尽管去年取得了一些进展，但国际社会在2019年依旧面临朝核问题。朝鲜暂停了核试爆与弹道导弹测试，但却保留了在无事先警告情况下恢复核试爆和发射导弹的能力。金正恩在2019年新年贺词中甚至提到这一能力，并暗示如果美朝关系继续紧张的话，平壤还有其他的合作伙伴顶替华盛顿。

朝鲜同美国和韩国的关系在2018年虽说有改善，但中国和俄罗斯依然是朝鲜最好的友邦。北京和莫斯科竭尽全力，避免可能威胁金氏政权的地区经济危机、大规模难民潮和军事冲突。事实上，他们的外交官可以容忍美国对平壤采取某些对中俄最重要的经济利益和安全利益不构成威胁的措施，但前提是他们相信这些制裁能够推动谈判，避免行动升级，并有助于长期和解。中国和俄罗斯反对可能导致平壤政权崩溃或者令其自身卷入地区冲突的强硬举动，相反，它们试图通过提供经济援助和安全保障来安抚平壤，使其主动放弃挑衅行为和军国政策。

经过多年低迷，去年的进展让北京和莫斯科变得更加乐观，并且看到获得地区利益的机会。在它们看来，2018年在朝鲜安全问题上取得的进展让两国获益。尤其是，它们认为国际社会正在遵循北京和莫斯科近年推动的“三步走”和平脚本。第一步，是韩朝与美国都减少地区军事活动。在这一“双冻结”阶段，平壤停止导弹试验和核试验，以换取美韩停止大规模军演。在第二阶段，朝鲜领导人打破一年来的孤立，与韩国、中国、俄罗斯尤其是美国等关键伙伴直接进行高层对话。

不过，中俄和平计划的最后阶段似乎仍遥不可及。最后阶段要求将单独的双边对话拓展整合为全面的多边努力，从而建立一个持久的地区和平与安全机制。朝鲜与美国的分歧依然尖锐，特别是在取消制裁的时间安排、实现朝鲜全面无核化以及签订和平条约等方面。美国和韩国仍要求朝鲜采取具体、不可逆、可验证的措施消除其核武库。相反，朝鲜政府首先是想结束制裁和拥有一个“延续且持久和平的政权”（理想状况是用和平条约取代现有的停战协定）。

虽然中国在韩朝两国的商业存在已经远远超过俄罗斯期望达到的水平，但在朝鲜问题上，北京和莫斯科并不互为主要经济竞争对手。中国寻求利用其经济主导地位来促进朝鲜经济改革，稳定朝鲜政权，减少其对中国长期援助的需求，同时让朝鲜将关注重点从对外挑衅转向国内经济。北京还希望获得朝鲜的市场、劳动力和自然资源。而莫斯科的野心则更多集中于推动跨国项目，这些项目有助于作为欧亚运输走廊的俄罗斯更紧密地与亚洲市场对接。北京与莫斯科已经在探讨数个涵盖韩朝两国的多边经济项目，在这些项目中，中俄将发挥互助共赢的重要作用。实际上，中国的决策者或许欢迎俄罗斯更多分担扶持朝鲜经济的重任。

中俄在朝鲜问题上也存在分歧。莫斯科和北京都不希望日本参与和平条约谈判，因为担心绑架问题会使谈判陷入僵局（朝鲜承认几十年前曾绑架日本公民来协助本国的情报计划）。而有些中国人则担心，俄罗斯为惩罚华盛顿采取制裁等反俄政策，同样也会破环和平谈判。此外，之前俄罗斯曾被列为金正恩最青睐的外国合作伙伴，但在过去一年里，中国在平壤的影响力出现反弹，这也可以说是莫斯科的损失。

不过，至少在短期内，中俄在朝鲜问题上的政策大体会保持一致。在两国进行的采访都表明，其政府都会在当前美朝关系缓和的基础上再接再厉，促使美国进一步削减在朝鲜半岛的军事力量，并推动美国和其他国家取消有碍中俄两国在朝鲜半岛经济野心的制裁。对于在无核化取得更大进展之前，韩朝关系应该限制在何种程度，美国和韩国之间存在着分歧，中俄两国还可能会尝试利用美韩之间的这种分歧。韩国现领导人认为，从长远来说，加强韩朝之间的经济、安全和社会联系将大大有助于核问题的解决。但特朗普总统对韩朝双方的计划表现出敌意，认为它减轻了朝鲜兑现无核化承诺的压力。

美国对中俄“三步走”和平建议的最初反应是负面的。美国官员认为，中俄路线图不均衡，因为它把朝鲜那些已经被俄罗斯、中国及其他国家政府视为非法的活动与美韩的合法自卫行动相提并论。不过，特朗普政府已经沿着这个路线图走完前两步。特朗普总统不仅去年在新加坡与金正恩会晤，而且正热切期待着未来几个月举行的第二次会面。原先号称暂停的美韩军演已经长期中止。这也是特朗普总统与最近辞职的国防部长詹姆斯•马蒂斯之间关系紧张的一个主要原因。

Despite some progress last year, the international community still has a North Korean nuclear problem in 2019. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), while suspending its nuclear explosions and ballistic missile tests, retains the capacity to resume these detonations and launches without warning. Kim Jong Un's 2019 New Year's address even referenced this capacity, and suggested that Pyongyang had alternative partners to Washington if DPRK-U.S. ties remain strained.

