图片来源：新华社

经过一年来形势的不断吃紧和对朝鲜核计划引发冲突前景的担忧，朝鲜半岛的紧张局面终于暂时消退了。4月27日，金正恩和韩国总统文在寅在非军事区内首次举行了大事张扬和充满象征意味的会面。这次会面开启峰会外交的新纪元，很快，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普也将与金正恩会面，从而可能为朝鲜半岛迎来新开端铺平道路。

按多个标准衡量，最近的朝韩首脑会晤都是一次成功，虽然一些关键细节问题仍有待解决。与过去相比一个突破是，金正恩同意在非军事区的“和平之家”与韩国总统文在寅会面。这样一来，他就成为第一位到达军事分界线韩国一侧的朝鲜领导人。金正恩在谈到朝鲜面临的经济困难时也十分坦率。但是，说到为朝鲜半岛确立一条新路，最重要的也许是双方在《板门店宣言》中承诺实现无核化。在朝韩首脑会议文件中，这还是第一次直接提到无核化。

南北方的这次峰会应该被看成是至少两个连续峰会中的第一个，目的是改善与朝鲜的关系，进一步确保即将到来的美朝峰会取得成功。《板门店宣言》有助于这些目标的实现，它确立了朝韩关系新框架，并开始着手解决美朝对话所要涉及的安全问题。这份文件的着眼点是朝韩合作的三个领域：在共同繁荣下发展、缓和军事紧张、开创朝鲜半岛的永久和平。

《板门店宣言》关于共同繁荣的一个关键内容，是双方同意履行朝韩之前的所有声明和协议。如果朝鲜遵循无核化承诺，那会给它带来明显的经济上的好处。关于缓和紧张局势，宣言再次确认了一项互不侵犯协议，呼吁停止敌对行为，实现分阶段裁军。双方还同意争取在2018年年底之前达成和平协议，以结束朝鲜战争。虽然无核化名义上放在了协议的最后，但如果接受之前朝韩双方达成的所有声明和协议的话，朝鲜也应该遵守1992年《关于朝鲜半岛无核化的联合宣言》。

帮助建立合作框架的同时，仍然有必要为宣言中达成的分阶段裁军制定细节。但也许最重要的是在制裁仍然有效的情况下，确定双方如何实行所商定的经济与社会合作。

如果说，与韩国总统文在寅的首脑会晤打开了朝鲜无核化大门，那么完成无核化协议就将取决于特朗普总统。不过，对这次会晤的期望应当有保留。《板门店宣言》在某些方面故意含糊，而“特金会”达成的任何协议只会是由上而下的愿望，不会是一份详细的协定。但如果这次峰会取得成功，则无论达成什么协议，其中都应该包括我们所期待的某些内容。

最重要的内容是双方如何定义无核化。美国和朝鲜一向对无核化的内涵有不同定义。对美国来说，无核化意味着朝鲜彻底、可验证、不可逆地放弃核计划。相反，朝鲜通常的说法是“朝鲜半岛的无核化”，意思是无核化进程还要包括废除美国的核保护伞，以及美国军队撤出朝鲜半岛。双方对无核化有共同定义，这将是重要的第一步。

时间表也很重要。虽然《板门店宣言》需要更多的细节，但它设定了明确的基准：5月1日起结束军事分界线一带的敌对行为，5月份举行军事会谈，8月15日举行离散亲人团聚活动，年底前缔结和平条约。无论美国与朝鲜达成什么协议，都需要明确规定无核化进程何时结束，什么时候可以开始核查，以及什么时候可以解除制裁。美国建议在解除制裁前先完成无核化，就像利比亚那样。朝鲜则认为在彻底实现无核化之前，应该采取分步走的方法，让它得到某些好处。首脑会晤结束后，双方需要就无核化细节及其他问题进行谈判，但应该制定出明确的时间表。

无论达成什么协议，都不应囿于无核化。美国应当争取将联合国安理会决议涉及的所有朝鲜大规模杀伤性武器都纳入协议。我们已经知道，朝鲜有化学和生物武器计划。鉴于去年对金正男的VX神经毒气暗杀，以及联合国专家小组报告称朝鲜与叙利亚有化武交易，大家都明白，朝鲜当局既愿意出售，也愿意使用其他的大规模杀伤性武器。

美国应该争取让协议有明确的内容，不过，朝鲜同样有要优先解决的问题，包括缔结和平条约、获得安全保证和解除制裁。它还可能要求把美国向朝鲜提供直接经济援助作为协议的一部分。

有报道显示，朝鲜不会提出要求让美国撤军、停止提供核保护或终结美韩同盟，而只会要求军事演习能顾及当前形势、美方保证不进攻朝鲜、不使用或不在韩国安置战略性资产、美国同意缔结和平条约。如果朝鲜的安全要求真的只是这种程度，那么达成协议就有切实的基础。

在朝韩首脑会议上，金正恩对先前的协议未能落实表示了失望。从他成为一国领导人以及2012年《闰日协议》早夭的那一刻开始，美国对此就一清二楚。虽然金正恩也许不会把《闰日协议》甚至1992年的无核化联合宣言作为范本，但若是他真正理解全面落实《板门店宣言》或与特朗普总统达成的协议的必要性，那么解决朝核问题也许就有机会，朝鲜半岛就会迎来新的开端。而如果他做不到的话，我们最终就会回到原点，压力与日俱增，冲突为期不远。

Photo Credit: Xinhua

After a year of rising tensions and concerns over the prospect of conflict over North Korea's nuclear program, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have momentarily eased. On April 27, Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in met for the first time in the de-militarized zone (DMZ) surrounded by pageantry and symbolism. The meeting kicked off a new era of summit diplomacy and will soon be followed by a critical meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un that may pave the way for a new beginning on the Korean Peninsula.

