危险的灵活

事实证明，唐纳德·特朗普在外交政策上是善变的。就在上周，他眨眼之间就彻底转变了对俄罗斯、中国、北约和叙利亚的态度，没有道歉，也没有解释。这种所谓灵活性的好处被高估了，尤其在对付俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜这些强敌的时候，误判和误解都可能导致战争。

想想看，政府必须对付的，是一位野心勃勃要恢复他的国家大国地位的俄罗斯领导人，是一位想让他的国家在世界事务中与美国平起平坐的中国领导人，是一位希望他的国家有核国家地位并获得合法性和安全保证的朝鲜领导人。教训是什么呢？就是和他们打交道必须多加斟酌，必须小心翼翼，必须记得他们都有实际军事能力轻而易举地打击美国的重要盟友，更别说美国自己了。

基本法则

那么，特朗普政府又是如何对付这些对手的呢？他采取了典型美国式危机管理的所有标准行动：报复、制裁、警告、调兵、威胁。这些行动违背了一个基本外交法则：威胁最有可能招致与愿望恰好相反的反应。威胁会激发民族主义热情，引来对方的反威胁，使对话受阻。尽管如此，特朗普还是选择无视这一法则，并造成了如下结果：

对俄罗斯，美国发出最后通牒，要求它与叙利亚保持距离，至少不要纵容叙利亚使用化学武器。俄国人当然是拒绝了最后通牒，同时不承认对叙利亚使用化武的指责。他们威胁美国说，如果再袭击叙利亚，他们就会出手报复。

对中国，美国要求改变贸易现状，要求中国对朝鲜施压，减少或清除核武器。否则的话，特朗普表示，美国将自己采取行动修理朝鲜。中方只答应会合作检讨贸易状况，习近平与特朗普会面时甚至连一个贸易专家都没带在身边。至于向平壤施压，一份半官方中国报纸提到过中国切断向朝鲜供应燃料的想法，中方之前短期内也这么做过。而（更有说服力的是）另一方面，中国与朝鲜上个季度的贸易额比一年前增长了37%。特朗普加大筹码，撤回了一直以来对中国是汇率操纵国的指控，希望中国能为美国的强硬姿态挽尊。他以惯常的孩子气认为，习近平对俩人某顿晚宴上的巧克力蛋糕的喜爱，意味着习赞成他特朗普的炮舰外交。

对朝鲜，特朗普声称美国正在朝鲜沿海部署航母打击群，这大概是警告平壤，如果继续采取挑衅行动，就会招致美方的强有力回应。人们普遍认为，在阿富汗扔一颗“炸弹之母”，就是为了进一步提醒朝鲜美国的力量。但朝鲜威胁说，如果遭到攻击它会不惜打一场核战，而且它能轻易摧毁美国的驻韩基地。朝鲜警告说自己不是另一个伊拉克、利比亚或叙利亚，它还再次进行导弹试验（这次失败了），并举行了导弹装备大阅兵。第六次核武器试验估计已经箭在弦上。

特朗普的行动成功地暂时转移了人们对他在国内受挫的注意，转移了人们对他应该处理三个国家主要问题——俄罗斯干预美国大选和支持叙利亚独裁政权、中国在南海进行军事扩张、朝鲜发展核武器和弹道导弹——的注意。更重要的是，特朗普团队对于可以让美国避免重大冲突的外交选择完全熟视无睹。

替代选择

如果美国在俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的目标是要避免有意或无意的战争，并为可能的冲突解决方案开辟道路，那么，对于特朗普做了什么，以及还能做什么，笔者有以下想法：

对俄罗斯，为什么不接受普京的提议（这个提议得到巴沙尔·阿萨德的支持），对所谓的化学战进行国际调查？如果华盛顿确信叙方负有责任，并且特朗普确信俄方事先知道化武袭击，那么美国理当欢迎调查，并对调查结果有信心。而近期内，对于维护阿萨德给普京带来的战略利益，特朗普政府应予承认，并寻找替代方案。例如，特朗普可以承诺不再实施导弹攻击，以换取俄方确保阿萨德永远不再使用化学武器，并在国际监督下销毁他藏匿的化学武库。俄方则应向美国保证，它会尊重为反阿萨德的武装和人民而设立的安全区，交换条件是不更换叙利亚政权，以及取消对俄罗斯的部分制裁。

对中国，特朗普已经放弃了对中国是汇率操纵国的错误指责，现在，他还必须停止把贸易关系与中国向朝鲜施压混为一谈。特朗普上周发推特说：“我向中国国家主席解释了，如果他们解决朝鲜问题，他们与美国的贸易协定就会对他们有利得多。”不过此刻他可能已经意识到，与医疗保健一样，“事情相当复杂”。在接受《华尔街日报》采访时，特朗普说：“听（习近平说）了十分钟之后,我意识到事情并不简单。我强烈以为他们（对）朝鲜有巨大影响力……但情况并不是你想的那样。”不，当然不是。

