虽然就任只有100多天，罗德里戈·杜特尔特总统已经把他的国家菲律宾置于全世界的聚光灯下。对他的领导风格，人们的反应既有赞美痴迷，也有批评怀疑。因其草根诉求、坚毅和异类的领导方法，被1600多万人民（比竞争对手多了600余万票）选出来的杜特尔特注定在国内外都有极高知名度。批评者对他粗俗的举止（脏话连篇，不遵守协议和程序）和没有条理的观点怨声载道。人们还批评他给菲律宾的对外关系带来不必要的不确定性，从而加剧地区的焦虑，对亚太地区政治安全局势产生不利影响。但是，在他的强烈民粹主义言论之外，是清晰的国家外交政策要旨，其立足点是菲律宾国内的当务之急和地区与全球格局的演变。

杜特尔特承诺覆行宪法赋予他的寻求独立外交政策的权力。他的有关声明其实抓住了问题本质，那就是要跨过卢比孔河（译者注：指作出最后的抉择）。这里的卢比孔河指什么？为什么菲律宾必须跨过？国家应该如何为这种跨越制定方向？

杜特尔特代表了一类菲律宾人，他们认为国家在太长时间里太过依赖美国，尤其是对外防御方面。在美国还处在顶端的单极世界秩序当中，安全保障方面搭美国的便车的确是权宜之计，它能让国家在相当长时间里略过领土和海洋防御，优先处理国内经济与社会问题。但在日益多极化的世界秩序里，新兴大国即便没有直接挑战，也逐渐瓦解着美国的霸权，尤其在东亚，继续过度依赖美国可能产生反作用，因为这对国家的其他安全合作伙伴形成掣肘。这种依赖还可能形成大国对抗事件中的一种倾向，对菲律宾来说，就是不管对错，菲律宾都会被认为显然要倾向于美国阵营。南海的爆点正在演变成海军强国之间的一场较量，杜特尔特显然是想让他的国家摆脱大国竞争。这类冲突可能来自美国“航行自由行动”的误判，因为中国强烈反对域外大国在它的近海部署军事力量。美中两国在南海对抗加剧，一旦两国间发生战事，菲律宾就可能面临池鱼之殃。必须指出，正是美国基地和军队的存在，使菲律宾在二战期间成为日本攻击的合理目标，这也导致菲律宾成为远东损失最惨重的国家之一。

此外，对于1951年的菲美《共同防御条约》是否包括西菲律宾海（译者注：即黄海）的岛礁和水域，美国一直态度暧昧，加上军事装备移交不足，菲律宾的脆弱性大增。2012年，根据现有的菲律宾与中国海商法，美国出面缓解巴约的马辛洛克（斯卡伯勒浅滩）（译者注：即黄岩岛）的紧张局势，但以失败告终。美国采取的“航行自由行动”也未能阻止中国在南海的人工岛礁建设。这使杜特尔特意识到，美国对于菲律宾的国家安全其实作用有限，尤其当事态严重的时候。所有这些，都迫使杜特尔特重新调整与美国的安全合作。所以，跨过卢比孔河，就相当于告别安全上对美国的过度依赖。在总统看来，这是应对时代变化的必要举措。在杜特尔特看来，国家把所有鸡蛋放进一个篮子是不明智的。对外防御不能外包，哪怕对方是长期盟友。近期南海局势再度紧张，但它不应该影响菲律宾保卫领土、主权和主权权利的自主能力的长远发展。而且，即使是军事上处于弱势的国家，也有多种方式守护这些国家利益。看来，杜特尔特已经开启这一领域的探索之路。

作为一个麻烦不断的南方城市的老市长，杜特尔特显然知道安全如何影响着政治和经济。棉兰老岛东部，包括达沃地区，是共产党新人民军的大本营，穆斯林叛军也离得不远。把达沃市从一个无法无天的地方变成安全繁荣的都市，从中获得的实践经验，让杜特尔特日后可以举一反三。为了利于城市的商业和发展，促进和平稳定，杜特尔特养成了与不同政治力量打交道的能力。

尽管明显是国家政治的门外汉，而且没有实际的外交政策背景，但是，杜特尔特的所作所为说明他很了解地区事态的演变。如果跨过卢比孔河代表减少对美国特别是在国防安全方面的依赖，那么，可以说菲律宾的许多东南亚邻国早就在朝这个方向努力了。武器供应商的多样化、通过与他国合作在本国生产武器、加强与多个安全合作伙伴的军事关系，这些都是它们在日益多极化的世界秩序中为提升各自的国家安全所采取的主要措施。

