习近平同朝鲜劳动党委员长、国务委员会委员长金正恩举行会谈

时隔14年，中国最高领导人再次踏上朝鲜的土地。

2019年6月20至21日，应朝鲜劳动党委员长、国务委员会委员长金正恩邀请，中共中央总书记、国家主席习近平对朝鲜进行国事访问。

这次访问是习近平对金正恩2018年三次、2019年一次访华的回访。金正恩接任朝鲜党和国家最高领导职务以来，已四次来华与习近平会晤，多次向习近平发出访朝邀请，中方也派出栗战书、王毅、宋涛等高官分别利用不同时机访朝。今年是中朝建交70周年，也是中华人民共和国成立70周年，两党两国关系已做足铺垫，习近平访朝时机成熟。

习近平与金正恩在中国的四次会晤主要是围绕两个议程进行。一个是挽救因朝核问题和治国理念差异而陷入低谷的中朝关系，修复相互地缘政治依托。另一个是就朝鲜“新战略路线”（把核导战略和经济发展战略“并进”的路线调整为集中精力发展经济的路线）进行协调。这种协调有效缓冲了朝鲜在空前严厉国际制裁下深陷的人道困境，也在2018年6月和2019年2月两次朝美首脑会晤之前助推朝方的“分阶段、同步行动”思路和“双暂停”（朝方暂停核和远程导弹试验，美方暂停大规模联合军演）原则走向明晰。

习近平访朝完成了中朝双方共同努力把彼此关系拉回到特殊邻邦状态的进程。此访设定了“共同擘画中朝关系美好未来，共同开启中朝友谊崭新篇章”的主题。朝方极尽其礼，25万民众涌上街头欢迎，在锦绣山太阳宫广场的致敬活动史无前例，10万人团体操表演盛况空前，凸显了对华关系在朝对外关系中的优先性和中朝关系的独特性。习近平则于启程前在《劳动新闻》等朝鲜主要媒体发文，确认中朝是“好同志、好邻居”，中方坚持中朝友好合作，支持朝新战略路线。

访问期间，习近平进一步阐明中方对中朝关系的基本认识：坚持共产党领导的社会主义国家是中朝关系的本质属性；共同的理想信念和奋斗目标是中朝关系的前进动力；最高领导人的友谊传承和战略引领是中朝关系的最大优势；地缘相亲和文缘相通是中朝关系的牢固纽带。更明确了中国对朝政策的“三个坚定支持”：无论国际形势如何变化，都坚定支持朝鲜社会主义事业，坚定支持朝方实施新战略路线，坚定支持朝方为政治解决半岛问题、实现半岛长治久安所做的努力。可以说，这一定调是在中朝两国内外政策调整和相互频密接触过程中，以及中国外部环境深刻变化的背景下逐步形成的，反映出浓烈的“命运共同体”意识，结束了中国国内在对朝关系取向问题上持续多年的争议和迟疑，表明在习近平6月访俄正式宣告中俄战略协作伙伴关系进入“新时代”后不久，中朝构建“命运共同体”的彼此关系“新时代”也正式开启，中国对外战略加强亚欧大陆布局的调整提速进行。

习近平访朝的主要议题当然包括朝鲜半岛局势。作为半岛长治久安的重要前提条件，半岛无核化进程目前受阻，症结还是在朝美之间。今年2月朝美首脑在河内的会晤功败垂成，主因在于朝方“分阶段、同步行动”原则与美方“一揽子弃核”原则差距太大，难以调和，同时也是因为双方对对方为“政治解决朝核问题”做出让步的预期过于乐观，导致谈判节奏紊乱。河内会晤后，朝美并未放弃接触，双方仍然需要一个协议。6月11日，美国总统特朗普证实他再次收到金正恩来信，不排除同金举行第三次会晤。6月23日，朝中社受权宣布，金正恩收到特朗普的复信，对信中包含良好的内容表示满意，“将慎重考虑有趣的内容”。

“有趣的内容”是什么，外界尚不得而知，大抵应是美方以更有形的保证换取朝方实质弃核的具体建议。由于朝美互信缺失，且朝方还在调整谈判团队，朝美之间全面重启谈判并促成领导人再次会晤恐怕还要拖上一段时间。但随着2020年美国大选选战的升温和中美关系的变化，特朗普政府对达成协议的需要将会重新上升，对自身谈判策略的反思也已开始，朝美和解的前景仍是开放性的。

