尼米兹号航空母舰（CVN 68）、乔辛号导弹巡洋舰（CG 65）、导弹驱逐舰桑普森号（DDG 102）和平克尼号驱逐舰（DDG 91）以及导弹护卫舰鲁本·詹姆斯号（FFG 46）在南海编队作业。尼米兹航母战斗群目前正在美国第七舰队负责区域开展作业。

中美之间的紧张在诸多领域正不断加剧。关税对决的开始有可能触发一场全面的双边贸易战；北京对华盛顿试图加强与台湾外交和军事关系的怒气越来越大；最后，两个国家对各自的南海政策目标的争执已经达到令人担忧的程度。

所有这些争执都充满危险，但台湾和南海问题最有可能使双边关系恶化，并升级为战争。在台湾问题上妥协难以实现，但美国政策的适度改变却有可能大大缓和南海的紧张局势。具体来说，华盛顿应该大量减少对抗性的“航行自由”巡逻，不再把北京当成南海地区的破坏性因素甚或是彻头彻尾的威胁来对待。

美国海军在西太平洋保持大规模存在的一个长期原因，是畅通无阻的航运对全球经济健康至关重要。由于担心商贸流通有可能被中断，美国政治和经济领导人几十年来一直都在这么做。这是可以理解的。据联合国贸发会议估计，全球贸易量的80%和贸易额的70%都是靠海运来进行的。

穿越南海的海上航道是极其重要的大动脉。贸发会议的分析显示，全球海上运输的1/3要通过这一水域。华盛顿战略与国际研究中心“中国力量项目”保守估计这一数字为每年3.37万亿美元，但它也承认，其他机构的估计甚至高达5.3万亿美元。战略与国际研究中心的研究报告强调，这一水域“对中国、台湾、日本和韩国尤为重要，因此这些国家都依赖连接印度洋与南海乃至太平洋的马六甲海峡”。

美国领导人正日益把中国视为潜在的商业威胁。华盛顿的怀疑来自于中国对南海领土主张的程度和强度。这已经不是什么新问题了。1947年12月，中华民国政府（蒋介石政权）发行了一张地图，图上划出了一行11段线（后减少为9段），把南海80%以上的水域都划归给中国。两年之后推翻了蒋介石并建立中华人民共和国的共产党政权接受了这一主张。

然而，直到大约十年前，北京的领土野心还只停留在理论上。中国军事力量不足，甚至无法通过让人信服的努力来实现其领土主张。但随着中国经济和军事实力的增强，中国领导人开始变得强硬，主张南海绝大部分水域理所应当是中国的领海。北京还在半沉半没的珊瑚礁周围地区进行疏浚，把这些珊瑚礁的陆地部分扩展成为成熟的人工岛。更让美国感到不安的是，中国还在这些新的岛屿上大兴土木，包括建造简易军用机场。虽然中国不是唯一搞此类填海工程的国家（尤其越南也这样做过），但中国的规划是规模最大的。

华盛顿断然反对北京在南海问题上的立场主张。美国官员一再谴责中国建造人工岛屿，特别是兴建军事设施。美国海军也增加了在南海巡航的频次，并明确声称这是“航行自由巡逻”。这一用语暗示，华盛顿认为，中国不断增加的存在感，包括中国海军行动的增多，是对自由航行的潜在威胁。反过来，北京对抵近中国本土的美国侵扰式巡逻表示愤慨，谴责它们是严重的挑衅行为。

华盛顿需要重新考虑其在南海的政策。无论是历史上还是法律上，中国的领土要求都是不合理的，正如国际仲裁法院2016年对菲律宾诉北京一案的裁决。但是，考虑到其自身有大量航运业务要通过南海，中国的确也有强大的动机来保持航路畅通。中国经由这一水域运输的出口货物比其他任何国家都多，占到总通过量的近25％。实际上，中国大约40%的出口都要经过这条海上通道。

中国领导人知道，如果他们扰乱了商贸往来，美国（以及日本、澳大利亚等其他拥有强大海军力量的国家）也可以轻而易举地切断中国产品的运输。由于中国是出口导向型经济，因此挑起南海问题将是北京所采取的最愚蠢的政策。中国领导人看来也已经意识到了这一点，他们与东盟成员国合作制定最大限度减少南海争端的“行为准则”就是明证。

特朗普政府不应该把中国看成对南海商贸的潜在威胁，而应当认识到中国可以成为有助于保持海上通道畅通的好伙伴。人们不要指望北京放弃其领土主张，而这种立场总是具有一定的潜在威胁。中国领导人无疑是希望他们的国家被看成是南海的主导力量，华盛顿想让北京接受美国在那里继续称霸，这个目标是不可能实现的。而同时，美国也不会甘心接受中国把南海变为其领海的法律诉求。

在可预见的将来达成彻底打破这一僵局的全面解决方案的机会不大。但双方可以达成有限和解，抑制危险的紧张局势的加剧。这其中的主要问题是中国对美国海军的航行自由巡逻感到愤怒。只要北京愿意做出正式保证，保证不会采取行动干扰南海的航运，并切实努力打击现有的威胁——最明显的就是举足轻重的马六甲海峡附近持续不断的海盗活动，那么，美国领导人就应当承诺大大减少巡逻的次数，并避免抵近中国建造的人工岛。

这种事实上的休战和暂时妥协无法保证南海的持久和谐，但它会显著减轻北京和华盛顿之间的外交紧张。也许更重要的是，它可以缓和两国海军之间日益加剧的紧张。为了这一潜在成果，华盛顿很值得采取主动，并向北京提出这样的建议。

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68), the guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin (CG 65), the guided-missile destroyers USS Sampson (DDG 102) and USS Pinkney (DDG 91), and the guided-missile frigate USS Rentz (FFG 46) operate in formation in the South China Sea. The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is conducting operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class David Mercil/Released)

Tensions between China and the United States are rising on multiple fronts. The onset of dueling tariffs is threatening to trigger a full-fledged bilateral trade war. Beijing's anger is rising about Washington's growing attempts to upgrade diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan. Finally, the two countries are sparring dangerously over their respective policies and goals in the South China Sea.