除了承办代号为“Komodo”的多边海军演习，印度尼西亚还与中国、印度、美国和澳大利亚进行联合海军演习；马来西亚与中国、印度、日本、美国合作；越南与法国、日本、美国、印尼和马来西亚合作；泰国采购中国武器（例如地对空导弹和反舰导弹、空中搜索雷达）和俄罗斯武器；越南长期以来一直购买俄罗斯武器（现在还可以从美国买武器）。泰国购买了3艘中国潜艇，马来西亚将购买中国的近海巡逻舰。俄罗斯是另一个杜特尔特总统希望与之建立牢固关系的国家，它向印尼移交了水陆两栖坦克和Yakhont超音速导弹，雅加达还表示有兴趣购买俄罗斯基洛级潜艇。杜特尔特宣布他有可能获得中国（甚至俄罗斯）的武器，这没什么好奇怪的，本地区很多国家的武器库里都有中国和俄罗斯的装备，也有西方生产的武器。同样，考虑与中国举行联合军演，也是与本地区越来越多的此类做法同步。

但要跨过卢比孔河，杜特尔特总统必须谨慎行事，必须摸着石头过河。国内公众情绪、经济需求与优先事项、国际特别是东亚邻国的反应，这些对他来说都是关键的考量。菲律宾公众赞成他访问中国和日本这两个重要的经济合作伙伴，期待数十亿美元的投资贷款项目不久能兑现。国内的和平、有序、稳定，加上良好的经济基本面（如投资评级、GDP快速增长），将使菲律宾拥有更多投资去扩大就业，不断提高经济效益。中国是新兴境外投资者，有尽人皆知的财力、技术和施工能力去做大型基础设施项目，比如可以给菲律宾经济发展带来革命性影响的铁路。实际上，中国进入全球基础设施市场，已经迫使日本这样的传统玩家重新制定自己的融资条件，以便与中国更灵活的放贷条件竞争。美国在这一领域表现消极也促使杜特尔特认真考虑中国的报价，尤其是结合地区背景考虑的时候。中国已经在印尼建设东南亚的首个高速列车（雅加达-万隆铁路），在马来西亚（关丹）建设一个港口和工业园，并开始在泰国建设一个将连接昆明和新加坡的铁路网。

之前阿基诺当政时期，西菲律宾海的争端左右着双边关系，杜特尔特看来对延续这一政策不感兴趣。如果能够很好地管控纷纷，菲律宾就可以专注于国内优先事项，同时缓解地区紧张。然而，这并不说明他对在西菲律宾海寻求国家利益没兴趣。出访与中国有南海纠纷的东盟伙伴国，即越南、印尼和文莱，出访与中国在东海有岛礁和水域纠纷的日本，访华后的菲中联合公报当中出现8次“南海”和4次“争端”字样，都说明总统对这一问题高度重视。虽说杜特尔特的中国之行主要出于经济动机，但他答应菲律宾渔民可以重新在巴约的马辛洛克（译者注：黄岩岛）打渔，这是他曾经作出的承诺。杜特尔特看来认识到了争端给小渔户造成的生计与需求压力，他希望在讨论争端当中更重要的政治安全问题的同时，尽快帮他们纾解困难。这种务实态度受到极大欢迎。杜特尔特也意识到，东盟国家在南海问题上存在分歧，个别东盟主权声索国事实上一直对中国奉行温和外交，支持通过多边论坛管控分歧。在这个意义上，杜特尔特可以说摸到了石头。

杜特尔特任总统，可能会持续不断地在大国角力当中拓展自主空间，管控短期内难以解决的棘手争端，并从与世界第二大经济体的经济合作中获取好处。但菲律宾前任领导人付出的这类努力，结果好坏不一。拉莫斯总统化解了1995年美济礁事件引发的紧张，但美济礁现在被中国占领了。马卡帕加尔·阿罗约总统与中国做的那些基础设施交易，后来因为腐败和违规被中止了。她与中国和越南进行的海洋地震合作，后来被认为是出让菲律宾在西菲律宾海的国家利益——虽然联合国海洋法公约鼓励共同开发资源，而且包括本地区国家在内，很多国家也在实践这一理念（例如马来西亚-泰国、马来西亚-越南海上能源合作，越南-中国北部湾渔业合作）。

杜特尔特通过成功访华，带回240亿美元投资和贷款，其中包括为基础设施项目的融资。阿罗约总统的经历也许给杜特尔特留下深刻印象，这也体现在访华后发表的菲中联合声明第24条当中：“双方同意共同实施的基础设施合作需服从适当招标程序、透明度，符合两国相关国内法律法规和通行的国际实践。”他在国家事务方面打击腐败和违法的强硬表态，或许将在即将实施的一系列交易中得到检验。至于西菲律宾海的联合开发，他看来也同样会征求国会和菲律宾人民的同意。这说明他尊重行政与立法分离，尊重权力与选民授权的相互依存。