但愿，特朗普不再把贸易当成给习近平的诱饵，并重新评估对朝政策（见下文），关注美中关系中更重要的问题。与之前严厉批评中国再次形成鲜明对比的是，特朗普如今称他和习“相处得非常好，我真的喜欢和他在一起”。如果真是这样的话，政府就有可能接受中国的请求，不再依靠制裁，而是恢复谈判。中国外长暗示，中国支持任何形式的谈判。美国可以把朝鲜近海的舰队撤到威胁距离以外，以此启动这一进程。（这样做还能打消中国的另一个不安：前往韩国的美国海军与日本海上自卫队一起，在东海中日两国有争议岛屿地区举行联合军事演习。）特朗普可以要求北京让金正恩同意放弃新的核和导弹试验，以此换取停止全面部署“萨德”反导系统，暂停未来的美韩军演。简言之就是，要试探中国的诚意和朝鲜的意图。

对朝鲜，显而易见，美国决策者在日本海显示“决心”，只会让金正恩更坚定地展示他的决心。同时，包括两位主要总统候选人在内的韩国人更担心的显然不是朝鲜的袭击，而是美国不和他们商量就发动对朝战争。（“韩国的安全和美国一样重要，”领先的候选人文在寅说。）美国和朝鲜回到谈判桌前必须牢记两个目的：第一，要消除上述紧张根源；第二，要重拾2005年六方会谈协议中“以行动换行动”的原则，重新考虑向朝鲜提供安全保证和经济援助，交换条件是对朝鲜核武器及相关设施实行可查证的的国际监督。

结论

成功的冲突管理需要和平的处理手段，这种手段重在促进谈判和互相让步，利用官方、非官方和个人三个层面的交往，力争缓和紧张，扭转冲突趋势。这些动作可以为重新接触和建立信任铺平道路。至少，要与对手“达成一致”，就不能考虑动武。武力总是有用的，但最好少用。

国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特在谈到朝鲜局势的时候，曾经发出一个充满希望的信号：“目前到了采取我们所能采取的一切行动——除了军事选择——来和平解决这一问题的时候了。”然而在韩国，副总统迈克·彭斯又出尔反尔，错误地声称以往对朝外交接触都是失败的，而且他否定了任何重启谈判的设想。对于发出这样混杂的信息，特朗普政府可能自以为得意，但实际上他们展现出的是一种外行的、不连贯的外交政策，它意味着麻烦不断。在一个国家的对外事务当中，炫耀武力是无法替代专业性和可靠性的。

Dangerous Flexibility

Donald Trump has proven to be a shape shifter on foreign policy issues. In just the last week he has completely changed his stance on Russia, China, NATO, and Syria—all without blinking, without apology, and without explanation. This so-called “flexibility” is an overestimated asset, particularly when dealing with serious adversaries—namely Russia, China, and North Korea—where miscalculation and miscommunication carries the potential for war.

Consider: the administration must deal with a Russian leader who has ambitions to restore his country's status as a great power; with a Chinese leader who wants his country to be co-equal with the United States in world affairs; and with a North Korean leader who wants his country to be acknowledged as a nuclear-weapon state and accorded legitimacy and security assurances. The lesson? They all need to be treated with respect and great delicacy, mindful that each has substantial military capability within easy reach of important U.S. allies, not to mention the U.S. itself.

A Cardinal Rule

So how has the Trump administration dealt with these adversaries? He has adopted all the standard actions typical of U.S.-style crisis management: reprisals, sanctions, warnings, force deployments, threats. These actions violate a cardinal rule of diplomacy: Threats will most likely produce a reaction exactly opposite of the one desired. Threats incite nationalist fervor, invite counter-threats, and obstruct dialogue. Nevertheless, Trump has chosen to violate that rule, with the following results:

With Russia, the U.S. has issued what amounts to an ultimatum: distance itself from Syria, or at least do not condone Syria's use of chemical weapons. The Russians, of course, reject an ultimatum and reject the accusation that Syria used chemical weapons. They threaten to retaliate if the U.S. attacks Syria again.

With China the U.S. demands a change in the terms of trade and Chinese pressure on North Korea to reduce or eliminate its nuclear weapons. Otherwise, says Trump, the U.S. will act on its own against the North. China promises nothing other than a joint review of the trade picture. Xi Jinping didn't even bring a trade expert with him to the meeting with Trump. As for pressuring Pyongyang, one semi-official Chinese newspaper has mentioned the idea of cutting off North Korea's fuel supply from China, something China has done before for a short period. On the other (and more convincing) hand, China's trade with North Korea is up 37 percent this quarter compared with a year ago. Trump sweetens the pot by withdrawing his longstanding charge that China is a currency manipulator, hoping China will salvage the uncompromising U.S. posture. In his usual childlike way, Trump thinks that Xi's love of the chocolate cake served at one of their dinners means Xi goes along with Trump's gunboat diplomacy.