All of those disputes are dangerous, but the Taiwan and South China Sea issues hold the most potential for poisoning the bilateral relationship and escalating into war. Compromise regarding Taiwan is inherently elusive, but a modest change in U.S. policy could significantly dampen tensions in the South China Sea. Specifically, Washington needs to dramatically reduce its confrontational “freedom of navigation” patrols and stop treating Beijing as a disruptive element, if not an outright threat, in that region.

One longstanding reason for a large-scale U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific is the importance of unimpeded shipping to the health of the global economy. U.S. political and economic leaders fret about potential disruptions to the flow of commerce and have done so for decades. That is an understandable concern. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that 80% of world trade measured by volume and 70% measured by value travels by sea.

The sea lanes transiting the South China Sea are especially crucial arteries. UNCTAD's analysis shows that one-third of global shipping passes through that body of water. A conservative estimate of the annual dollar value by the Center for Strategic and International Studies' China Power Project put the figure at $3.37 trillion, but concedes that other estimates are as high as $5.3 trillion. The CSIS study emphasizes that the waters “are particularly critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which rely on the Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean.”

U.S. leaders increasingly view China as a potential menace to that commerce. The root of Washington's suspicion is the extent and intensity of Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is not a new issue. In December 1947, the government of the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-shek's regime) issued a map delineating an 11-dash line (later reduced to a 9-dash line) that laid claim to more than 80% of the South China Sea. The communist regime that overthrew Chiang two years later and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) subsequently embraced that claim.

Until the past decade or so, though, Beijing's audacious territorial ambition remained little more than theoretical. The PRC lacked the military power to make even a credible effort to enforce its claims. But as China's economic and military power has grown, PRC leaders have become more insistent that most of the South China Sea is rightfully Chinese territorial waters. Beijing also has dredged areas surrounding partially sunken reefs to expand the land areas on those reefs into full-fledged artificial islands. Even more troubling from the U.S. perspective, China has built structures, including military airstrips, on those new islands. Although China is not the only country to pursue such reclamation projects (Vietnam, in particular, also has done so), the PRC's program is the most extensive.

Washington has flatly rejected Beijing's stance regarding the South China Sea. U.S. officials have repeatedly condemned the creation of artificial islands, especially China's building of military installations. The U.S. Navy also has increased the frequency of patrols through the South China Sea and explicitly labeled them 'freedom of navigation patrols.' That term implies that Washington regards China's growing presence, including an increase in PRC naval activities, as a potential threat to free navigation. Beijing, in turn, has reacted angrily to intrusive U.S. patrols so close to the Chinese homeland, condemning them as a serious provocation.

Washington needs to reconsider its policy in the South China Sea. The PRC's territorial claims are not justified by either history or law — as the International Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 in a case brought by the Philippines against Beijing. But given its own extensive shipping that transits the South China Sea, the PRC also has a powerful incentive to keep the waterway open. The amount of Chinese exports transported through that body of water is larger than that of any other country, accounting for nearly 25% of the overall flow. Indeed, some 40% of China's total exports travel those sea lanes.

PRC leaders know that if they disrupt that commerce, the United States (and other naval powers such as Japan and Australia) could easily choke-off the flow of Chinese products as well. Given its export-driven economy, causing problems in the South China Sea would be an especially foolish policy for Beijing to adopt. Chinese leaders seem to recognize that point, as evidenced by their work with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a “code of conduct” that could minimize disputes in the South China Sea.

Instead of viewing China as a potential threat to South China Sea commerce, the Trump administration should recognize that the PRC can be a useful partner in helping to keep the sea lanes open. One should not expect Beijing to abandon its territorial claims, and that stance will always have a somewhat menacing potential. Chinese leaders undoubtedly want their country to be recognized as the leading power in the South China Sea; Washington cannot possibly achieve the goal of having Beijing accept continued U.S. hegemony there. At the same time, the United States has no intention of acquiescing in the PRC's legal quest to convert the South China Sea into Chinese territorial waters.

There is little chance of a comprehensive settlement to completely resolve such an impasse in the foreseeable future. But the two sides can reach a more limited accommodation that would reduce the upward trend in dangerous tensions. The main problem is China's anger about the U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation patrols. U.S. leaders should offer to greatly reduce the number of those patrols, and avoid sending them into the vicinity of Chinese-built artificial islands, as long as Beijing is willing to offer formal assurances that it will take no action to disrupt shipping through the South China Sea, and will, in fact, work to combat existing threats, most notably the continued problem of piracy in waters near the vital Strait of Malacca.

Such a de facto truce and modus vivendi would not guarantee lasting harmony regarding the South China Sea. However, it would markedly reduce diplomatic strain between Beijing and Washington — and, perhaps even more importantly, decrease the mounting tensions between the naval forces of the two countries. That potential achievement is well worth Washington taking the initiative and offering such a proposal to Beijing.