The Pacific Dialogue is a new way to virtually connect thought leaders across the Pacific Ocean to continue frank and direct conversations during this difficult time. As Covid-19 continues to fracture the international community, concern is mounting that China and the U.S. are on a path of dangerous confrontation. The following are highlights of episode two of The Pacific Dialogue, between veteran Chinese diplomat Ambassador He Yafei and long-time American scholar on China Professor David Lampton. The dialogue took place on June 25, 2020, and was moderated by China-US Focus Editor-at-Large James Chau. For the full conversation, please visit www.chinausfocus.com/videos.
James Chau:
Ambassador He Yafei and Professor David Lampton, thanks very much for joining us. You know the world is complex and nuanced and challenged, all at the same time. We've got a global pandemic. We have mass protests over in the United States. We have a lot of uncertainty, and in changing settings as well. And within all that, a summit took place in Hawaii between China and the United States — between Mike Pompeo and Yang Jiechi. Let's start with Ambassador He Yafei. Tell us, why did this summit take place? And what do you take from it?
He Yafei:
There is no public disclosure of what had been discussed in the meeting in Hawaii. But I believe talking is always better than not talking. So, my guess is that there was extensive exchange of views on very critical issues concerning both countries. They may have agreed on something or disagreed on something else—we don't know. But I can see a beginning of good momentum in talking. You mentioned COVID-19, I think this is only an accelerator. It [COVID-19] exposed some of the deeper frictions in the relationship. For one thing, I think it's mostly the relationship going in a bad direction, because the balance of power has changed. This is, you know— Professor Lampton is an expert— from a realist point of view on international relations. When the balance of power changes, relations between major powers – if one is rising, the other is the incumbent power – the frictions will increase. It's a test for both countries, but it's inevitable.
James Chau:
Professor Lampton, what do you think? Do you share that same take?
David Lampton:
Well, I do think that friction as power relationships change is inevitable. But I don't think it's inevitable how each side will manage that shift. And secondly, I don't think it's always obvious what direction the power relationship is going. In other words, you could have economic problems in the short run, but have a very innovative and dynamic society for the long run. And so, judging exactly the state of the balance of power between countries is as much an art as it is a science. And I think, furthermore, on how we manage this changing balance of power, is that there are multiple ways to handle it. And right now, I don't think either side is handling it very well.
But I agree with Ambassador He that, overall, the momentum (I think was the word he used) is going in a negative direction, which brings me to the Hawaii summit. And I'll speak more about my understanding of the American side than the Chinese side. But frankly, I don't think it was very successful. I don't think it's solved any problems, frankly. I think at least – I don't speak for the U.S. government, I don't consult with the U.S. government at the current time, so I'm speaking my own mind ¬– but I think, frankly speaking, President Trump is running for re-election. And he does not want one of the few accomplishments he has in foreign policy – the phase one trade deal – to be seen as unsuccessful. And on the other hand, he's built his political brand on being tough on China. So, I think he wanted to use the summit for what I would call “tactical” reasons; to look tough on China, but not destroy his signature achievement, namely the trade deal. So, I think it served mostly domestic political purposes. But it did not fundamentally address the issues between China and the United States. And just to wind up, I do think, yes, friction between our two countries is inevitable. We've had that friction for the last 40 years. And of course, in the Cold War, we had big frictions, but I would say the last 40 years prior to the Trump administration, and frankly, in the time prior to President Xi, we were much more successful in managing difficulties than we are now.
James Chau:
Ambassador He, what was the dangling fruit for China? Why would they want to go for this summit?
He Yafei:
You cannot obviously expect that the first round of talks in so long to be so productive. People say, "wow, there were so many frictions and some are very deep and dangerous." So, for me, I would turn, rather, to see whether we can identify some of the major frictions between our two countries now, and how, as Professor Lampton said, "how can we manage it better?" I think the first one, in the economic field, is decoupling. Decoupling was pushed, again, on the U.S. side, by some people out of geopolitical considerations, etc. I don't want to overstate that, but decoupling is happening, especially in the high-tech area. But personally, I do not believe a full decoupling will soon become a reality. The second thing is [about] ideological conflict and friction. We all know China and the U.S. are different countries. They have different political systems, believe in different ideologies. But now, this ideological conflict and friction comes to the fore. You know, China has been labeled as whatever, short of an evil country. Almost every bad name has been attached to China. And China, of course, is not happy, and you have people reacting to that and saying things about the United States. So, decoupling and ideological conflict, or ideological war, are most dangerous because it will only deepen the mistrust.
James Chau:
If you look at the world as a whole, mistrust (as Ambassador He says just there) in our governments, and in our institutions, has become something of the norm rather than the exception. So, should we be alarmed by what we are seeing?
David Lampton:
Well, I do think there are global trends, and then there are the trends in our bilateral relationship. And I think there is a global trend towards more populist leaders around the world. [There are] people who try to build strongman political positions by speaking to the grievances of those left behind by globalization. I firmly believe that globalization 1.0 improves the livelihood of people around the world, probably 85-90% of people are better off. But in each of our societies, there are people who have been left behind, or certainly people who think they were entitled to do better, and they have grievances. And now around the world, we have leaders in each of our societies that play to these grievances of various sorts, including a rising power such as China that believes the United States is not moving rapidly enough to make room for China in the international system, or worse yet, even desires to slow China's growth and development down. So, I think these are the global trends that are also reflected in US-China relations.