Notwithstanding the improvement in North Korea's ties with Washington as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2018, China and Russia remain the DPRK's best foreign friends. Beijing and Moscow strive to avert regional economic crises, large refugee flows, and military conflicts that could threaten the Kim regime. It is true that their diplomats tolerate some U.S. measures against Pyongyang that do not threaten their most vital economic and security interests, but only if they believe these sanctions can spur negotiations, stave off tougher actions, and contribute to a longer-term reconciliation. China and Russia oppose strong actions that could topple the Pyongyang regime or pull them into a regional conflict. They instead seek to coax Pyongyang, through economic assistance and security assurances, into voluntarily abstention from provocations and militarism.

After years of gloom, developments last year have led Beijing and Moscow have to become more optimistic and see opportunities for regional gains. They believe that they have benefited from Korean-related security developments in 2018. In particular, they see the international community as following the three-step script for peace pushed by Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In the first step, the two Korean states and the United States scaled back their regional military activities. In this “double-freeze,” Pyongyang suspended its missile and nuclear tests in return for the halting of major ROK-U.S. military exercises. In the second phase, the North Korean leadership broke out of a year of isolation and engaged in direct high-level talks with key partners, including South Korea, China, Russia, and especially the United States.

Nonetheless, the final phase of the Sino-Russian peace plan, which calls for expansion and integration of the separate bilateral talks into a comprehensive multilateral attempt at building an enduring mechanism for regional peace and security, seems as distant as ever. DPRK-U.S. differences remain acute, especially regarding the sequence and timetable for the removal of sanctions, full DPRK denuclearization, and agreement on a peace treaty. The United States and South Korea still demand that North Korea take concrete, irreversible, and verifiable measures towards eliminating its nuclear arsenal. In contrast, the DPRK government prioritizes attaining an end to sanctions and a “lasting and enduring peace regime” (ideally a peace treaty to replace the current armistice).

Beijing and Moscow are not major economic competitors regarding North Korea, even though China's commercial presence in both Korean states is far greater than Russia could ever hope to attain. The PRC has sought to employ its economic primacy to promote economic reform that stabilizes the North Korean regime, reduces long-term aid demands on China, and refocuses North Koreans' attention towards domestic economic wellbeing rather than international provocations. Beijing also wants access to North Korean markets, labor, and natural resources. Moscow's ambitions have focused more on promoting transnational projects that would help tie Russia more closely to Asian markets as a conduit for transit corridors between Asia and Europe. Beijing and Moscow have discussed several multilateral economic projects encompassing the two Koreas in which China and Russia would play major mutually supporting “win-win” roles. Indeed, PRC policymakers might welcome Russia sharing more of the burden of propping up the DPRK economy.

Sino-Russian differences regarding Korea do exist. Neither Moscow nor Beijing wants Japan to participate in negotiations over a Korean peace treaty for fear that the abduction issue (the DPRK's admitted seizure of Japanese nationals decades ago to aid the country's intelligence programs) could stalemate talks. However, some Chinese fear that Moscow might also spoil any peace talks to punish Washington for its anti-Russian policies like sanctions. Furthermore, whereas Russia previously ranked as Kim Jong-un's favorite foreign partner, Chinese influence in Pyongyang has been on the rebound this past year, arguably at Moscow's expense.

At least in the short run, however, Chinese and Russian policies regarding the Koreas will likely remain generally harmonious. Interviews in both countries suggest that the two governments will probably strive to build on the current détente between Pyongyang and Washington to promote further reductions in U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula as well as U.S. and other sanctions that hamper their economic ambitions on the Peninsula. They will also likely try to exploit ROK-U.S. differences over how much to constrain intra-Korean ties pending greater progress on denuclearization. Currently, South Korean leaders believe that, in the long run, improving intra-Korean economic, security, and social ties can substantially contribute to resolving the nuclear issue. President Trump has shown an animus towards intra-Korean projects that reduce pressure on the North to realize its denuclearization pledges.

The initial U.S. reaction to the Chinese-Russian three-phased peace proposal was negative. U.S. officials considered the Sino-Russian roadmap imbalanced since it equates DPRK activities that Russia, China, and other governments had already declared illegal with legitimate ROK-U.S self-defense efforts. However, the Trump Administration has since taken the first two steps along the roadmap. Not only did President Trump meet with Kim in Singapore las year, but he is eagerly looking forward to a second encounter in the coming month. And what was initially described as a temporary ROK-U.S. exercise pause has become a long-term suspension. The issue was a major source of tension between President Trump and former Defense Secretary James Mattis.