2018年以来，朝鲜半岛形势明显缓和，各方对话恢复，实现半岛无核化和建立和平机制重现曙光。然而，美朝对话在2018年下半年陷入僵局又给半岛无核化前景蒙上了阴影。应当如何看待当前的半岛形势？即将召开的第二次美朝峰会能否打破僵局取得突破？如果对话再次陷入困境，冻结现状是否应成为一项政策选择？下面围绕这些问题谈一些自己的看法。

一、当前的半岛形势既有挑战又有机遇

2018年6月的首次美朝峰会取得积极进展，双方达成四项协议，有力地促进了半岛形势的缓和。但在此之后，半岛形势却出现了复杂的变化。一方面美朝后续对话在无核化时间表、路线图上分歧巨大，陷入僵局。另一方面南北之间的和解与交流继续快速发展，双方第三次峰会在降低军事风险和开展未来经济合作方面取得重大进展。此外，朝鲜与中俄的关系也继续改善发展。

然而，如果美朝对话的僵局不能尽快打破，半岛无核化进程停滞不前，南北关系再向前走将十分困难，中朝关系进一步发展也将面临障碍。

令人鼓舞的是，进入2019年后，半岛形势又有新发展。金正恩的新年贺辞及其第四次访华发出了坚持战略转型、坚持半岛完全无核化的信号。美朝双方也恢复了新的互动。通过双方官员在华府会面，在瑞典对话，特别是元首互致亲笔信，双方已确定第二次美朝峰会将于2月底在越南举行。两国工作层的板门店磋商则是最新进展。

此外，在未来一段时间里，中美韩朝俄等国将举行一系列峰会，围绕半岛问题的新一轮外交互动即将全面展开。在此形势下，虽然有关各方对于实现半岛无核化的前景仍然存在乐观与悲观两种声音，但乐观的声音开始升高，认为美朝峰会可能打破僵局的意见逐渐占了上风。

当前，有利于美朝第二次峰会取得进展的因素主要包括：

1、两国最高领导人（彼此相互信任）都希望会谈取得成功。金正恩急需减缓国际制裁，为战略转型增添动力。特朗普在国内难有作为，希望以外交成果巩固权力。

2、南北关系、中朝关系的快速发展使美国感到必须有所行动，否则可能失去对半岛的主导权。

3、中美贸易谈判取得进展，有助于两国在半岛开展合作而非对抗。

4、国际社会普遍期望美朝两国能抓住难得的历史机遇，巩固、发展半岛缓和成果，推动半岛无核化进程向前发展。

二、第二次朝美峰会可能取得新进展

从现在看，美朝第二次峰会有可能就无核化与建立和平机制的路线图达成一定协议，从而打破双方持续大半年的僵局。首次美朝峰会只是就建立新型美朝关系、建立半岛持久和平、实现半岛无核化达成了原则协议，但对如何实现这三大目标既无时间表也无路线图。此后，双方后续谈判在这两个问题上严重对立，很快陷入僵局。朝美第二次峰会如要取得成功，必须在这两个问题上取得突破。从目前看，由于去年7月特朗普已明确表示美国在朝鲜弃核问题上不设时限，不急于求成，金正恩则在去年9月表示愿意加快无核化步伐（在特朗普任期结束前实现无核化，结束朝美敌对状态），美朝在时间表上的分歧已经有所缓和。这次美朝峰会只要能在路线图上达成一定共识，双方就能打破僵局，取得突破。为此，美朝须首先就“分阶段、同步走”达成共识。其次，双方须以此为指导，制订一个一揽子、分阶段实施的路线图（或谈判路线图）。从现在看，此次峰会就“分阶段、同步走”的原则达成共识应不是大问题，但要制订一个全面、详细的路线图仍难度较大，双方较可能的做法是先制订一个只包括近期具体步骤、具体措施的路线图。根据此前美朝双方多次对对方提出的要求与建议，双方将采取的措施可能包括以下内容：

朝鲜

 朝鲜欢迎对其已销毁或撤除的核、导试验场进行国际核查；

 朝鲜宣布冻结宁边核设施并允许对其进行必要的核查；

 朝鲜对其核设施或核计划进行部分申报；

 朝鲜就首先销毁ICBM做出承诺；

美国

 美国承诺进一步降低联合军演的数量、规模和对朝威胁；

 美国承诺恢复和加强对朝提供人道主义援助；

 美国同意与朝鲜及有关方共同发表终战宣言；

 美国承诺将逐步放松对朝制裁，如同意韩国取消某些单边制裁或放松安理会的某些制裁措施；

 双方筹备建立联络处并启动某些人文交流项目。

美朝峰会如果能就上述措施中的一些达成协议，将打破大半年来双方对话的僵局，在落实新加坡峰会前三项协议上取得初步但却积极的成果。这不仅将增加双方互信，为半岛无核化进程向前发展打开通路，而且将增加有关各方对实现无核化和建立半岛和平机制的信心。