The reality is, that for about three-plus years, we've virtually had no, what we call, systemic, system-wide dialogues on an ongoing basis. And now we don't have those avenues of dialogue and I think we need to develop them. So, that'd be the first thing. Secondly, I think this issue of decoupling… Quite frankly, yes, there are a lot of Americans who incidentally probably don't know much about economics, that talk about decoupling and, certainly, the COVID pandemic raises the issue of reliance on other countries to provide commodities, such as antibiotics or personal protective equipment. And also, as Ambassador He said, in the security area, high technology has become sensitive. But the point I want to make is, it's not just the United States making this point. Well, you hear that in China too, because as we become less trustful of each other, we're each less willing to rely on the other for essential inputs into our economic or strategic systems. So, I would say that on decoupling is that there are people thinking this way in both societies. I think we need to get back to what I might call globalization 2.0. And that is, don't throw out comparative advantage. Don't throw out the idea that we each need each other. But let's make globalization more friendly to that 20% of the populations in our countries or around the world.
James Chau:
Is it possible to manage this talk of a broader decoupling? Is it possible to forestall that decline?
He Yafei:
[I have] several points to make: One, as Professor Lampton mentioned, there have been fewer talks in the last three and a half years. I also noticed that there is not too much talk – systemic talks – between the two major powers. We need to restore that. But my concern is that there was less enthusiasm on the part of the United States to engage in systemic talk with China. That's why I'm saying the Hawaii talks could be a beginning. We hope it will be the beginning of a systemic talk between the two major powers. Secondly globalization 2.0 is absolutely necessary. Lastly, concerning the relocation of the global supply chain, I do not believe self-reliance is a negation of globalization. China is in full support of further globalization. Well, China's progress so far is a product of globalization, not the other way around
James Chau:
Are there ways where halfway points can be established?
David Lampton:
Our politicians have to recalibrate the distribution of benefits within their societies. But they also have to try to level the playing field that wasn't so level before, for good reason. Not all of the parties were, you know, economically equal. So, I think it's a very difficult task. And I would say one other thing. It's not just globalization and economic circumstances that have changed, both within and between societies. It is basically our strategic posture. For the preceding 40 years, the United States and China basically tried to reassure each other. Sometimes we didn't succeed at that. Sometimes we failed. Sometimes we had crises. But the overall trend was to convince each other that, as we each got stronger, we did not represent a threat to each other. I think that basic effort has broken down. And what we are now both doing strategically is organizing ourselves for deterrence. And what deterrence means is to threaten the other, so they don't do what you don't want them to do. That's the core. And as long as you build a relationship on threats, it's going to be very difficult to reassure.
He Yafei:
I have a few points in response to what the professor said about the fairness between countries, among countries. I agree we need to have a level playing field when we compete, economically or otherwise, but level playing fields have to be two-way traffic. Secondly, I also agree with you that strategic assessment, strategic judgment, is extremely important. And in the past, personally, I led the negotiation on the part of China during Obama's visit in 2009 to China. We issued the joint communique and we've managed to agree on many things and managed to agree to disagree on a few things. But the important thing is that we do agree that China and the U.S. should strive to build a forward-looking, more comprehensive partnership. Unfortunately, that fell by the wayside when President Trump took office. We need to restore and seriously engage in strategic dialogue to make sure there will be no, you know, “either you die or I die,” that kind of thing, in the strategic competition. Competition is not scary. It's not the worst possible thing. The worst possible thing is to try to put the other side into the corner.
James Chau:
What do you think can be done to utilize the next couple of months? Especially since we're in the middle of a humanitarian crisis right now, in every part of the world.
David Lampton:
Well, I think there are a number of things. First of all, we started with the Hawaii summit. So, I would say, start talking. And I would say, start talking a lot – a dialogue among multiple sectors. And one of the things that strike me is that it's not only top-level dialogue that has pretty [much] been ended, partly because nobody can travel in this pandemic. But I think, you know, our people, the people - our nongovernmental organization to nongovernmental organization relationships have really frayed and certainly, and the NGO law in China was part of that, the pandemic is part of that, bad bilateral relations are part of that. But I would say, as soon as possible, restart as many dialogues between as many bureaucracies, companies, and NGOs as possible.
Secondly, I think quite frankly the biggest strategic mistake China has made, or among the biggest, is to somehow lose the underlying support of the American business community. For 40 years, American business looked to the future with optimism. It always had its problems. It always was unhappy about something. But in the end, American business always said, “better to have good relations with China than not.” Well, American business isn't saying that anymore. And so China's got to turn that around.
He Yafei:
One, I agree totally with Professor Lampton that we need to talk. We need to have systemic talk, not only government-to-government, both at federal and state levels, but also, people-to-people exchanges. Once COVID-19 dies away, we need to increase people-to-people exchanges, and we especially need to involve American business in our talks.
Secondly, both domestically, China and the United States need to take care of its groups of people who are vulnerable, who are angry, who are not happy with the distribution of gains, economic gains, whether by globalization or otherwise. Governments have responsibilities for their own people. Internationally, I've been advocating the view for some time now, that the world will not be a happy one, that the global economy will not grow anymore if we have a large number of developing countries being left behind. That fairness needs to be addressed. I think the U.S. and China have a common responsibility. We need to unite. We need to work together. We have some successful experience in working in Africa to combat infectious diseases – that was before COVID-19 –The U.S. and China working together to help African countries to build up a public health response system.
James Chau:
Well, as the moderator, it's been fascinating hearing you both engage on some of the most critical aspects of what I believe to be the most critical bilateral relationship in the world today. Ambassador He Yafei and Professor David Lampton, thank you for joining the Pacific Dialogue. We hope to welcome you back again one day.