当前朝鲜半岛种种现象无法忽略的另一背景是中美战略竞争表面化。外界有种判断认为，中方为疏缓美方压力，有可能对朝施压，不仅帮助特朗普把朝鲜拉回谈判桌，更会在促朝弃核方面寻求进展。这种判断不符合中朝两国的政治逻辑。能够趋使中国强行介入朝核形势的只有自身利益的攸关性，无论中美关系走势如何，促使朝鲜合理处置其核导计划和推动半岛局势缓和都是中方工作的基本方向。对朝鲜而言，直接与美国谈判做交易是既定路径，其内心不会认同“通向华盛顿的路必须经过北京”。6月20日，为纪念金正日著作《在革命和建设中坚持主体性和民族性》发表22周年，朝鲜《劳动新闻》刊登署名文章，大谈主体性和民族性是“国家和民族的生命”。

习近平访朝做了继续推动对话进程的工作，鼓励朝鲜继续与美国沟通和保持“暂停”不可能不在其中。习近平对金正恩说，国际社会普遍希望朝美谈下去并谈出成果，中方支持推进半岛问题政治解决进程，为解决问题积累和创造条件。金正恩回应，过去一年多来，朝方为避免局势紧张、管控半岛局势，采取了许多积极举措，但没有得到有关方的积极回应，这是朝方不愿看到的；朝方愿保持耐心，同时希望有关方同朝方相向而行，探索符合各自合理关切的解决方案，推动半岛问题相关对话进程取得成果。这番对话理性而平和，说明中方仍努力在恢复发展对朝关系和促使朝鲜坚持无核化方向之间保持平衡，不会因为加强对朝关系和对冲美国战略压力的需要而改变坚持半岛无核化政策的底线。同时也表明，朝鲜坚持把无核化谈判的重心放在朝美双边渠道，只要美国对朝鲜的安全威胁不消除，朝方就无法在涉及半岛未来的一系列规划上放开手脚。

习近平利用访朝推动中国在朝核问题政治解决进程中发挥更直接的作用。他在出访前发表的文章中指出，“中方愿意和朝鲜同志携手努力，共谋实现地区长治久安的大计”。在与金正恩的会晤中他强调，“中方愿为朝方解决自身合理安全和发展关切提供力所能及的帮助，愿同朝方及有关各方加强协调和配合，为实现半岛无核化和地区长治久安发挥积极建设性作用”。从这两句关键性的表述可以看出，一揽子和平解决半岛问题的“中国方案”或“中国路线图”已在路上，其要义大体是：以朝鲜可核查、可验证、分阶段弃核为前提，大国共同向朝鲜提供不超出自身能力的安全保障和经济发展援助。总之，坚持无核化方向，在无核化进程中一揽子构建半岛和平机制，大国共同担保朝鲜的合理安全与发展关切，是习近平与金正恩第五次会晤围绕半岛局势传递出来的核心信息。未来这一蓝图如获实现，中国向朝鲜提供的安全保障有望在军事安全合作、核安全保证、核材料拆卸等方面得到体现。今年4月普京在符拉迪沃斯托克与金正恩会晤，俄方展现的也是这样的姿态。

什么是朝鲜的“合理安全和发展关切”？从长期的六方会谈进程和过去两年朝方与有关各方沟通的情况看，就是终结半岛战争状态，朝美签署互不侵犯条约，并相互给予外交承认，从根本上解决朝鲜政权的合法性和续存问题，以利朝鲜集中精力发展经济、改善民生、改良体制。相对于“合理安全和发展关切”，是“不合理的安全和发展关切”。朝鲜如置周边国家安全与利益于不顾，执意继续发展核导能力，在国际核不扩散体制中谋求与有核国同等的地位，甚至企图以核讹诈为手段获得安全利益，通过核导扩散行为赚取外汇，显然就不属于“合理的安全和发展关切”。

在即将到来的G20大阪峰会期间，习近平将与特朗普举行会晤，通报访朝情况并与美方就朝核问题解决方案做进一步沟通肯定是议题之一。之后，相信各方围绕朝鲜半岛和平与安全问题的接触将会提速，第三次朝美会晤更加可期，半岛持久和平和东北亚次区域合作之门缓缓开启的势头将重新得到加强。

习近平同朝鲜劳动党委员长、国务委员会委员长金正恩举行会谈

It has been 14 years since the last time a Chinese head of state visited the DPRK.

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, invited Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese President, to make a state visit to the DPRK from June 20 to 21, 2019.

