在美中日益升级的大国冲突背景下，蓬佩奥与杨洁篪的夏威夷会谈是一个令人欢迎的缓和迹象。它表明双方对继续对话仍保持开放心态，知道美中对抗给全球带来日益加深的担忧，并意识到两国领导人面临的巨大国内压力。然而，这一转瞬即逝的友好时刻或许并非意味着紧张态势有所缓和，而更多是给双方提供一个摸索彼此底线的机会，试探对方在诸多存在分歧的领域有多少愿意让步的空间。

国务卿蓬佩奥与中共中央外事工作委员会办公室主任杨洁篪的闭门会谈长达七个小时，在位于火奴鲁鲁的希卡姆空军基地举行。这次会谈出人意料，双方对细节也闭口不谈。一系列热点问题——从香港充满争议的《国家安全法》和台湾爆点，到南海和贸易与技术争端——已经持续发酵数月，所带来的紧张或许令双方不堪重负。平壤炸毁位于开城的朝韩联络办事处也许是紧迫原因之一。前国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿出书指责唐纳德·特朗普总统的外交政策也令局势火上浇油，尤其这也许影响特朗普今年11月的重新当选。

在会谈后发布的简要声明中，国务卿蓬佩奥“强调了美国的重要利益以及两国在商业、安全和外交互动中实施完全对等原则的必要性”。这位前中情局长同时“强调了为抗击眼下的新冠疫情并防止疫情将来再次暴发而完全透明及信息共享的必要性”。声明反映了两个大国在一系列议题上的分歧，以及美国对于中国控制疫情扩散不力的看法。

对于美国而言，蓬佩奥的一条推文或许更能说明情况：让中国遵守今年1月达成的“第一阶段”贸易协定的承诺至关重要。特朗普总统似乎也抱有相似观点，虽然嘴上说“脱钩”依然是一个政策选项，但总统本人似乎更倾向于推动双方达成协议。北京承诺购买2000亿美元的美国产品并进一步开放中国市场或许能帮助重振遭疫情重创的经济。这也将证明他为贸易谈判付出政治资本是值得的，同时为达成第二阶段协议铺平道路。随着大选临近，这些成果将派上用场。作为扭转贸易赤字、遏制不当行为和更好保护美国知识产权在中国不受侵犯的回报，特朗普总统或许会帮助北京解决近期的一些问题。例如5月底，他主动提出为中国和印度的边境争端进行斡旋，2017年他曾同样在中国与其东南亚邻国间就南海问题进行调停。美国还急于让中国加入美国与俄罗斯的核武器谈判，中国和美国也许还会就如何回应朝鲜近期的行为展开合作。

对于中国而言，派出一位经验丰富的美国通而非外交部长——这位外交部长因据称容忍并维护好战的外交手段而遭到抨击——意味着，北京想寻求实质性结果而非表面文章。美国国务院的声明对新疆、香港、台湾和南海问题只字未提，这或许被解读为向北京作出让步，虽然这些议题一直是此前美国国务院声明的主题。中国外交部发言人赵立坚支持这一观点，称杨洁篪阐明了中方在台湾、香港和新疆问题上的立场，即这些问题都属于中国内政。中国外交部发布的简短声明也对会谈细节语焉不详，仅将这次会谈形容为“建设性的”对话，称这是让两国阐明各自立场的机会。声明同时表示，“双方同意采取行动，认真落实两国元首达成的共识”——这很可能是指两国此前达成的第一阶段贸易协议

然而，美国国内公众和两党对中国的反感与日俱增，中国国内也出现越来越多针对美国和西方批评的“战狼”心态，这都制约了华盛顿和北京的转圜空间。美国国会希望限制总统的外交权限，这或许基于特朗普的不可预测、交易主义以及担心其外交策略侵蚀美国的全球地位。通过出台针对中国的制裁法案，美国立法机构希望借此制约总统。面对一个不仅被日益视为竞争对手，而且被视为威胁的国家，没有哪位总统候选人愿意表现软弱。因此，特朗普政府在处理与北京的关系时必须谨慎行事。故在蓬佩奥与杨洁篪于夏威夷进行会谈的同一天，特朗普签署了《维吾尔人权政策法案》。此举与特朗普去年11月签署《香港人权与民主法案》如出一辙，当时中美两国围绕达成“第一阶段”贸易协定的谈判正在进行中。11月初，中美双方“原则上”达成共识，并探讨了彼此分阶段降低关税的可能性。即便如此，白宫仍在反击国会限制总统外交权限的努力。所以，特朗普在两份法案上签字的条件就是（很可能也是在随后与中国相关法案上签字的条件），这些法案无论如何都不能限制总统依照宪法从事外交活动。对某些条款，如干涉总统处理外交关系的制裁要求，应被视为建议而非强制性的。

但是，虽然这种谈判-制裁的手段有可能提振特朗普在美国国内外的支持率，但它却让习近平在美国压力面前显得胆小软弱。中国政府的管理结构令习近平同样无法免于国内压力。事实上，随着疫情威胁到中共两个百年计划之一——到明年实现“小康社会”，我们可以想象北京最高领导层面临的压力。事实上，在外交政策议题上表现强硬是最起码的，尤其是在与北京核心利益息息相关的香港和台湾问题上。

虽然夏威夷会谈未令美中关系重启，但它的确为美中两国提供了一个围绕影响双边关系的紧迫议题表明自身基本立场的平台。了解谈判的底线和空间有可能对未来的战略或特定议题对话大有助益。

The Pompeo-Yang meeting in Hawaii was a welcome respite in an otherwise escalating great power rancor between the United States and China. It showed that both sides remain open to dialogue, cognizant of growing global concern about their rivalry and aware of the intense domestic pressures confronting their leaderships. However, the fleeting aloha moment may not be meant to dial down tensions, but rather a chance to probe one another's red lines and find out how much leeway each power is willing to concede on the myriad of issues on which they disagree.

The meeting between Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Director of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China's Central Committee Yang Jiechi was a seven-hour closed-door meeting at Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu. The summit was unexpected and both sides were tight-lipped on details. The cumulative weight of hot-button issues – from Hong Kong's controversial national security law and flashpoints over Taiwan, to the South China Sea and wrangling over trade and technology – had built for months, and may have proved too much tension to bear. Pyongyang's blasting of the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong may have also provided cause for urgency. A damning indictment of President Donald Trump's foreign policy by his former National Security Adviser John Bolton provided some context as well, especially as it may impact Trump's re-election bid this November.

In the brief post-event readout, Secretary Pompeo “stressed important American interests and the need for fully-reciprocal dealings between the two nations across commercial, security, and diplomatic interactions.” The former CIA chief also “stressed the need for full transparency and information sharing to combat the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and prevent future outbreaks.” The statement reflects differences between the two powers in a broad range of issues and resonates U.S. views regarding China's mishandling of the contagion.

For the U.S., a tweet from Pompeo may be indicative: getting China to fulfill its commitment under the “Phase One” trade agreement reached last January was key. President Trump seems similarly inclined; while saying that decoupling remains a policy option, President Trump seems more likely to push for a deal. Beijing's pledge to buy $200 billion worth of American goods and offer greater access to the Chinese market may help revive an economy battered by the pandemic. It will also vindicate the political capital he expended for the talks and set the stage for a second phase. These gains would come in handy as elections draw near. In return for correcting the trade imbalance, curbing malfeasance and securing better protection of US intellectual property in China, President Trump may extend a hand in resolving Beijing's recent reverses. In late May, for instance, he offered to mediate between China and India over their border spat, echoing a similar move he made in 2017 for China and its Southeast Asian neighbors over the South China Sea. The U.S. is also keen to bring China into its joint nuclear arms talks with Russia, while both China and the US may forge cooperation to respond to North Korea's recent action.

For China, sending a seasoned American hand instead of its Foreign Minister – who drew some flak for reportedly condoning and defending a bellicose brand of diplomacy – suggests that Beijing is after substance over optics. The State Department readout lacked any mention of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea – a fact that may be read as a concession to Beijing, although these issues have been the subject of past separate Department statements. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian buttressed this view by saying that Yang expounded on China's positions towards Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang which were deemed as internal affairs. The short statement from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly lacked specifics; it described the exchange as “constructive,” and said it was an opportunity for both countries to express their respective positions. It also said that “the two sides agreed to take actions to earnestly implement the consensus reached by the two heads of state” – a possible reference to the initial trade pact.

However, America has seen mounting public and bipartisan antipathy against China, and China has witnessed rising “Wolf Warrior” sentiment towards U.S. and Western criticisms, constraining movement for both Washington and Beijing. Congress wants to clip the executive's diplomatic latitude, probably on account of Trump's unpredictability, transactionalism, and worries that his foreign policy gambits may erode America's global standing. By lining up bills aimed at imposing sanctions on China, the legislative branch hopes to tie the hands of the President. No candidate wants to appear soft towards a country increasingly portrayed not only as a competitor, but as a threat; thus, the Trump administration has to walk a tightrope as it deals with Beijing. Hence, on the same day Pompeo and Yang met in Hawaii, Trump signed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. The move evoked a similar chord when Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act last November while trade negotiations leading to the Phase One deal was underway. Earlier that month, both sides reached an agreement “in principle” and discussed rolling back tariffs in one another's goods in stages. That said, the White House is also pushing back on Congress' efforts to limit its diplomatic elbowroom. Hence, caveats on Trump's signature on the two laws (and likely on succeeding China-related bills) were made, saying that they should in no way stifle the executive's constitutional exercise of diplomacy. To the extent that certain provisions like sanctions requirements interfere with the President's conduct of foreign relations, they would be treated as advisory and not mandatory.

But while this negotiate-and-sanction approach may improve Trump's standing at home and abroad, it makes it difficult for President Xi Jinping not to appear meek in the face of American pressure. Variance in their form of government does not make Xi any less immune to domestic forces. In fact, with the pandemic threatening one of the two chief centenary goals of the CCP – to attain a “moderately prosperous society” by next year – one can expect stress to build up on Beijing's top leadership. In fact, the appearance of assertiveness on foreign policy issues – especially on Hong Kong and Taiwan, where they intersect with Beijing's core interests – is a minimum expectation.

While the Hawaii summit was not a reset, it did provide the U.S. and China a venue to outline their basic positions on pressing issues that affect their bilateral ties. Knowing the floor and room for discussion may go a long way in holding future strategic or issue-specific dialogues.