美朝峰会的成功还将给随后举行的诸多双边峰会带来积极影响，而后者的进展又会推动下一步的美朝对话。从长远看，这些双边对话将为重启朝核问题多边对话特别是六方会谈打下重要的基础。

三、美朝对话仍可能停滞不前

尽管当前我们有理由对美朝第二次峰会持较乐观的态度，但由于美朝之间极度缺乏互信，如果出现下述情况，朝美对话仍可能再次陷入僵局。这些情况包括：

 朝鲜拒绝在现阶段做任何形式的核申报或不接受对申报内容进行核查；

 美国国会坚决反对政府采取任何逐步放松对朝制裁的措施，坚持要求朝鲜须首先全面弃核或首先进行全面核申报；

 峰会达成的协议在细化和落实过程中遇到种种难题或受到来自两国强力部门的阻碍；

 美朝、朝鲜南北之间发生重大突发事件（这在历史上不乏先例）；

 特朗普的领导力因国内政治受到严重削弱，双方自上而下的做法难以为继。

四、冻结现状决不应成为政策选择

如果新一轮美朝对话再次陷入僵局，在未来较长一段时间里，虽然也可能有其他发展前景，但最可能出现的前景将是朝美对话再次长期停滞和半岛现状的固化。届时，朝鲜将继续停止核导试验，但却保持核武器、核能力；美国将保持其在半岛的军事同盟与军事存在；朝韩之间的和解交流难以为继甚至有所倒退；中俄日的安全关切居高不下；朝鲜战略转型举步维艰。这种前景虽然略好于冲突与战争，但由于半岛无核化、建立半岛和平机制、建立新型朝美关系三大目标均未实现，朝核问题“印巴化”的趋势将加强，冻结现状的朝鲜半岛仍将充满安全风险，对地区与国际安全构成严重威胁。

毫无疑问，这样的发展前景决不应成为半岛有关各方的政策选择与目标。为了半岛的持久和平，冲突战争不可取，冻结现状也不可取，共同为实现半岛完全无核化和建立半岛和平机制做出长期不懈的努力才是我们唯一正确的选择。

（以上为2019年2月14-15日在韩国崔钟贤学术院举办的“美中韩三边会议：东北亚转型期”上的发言）

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has obviously relaxed since 2018. Various parties have resumed dialogue and the dawn of denuclearization and peace seems to have come. However, the stalemate in the US-DPRK dialogue in the second half of the year has cast a shadow. Will the upcoming second US-DPRK summit break the stalemate and achieve a breakthrough? If the dialogue lands into difficulties again, should freezing the status quo be a policy option?

First, the current situation on the Peninsula presents both challenges and opportunities.

The first US-DPRK summit in June 2018 produced positive results. The four agreements greatly contributed to relaxation on the Peninsula. But complex changes have taken place since then. On the one hand, the US-DPRK dialogue stagnated due to the huge differences between the two with regard to the schedule and roadmap of denuclearization. On the other hand, South-North reconciliation and exchanges have continued and developed rapidly. Their third summit produced major progress in reducing military risks and developing future economic cooperation. Besides, the DPRK's relations with China and Russia have also improved and developed.

However, if the US-DPRK stalemate remains and the denuclearization process stagnates, it will be extremely difficult for South-North and China-DPRK relations to move further forward.

It is encouraging that there have been new developments since the beginning of 2019. Kim Jong-un's New Year message and his fourth visit to China both sent signals for strategic transition and full denuclearization of the Peninsula. The US and DPRK have resumed interactions. Through meetings in Washington DC and Sweden and by exchanging letters between heads of state, the two sides have decided to have the second summit in Vietnam at the end of February.

A series of summits will be held among China, US, the ROK, the DPRK, and Russia. A new round of diplomatic interactions will unfold.Optimism has increased and more people now seem to believe that the US-DPRK summit will help break the current stalemate.