The recent inter-Korean summit was a success by many measures, even if some of the key details remain to be worked out. In a break with the past, Kim Jong-un agreed to meet South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the Peace House in the DMZ, making him the first North Korean leader to travel south of the DMZ. There was also a frankness in how Kim Jong-un spoke of the economic difficulties facing North Korea. Perhaps most significant for setting a new path on the Korean Peninsula, however, was the commitment by both Koreas to realizing denuclearization in the Panmunjom Declaration, the first direct reference to denuclearization in an inter-Korean summit document.

Designed to improve relations with North Korea and help ensure the success of the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit, the inter-Korean summit should be viewed as the first of at least two interlocking summits. The Panmunjom Declaration helped to achieve these objectives by establishing a new framework for inter-Korean relations and beginning to address the security issues needed for talks between the United States and North Korea. The document focuses on three areas of inter-Korean cooperation: the development of co-prosperity, the reduction of military tensions, and the development of a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

One of the key elements of the Panmunjom Declaration regarding co-prosperity is the agreement to implement all prior inter-Korean declarations and agreements which would provide North Korea with clear economic benefits should it follow through with denuclearization. In the area of reducing tensions, the agreement reaffirms a non-aggression pact, calls for the end of hostile acts, and a phased disarmament. Both sides also agreed to seek a peace treaty to end the Korean War by the end of 2018. While denuclearization is the last element of the agreement, nominally, the adoption of all prior inter-Korean declarations and agreements should also commit North Korea to the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula.

While helping to create a framework for cooperation, details will still need to be worked out on the phased approach to disarmament agreed to in the declaration, but perhaps most important will be defining how the economic and social cooperation agreed upon will be conducted while sanctions are still in place.

If the summit with South Korean President Moon opened the door to a denuclearized North Korea, it will be up to President Trump to close the deal on denuclearization. But expectations should be managed. The Panmunjom Declaration is intentionally ambiguous in some regards and any agreement reached at the Trump-Kim summit will be about top down aspirations, rather than a detailed agreement. However, if the summit is successful, there are certain elements we should look for in any agreement.

The most important element will be how the two sides define denuclearization. The United States and North Korea have historically had different definitions of what denuclearization means. For the United States, denuclearization has meant the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program. In contrast, North Korea has often referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” by which it means the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula as part of the process of denuclearization. An important first step will be arriving at a common definition of denuclearization.

Timelines will also be important. The Panmunjom Declaration placed clear benchmarks, even if further details are still needed, for the end of hostile acts in the DMZ by May 1, military talks in May, family reunions on August 15, and the conclusion of a peace treaty by the end of the year. Any U.S.-North Korea agreement will need to clearly define when denuclearization will be concluded, when inspections can begin, and when sanctions relief can begin. The United States has suggested that denuclearization be relatively quick, as was the case with Libya, before sanctions relief can begin, while North Korea has suggested a phased approach that would provide some benefits before complete denuclearization is achieved. Details on denuclearization and other issues will need to be negotiated after the summit, but clear timelines should be established.

Any agreement should go beyond denuclearization. The United States should be pushing to include all of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction included in UN Security Council resolutions in an agreement. North Korea is known to have a chemical and biological weapons program. With the assassination of Kim Jong-nam with VX nerve gas last year and the UN Panel of Experts report on North Korea's dealings with Syria on chemical weapons, we know that the regime is willing to both sell and use other weapons of mass destruction.

While there are clear elements the United States should seek in any agreement, North Korea will have priorities as well. These are likely to include the conclusion of a peace treaty, security guarantees, and sanctions relief, but will also likely include a request for the United States to provide direct economic aid to North Korea as part of any agreement.

Reports have indicated that North Korea will not ask for the removal of U.S. troops, the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or an end to U.S.-South Korea alliance, merely that military exercises be appropriate to the situation, the U.S. pledge not to attack North Korea, that strategic assets not be used or based in South Korea, and that the U.S. agree to a peace treaty. If this is truly the extent of North Korea's security requests, there could be real grounds for an agreement.

At the inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-un noted disappointment at North Korea's failure to implement prior agreements, something the United States knows all too well from his time as leader and the short-lived 2012 Leap Day Agreement. While Kim was likely not referencing the Leap Day Agreement or even the 1992 joint declaration on denuclearization, if he genuinely understands the need for full implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration and any agreement reached with President Trump, there may be a chance to resolve the North Korean nuclear situation and achieve a new beginning on the Korean Peninsula. However, if he does not, we may end up back where we were before— with increasing pressure and the prospect of conflict.