With North Korea Trump says the U.S. is deploying an aircraft carrier strike force off the Korean coast, presumably to warn Pyongyang that some further provocative step might meet with a forceful U.S. response. Dropping a “mother-of-all-bombs” in Afghanistan is widely believed to send the North Koreans a further warning of U.S. capabilities. But North Korea threatens nuclear war if attacked, says it can easily destroy U.S. bases in South Korea, warns that it is not another Iraq, Libya, or Syria, and carries out yet another missile test (which fails) and huge parade of its missile inventory. A sixth nuclear-weapon test may yet come.

Trump's actions have succeeded in temporarily diverting attention from domestic setbacks and from dealing with the major issues he has with the three countries—Russia's meddling in the U.S. elections and its support of the Syrian dictatorship, China's military expansion in the South China Sea, and North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile buildup. More importantly, Trump's team is oblivious to diplomatic alternatives that might keep the U.S. out of a major conflict.

Alternatives

If the U.S. objective with Russia, China, and North Korea were to avoid war by accident or design and instead create a path to potential conflict resolution, here are some thoughts about what Trump might have done and can still do.

With Russia, why not accept Putin's proposal (supported by Bashar al-Assad) for an international investigation of the chemical warfare claim? If Washington is so convinced of Syria's responsibility—and if Trump believes Russia might well have known about the attack in advance—the U.S. should welcome an investigation with confidence in the outcome. As for the immediate future, the Trump administration should establish Putin's strategic interest in protecting Assad and seek ways to substitute for it. Trump might, for example, promise no further missile strikes in exchange for Russia's assurance that Assad will never again employ chemical warfare and will destroy the chemical stocks he has hidden under international inspection. In exchange for ruling out regime change in Syria and removing some sanctions on Russia, Russia would assure the US that it will respect safe zones for anti-Assad forces and people.

With China, Trump has already dropped his incorrect accusation that China is a currency manipulator. Now he must also drop his linkage of trade relations with Chinese pressure on North Korea. Last week Trump tweeted: “I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!” But now he may have come to the realization that, as with health care, “it's complicated.” In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Trump said: “After listening [to Xi Jinping] for 10 minutes, I realized it's not so easy. I felt pretty strongly that they had a tremendous power [over] North Korea. … But it's not what you would think.” No, it isn't.

Hopefully, Trump will stop trying to bait Xi on trade, reevaluate North Korea policy (see below), and focus on larger issues in U.S.-China relations. Trump now says, once again in direct contrast with previous scorching criticisms of China, that he and Xi “get along really well, I really like being with him.” If so, the administration might take up China's plea not to rely on sanctions and to resume negotiations, which its foreign minister suggested China would support in any format. The U.S. could jump-start the process by withdrawing the fleet near Korea to a nonthreatening distance. (Doing so would remove another source of China's upset: the U.S. naval force en-route to Korea conducted joint drills with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force in the East China Sea, in the area of islands disputed by China and Japan.) Trump might challenge Beijing to obtain Kim Jong-un's agreement to forego new nuclear and missile tests in return for a stop to full deployment of the THAAD antimissile system and suspension of future U.S.-South Korea military exercises. In short, test China's goodwill and North Korean intentions.

With North Korea, it should be obvious to U.S. policymakers that showing “resolve” in the Sea of Japan only makes Kim Jong-un more determined to show his resolve. In the meantime, it is apparent that South Koreans, including both of the two top presidential candidates, are more worried about a U.S.-initiated war with North Korea, without their being consulted, than about a North Korean attack. (“The safety of South Korea is as important as that of the United States,” the leading candidate, Moon Jae-in, said.) The U.S. and North Korea need to get back to the negotiating table with two objectives in mind: first, remove the sources of current tension, as noted above; second, restore the “action-for-action” principle in the 2005 Six Party Talks agreement and reconsider security assurances and economic assistance to North Korea in exchange for verifiable international inspection of its nuclear weapons and weapons-related facilities.

Conclusion

Successful conflict management calls for establishing a peaceful way of doing business. That approach emphasizes inducements, which may stimulate talks and reciprocal concessions; use of all three levels of diplomacy—official, nonofficial, and people-to-people; and actions on the ground that, by reducing tensions, reverse the momentum for conflict. These actions may pave the way for a process of reengagement and trust-building. At the very least, “getting to yes” with an adversary takes the use of force off the table. Force is always available, but is best when rarely used.

The national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, gave a hopeful sign when he said of the Korea situation: “It's time for us to undertake all actions we can, short of a military option, to try to resolve this peacefully.” But in Korea, Vice President Mike Pence backtracked, mistakenly labeling as failures past diplomatic engagements with North Korea and dismissing any idea of new negotiations. The Trump administration may pride itself on sending out mixed messages such as these, when in fact they reveal an amateurish, incoherent foreign policy that spells constant trouble. Displays of military power are no substitute for professionalism and reliability in the conduct of a country's external affairs.