This was Xi's return trip after Kim's previous four visits to China, three in 2018 and one in 2019 since Kim assumed the top leadership of the WPK and the country. Kim has sent multiple invitations to Xi, while China has also delegated top officials including Li Zhanshu, Wang Yi, and Song Tao to visit the DPRK on different occasions. This year celebrates the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The two sides have come a long way in terms of the relationship between both Parties and countries, laying a sound foundation for Xi's visit to the DPRK.

As the top leader of the DPRK, Kim's past visits to China centered on two agendas: first, to remedy the nose-diving China-DPRK relationship that is shadowed by the nuclear issue and the two countries' differing development paths, in order to secure North Korea's most important source of geopolitical support; second, to discuss with China the DPRK's “new strategic line”, which is shifting away from its previous approach of pursuing nuclear missiles alongside economic growth, towards a new model: a commitment to put economic growth first. Talks with Xi allowed for an exchange of views on DPRK-US negotiations and a chance to win China's support for North Korea's prioritization of economic development. These efforts at coordination effectively alleviated the DPRK's humanitarian predicament brought on by the strictest international sanctions ever. More importantly, they played a key role in preparing the DPRK for talks with the US in June 2018 and February 2019 respectively, so that North Korea could gradually put forward proposals for “phased and synchronized” approach and “suspension for suspension” principle, calling for the suspension of nuclear and long-range missile activities by the DPRK and the suspension of massive military exercises by the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Xi's visit to the DPRK elevated the joint attempt to bring back the special-neighbor relationship to the highest level. Under the theme of “Jointly Blueprinting a Bright Future of the Bilateral Relationship and Opening a New Chapter of the China-DPRK Friendship,” North Korea offered its best welcome including a crowd of 250,000 people, an unprecedent salute at the square of Kumsusam Palace of the Sun and a majestic group calisthenics performance involving 100,000 people. All accentuated how important China is to the DPRK and how special the China-DPRK relationship is. Before starting his visit, Xi published in Rodong Sinmun (Worker's Newspaper) and other major DPRK media, confirming that China and the DPRK are “good comrades and neighbors.”

During his visit, Xi further clarified China's fundamental take on the China-DPRK relationship: essentially, both are socialist countries adhering to the leadership of a Communist party; shared ideals, beliefs, and goals are driving force of the relationship; the continuous friendship between top leaders and the strategic guidance they offer are the two countries' greatest strength; while geographic proximity and cultural affinity offer a firm bond. Xi also confirmed China's resolute support for the DPRK in three aspects: China will resolutely support North Korea's socialist cause, its implementation of the new strategic line, and its efforts to solve the Korean Peninsula issue through political means to create long-term peace and order in the area. These tone-setting events — achieved by fine-tuning both countries' domestic and international policies, and amid profound changes in China's external environment, represented the philosophy of “community of shared future” — and this welcome seemed to be designed to end the contention and hesitation that had long marked China's relationship with the DPRK, and signaled the start of a “new era” for China-DPRK relations. The two sides seem set to build a “community of shared future,” coming soon after Xi's announcement that China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination ushered in a “new era” this June during his state visit to St. Petersburg. So far, China has picked up speed in rearranging its foreign policy strategies across the Eurasian continent.

The Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue was certainly among the top topics during Xi's visit, but the current prospect for denuclearization is still impeded by the relationship between the DPRK and the United States. The Xi-Trump in Hanoi this February failed at the last hurdle, mainly due to huge difficulties in bringing together the DPRK's “phased and synchronized” principle and America's “Libya-style” approach; and also partly because they each had overly high expectations for the other side to make concessions. Nevertheless, the two sides did not stop reaching out even after the failure in Hanoi. On June 11, President Trump confirmed that he has received a letter from Kim Jong-un once again, and that there might be a high chance for them for hold a third meeting. The Korean Central News Agency was authorized to announce on June 23 that Kim received Trump's reply and had positive feelings about the favorable contents of the letter. He also expressed his gratitude to Trump for his “great political judgment and extraordinary courage” and would “give careful thought to the interesting content.”

Though this “interesting content” is kept away from the outside world, it might contain some specific suggestions on solid guarantees the US could offer in exchange for the DPRK's commitment on concrete denuclearization actions. It's very likely that it will be long before the two sides reopen negotiations and hold another meeting between their leaders, owing to feeble mutual trust and the DPRK's adjustment of its negotiating team. However, as the US 2020 presidential election draws near and China-US relations are ever changing, the Trump's administration is eager to close a nuclear deal with the DPRK and has started to reflect on its negotiation strategies. The prospect of reconciliation between the DPRK and the US is still open.

Another context that cannot be ignored in the Korean Peninsula issue, besides the growing contacts between China and the DPRK, is the apparent strategic competition between China and the United States. Some believe that China may distance itself from the DPRK so that the US will ease up in its pressure on China. This will not only help Trump to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table, but also promote progress for the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. However, this stance does not conform to the political logic of China and the DPRK. China has chosen to play a more active role in the Korean peninsula nuclear issue for its own reasons. Regardless of the future of China-US relations, China aims to ease the situation on the peninsula. For the DPRK, direct negotiation with the United States is a path it has already taken, so Kim Jong-un and his comrades will not agree that "the path to Washington must pass through Beijing." On June 20th, to celebrate the 22nd anniversary of Kim Jong Il's book Maintaining Subjectivity and Nationality in Revolution and Construction, a signed article published in Rodong Sinmun described these values of subjectivity and nationality as "the life of the country and the nation"—a reminder of North Korean pride.

Xi's visit to Pyongyang continued to promote dialogue and the “suspension for suspension” principle between the DPRK and the US. Xi said to Kim Jong-un that the international community hopes that the North Korea-US dialogue can continue and bear fruitful results, and that China supports a political settlement for the peninsula, creating conditions to solving problems based on previous experience. Kim Jong-un responded that over the past year, the DPRK has taken many positive measures to avoid tensions and manage the situation on the peninsula, but it has not received positive responses from the relevant parties, a result the DPRK does not wish to see. However, the DPRK is willing to remain patient and hopes that the parties concerned will meet each other halfway, exploring solutions that meet their respective legitimate concerns. The dialogue between Xi and Kim was rational and smooth, indicating that China still strives to maintain a balance between restoring relations with the DPRK and promoting denuclearization, and will adhere to the policy of denuclearization on the peninsula and oppose DPRK's nuclear pursuit — despite the need to strengthen relations with DPRK and offset US strategic pressure on China. At the same time, it also shows that North Korea believes the denuclearization negotiations heavily depend on how the DPRK and the US interact. As long as the US threat to the DPRK is not eliminated, the DPRK will not be able to implement a series of plans concerning the future of the peninsula.

Xi, by going on this trip, managed to promote China's role in the political settlement of the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. In an article published before the visit, he pointed out that "China is willing to work with the DPRK to seek [a] common strategy for long-term stability in the region." In the meeting with Kim Jong-un, he stressed that "China is willing to provide the DPRK with support to the best of its ability to solve its own legitimate security and development concerns. We are committed to strengthening coordination and cooperation with the DPRK and other parties concerned so as to play a positive and constructive role in achieving denuclearization of the peninsula and long-term regional stability." From these two key statements, it can be seen that a "China Plan" or "China Road Map" for a peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue is in the making, the essence of which is that major countries should do everything possible to jointly provide the DPRK with security guarantees and economic development assistance on the premise of examinable, verifiable phased nuclear dismantlement by the DPRK. If this blueprint is realized in the future, the security guarantees provided by China can be expected to include military security cooperation, nuclear material dismantlement, and nuclear safety assurance.

What are the DPRK's “legitimate security and development concerns”? Judging from the long-term process of the Six-Party Talks and the dialogue between the DPRK and relevant parties in the past two years, it means ending the state of war on the peninsula, signing mutual non-aggression treaties between the DPRK and the US, granting diplomatic recognition to each other, and fundamentally affirming the legitimacy and survival of the regime, so as to help the DPRK focus on the economy, the people's livelihood, and improving the system. What, then, is the opposition to these “legitimate security and development concerns”? The answer is obvious: the DPRK ignores the security and interests of neighboring countries, is determined to continue developing its nuclear weapons, seeks the same status as a nuclear power within the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and even attempts to obtain security benefits through nuclear blackmail, while cashing in on foreign exchange through the nuclear missile trade.

At the upcoming G20 Osaka Summit, President Xi will meet President Trump to share information about his visit to the DPRK and further communicate with the US on the peninsula's nuclear issue. After that, discussions of peace in Korea and security among all parties will gain momentum, with the expectation of a third meeting between North Korean leadership and the Trump administration. Thus the prospect of lasting peace on the peninsula may be more promising, and cooperation in the Northeast Asian region will gradually gather strength once again.