There are some positive factors:

A. The top leaders of the two countries trust each other and hope to see a successful summit. Kim urgently needs relaxation of international sanctions to aid the DPRK's strategic transition while Trump, facing great difficulties at home, hopes to consolidate his position with diplomatic achievements.

B. Rapid development of North Korea-South Korea and China-DPRK ties gives the US a sense of urgency in taking action instead of losing its dominance in Peninsular affairs.

C. Progress in China-US trade negotiations enables the two to develop cooperation instead of engaging in confrontation on the Peninsula.

D. The international community has a shared hope that the US and the DPRK will seize the rare historical opportunity to advance the denuclearization process.

Second, the second US-DPRK summit may well produce new progress.

Some agreement may be reached on the roadmap for denuclearization and peace at the summit, thus breaking the half-year-plus stalemate.The first US-DPRK summit only reached an agreement on establishing a new type of relations in principle, creating lasting peace on the Peninsula, and working towards denuclearization. But there was neither a timetable nor a roadmap for the three objectives. Then the follow-up negotiation went into stalemate very soon due to opposing positions on the last two issues. For the second summit to be successful, breakthroughs must be made. Trump made it clear last July that the US does not have a deadline for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and is not anxious for quick results. Kim in September expressed willingness to speed up denuclearization and the end of hostilities with the US before the end of Trump's term. These have helped reduce US-DPRK differences on the timetable. So long as the two sides reach certain common understandings on a roadmap, they will surely break the stalemate and realize a breakthrough. To this end, the US and the DPRK must first agree on 'phased and parallel' implementation and on that basis produce a roadmap for it. Features of that roadmap may include the following:

The DPRK

• Welcomes international verification of its destroyed or dismantled nuclear and missile test sites;

• Freezes the Yongbyon nuclear facility and allows necessary verification;

• Partially declares its nuclear facilities or nuclear program;

• Undertakes to first destroy its ICBMs;

The US

• Undertakes to further reduce the number and scale of joint military exercises;

• Undertakes to resume and strengthen humanitarian assistance to the DPRK;

• Agrees to issue an end-of-war declaration jointly with the DPRK and other relevant parties;

• Undertakes to gradually lift sanctions over the DPRK and agrees to the ROK removing some unilateral sanctions; and

• The two sides make preparations for the creation of liaison offices and launch some cultural exchange projects.

Such a step at the US-DPRK summit will help break the stalemate of the past half year. It will not only enhance mutual trust but also increase the confidence of all relevant parties.

The success of the US-DPRK summit will have a positive influence on future bilateral summits. In the long run, these bilateral dialogues will lay down an important foundation for restarting multilateral dialogue on the DPRK nuclear issue, and the Six Party Talk in particular.

Third, there is still a possibility for continued stagnation.

Although there are reasons for optimism, due to the extreme shortage of mutual trust, it is still possible for the US-DPRK dialogue to end in a stalemate again with the following scenarios:

• The DPRK refuses to make a nuclear declaration in any form or does not accept verification of its declaration;

• The US Congress refuses to approve any agreement involving gradually lifting sanctions over the DPRK and insists on DPRK first comprehensively abandoning its nuclear program or making a comprehensive declaration;

• Serious obstacles or difficulties in detailing and implementing any agreement reached at the summit;

• A major emergency between the DPRK and the US or South Korea;

• Trump's leadership is seriously undermined domestically and results in a top-down approach no longer being viable.

Fourth, freezing the status quo must not be a policy option.

If the new round of US-DPRK dialogue is stalemated again, the most likely prospect will be another long stagnation plus fixation of the Peninsular status quo. Then the DPRK may continue its moratorium on nuclear and missile testing while keeping its nuclear weapons and capabilities. The US will maintain its military alliance and presence on the Peninsula. It will be difficult to sustain North-South reconciliation and exchanges, which may experience setbacks. China, Russia, and Japan will continue having serious security concerns. And the DPRK will have difficulty pursuing its strategic transition. Admittedly the prospect is slightly better than conflict or war. But as none of the three major objectives (denuclearization, peace, and a new type of US-DPRK relations) is anywhere closer to realization, the DPRK seems increasingly like India and Pakistan. The Korean Peninsula with a frozen status quo will still be full of security risks and pose a serious threat to regional and international security.

Undoubtedly such a prospect must not be a policy option or objective for the relevant parties. To realize lasting peace, conflict or war is not advisable, nor is freezing the status quo. Our only correct choice is to jointly make long-term efforts for full denuclearization of the Peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism.