consistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, while emphasizing the importance of international law and conventions. Moreover, it covers the western Indian Ocean region — the East Coast of Africa — to which Europe has traditionally been closely linked.

For policymakers, the content of a concept is more crucial for analysis than the concept itself. Under the banner of an Indo-Pacific strategy, different countries set their own agendas for the region according to their interests and policy environment. Therefore, it is quite a challenging task for the U.S. to unify the policies and behaviors of its allies, even if they share a similar values framework. While balancing China is an important strategic goal of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the four constituent countries have differed at the concrete level on how, exactly, to interact with it. The Indo-Pacific strategies in European countries also vary in outlook. The pluralistic reality of the various strategies has blurred the strategic direction and weakened the influence of the U.S. version.

Regarding multiple Indo-Pacific strategies, it is necessary to treat them with a calm mind, carefully study and analyze the approach of different countries and find common ground in responsibilities and interests regarding China. To conclude, if strategy in the Indo-Pacific could be evaluated from the level of regional development rather than the narrow focus of security, it would be of positive significance to deepen the regional cooperation agenda and develop constructive regional partnerships.