总之，杜特尔特认识到他必须带领他的国家跨过卢比孔河。几乎所有其他东南亚国家已经跨过去了。该地区国家长期以来致力于经济、安全合作伙伴的多样化，以分散风险，避免卷入大国角力。此外，菲律宾还在加强与东亚邻国的贸易，即使领土和海洋争端仍对这一新兴的经济关系构成挑战。跨国的安全挑战，如贩毒、走私、海盗和跨境犯罪等，也为相邻沿海国家的合作创造了天然空间。这也可以解释杜特尔特为什么更重视距离最近的邻国。但是，跨过卢比孔河必须慎之又慎。不确定性和模糊性，也许是保持行动自由和机动性所必须的，但应该避免以自由落体之势倒向一边。

Despite being just past 100 days in office, President Rodrigo Duterte had already put his country, the Philippines, under global spotlight. Reactions to his leadership style ranged from praise and fascination to criticism and suspicion. Elected by more than 16 million people - more than 6 million votes ahead of his next contender - he has definitely garnered enormous publicity, not only at home, but also abroad, thanks to his grassroots appeal, and decisiveness, unorthodox leadership approach. Critics tend to harp on his rough demeanor – his penchant for expletives and seeming non-observance of protocol and formalities – and lack of coherent vision. He has also been criticized for creating unnecessary uncertainty in Philippine foreign relations that exacerbates regional anxiety and adversely affects politico-security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. But beyond his strong populist rhetoric are clear elements of a national foreign policy grounded on Philippine domestic imperatives and evolving regional and global architecture.

Duterte promised to fulfill the Constitutional mandate of pursuing an independent foreign policy. One of his statements in relation to this subject captures its essence – crossing the Rubicon, an expression that means crossing the point of no return. What is this Rubicon? Why do the Philippines have to cross it? And how should the country navigate such crossing?

Duterte personifies Filipinos who believed that the country had relied too much on the US, particularly for its external defense, for too long. In a unipolar world order with the U.S. at the apex, such free riding on U.S. security guarantee was expedient, enabling the country to prioritize domestic economic and social concerns at the expense of neglecting territorial and maritime defense in the long run. But in an increasingly multipolar world order with new emerging powers gradually chipping away, if not directly challenging, U.S. supremacy, particularly in the East Asian region, continued overdependence on the U.S. could become counterproductive as it limits the country's security partners. Such dependence can also constitute a liability in the event of major power rivalry, with Philippines, rightly or wrongly, being seen as overtly leaning towards the U.S. camp. The South China Sea (SCS) flashpoint is evolving into a contest between big naval powers, and Duterte clearly wants to steer his country away from such major power competition. Such conflict may arise from miscalculations given U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and China's strong opposition to deployments of military assets by external powers in its near seas. Thus, intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in SCS, has the potential of inflicting collateral damage to the Philippines should hostilities break out between the two powers. It must be noted that the presence of U.S. bases and troops in the country made it a legitimate target for Japanese attacks during World War II causing the country to be one of the most seriously devastated in the Far East.

Furthermore, an ambiguous U.S. position on whether the features and waters on West Philippine Sea are included in the 1951 PH-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty or not and inadequate transfer of military hardware raises Philippines' vulnerability. Failure on the part of the U.S. to defuse tensions in Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) in 2012 through simultaneous Philippines-China maritime law and futility of FONOPS in preventing China from completing construction of artificial islands in SCS made Duterte realize the limits of U.S. role for the country's security, especially when push comes to shove. All these compel Duterte to recalibrate security engagement with the U.S. Crossing the Rubicon can, thus, be equated with weaning away from excessive security reliance on US, a move seen by the President as necessary to reflect the changing times. For Duterte, it is not wise for the country to put all its eggs in one basket. External defense cannot be outsourced, even to a longstanding ally. Recent renewed tensions over SCS should not hijack long-term development of homegrown capability to defend the country's territory, sovereignty, and sovereign rights. Moreover, there are many ways of securing such national interests even for militarily disadvantaged states, and he seems opened in exploring this whole gamut.

As a longtime mayor of a city in the largely troubled south, Duterte clearly knows how security affects politics and economics. Eastern Mindanao, including Davao Region, is a stronghold of the communist New People's Army and Muslim rebels are located not far. Transforming Davao City from a lawless area to a safe and thriving metropolis gave him practical lessons that would later found relevance on a bigger scale. Duterte had developed an ability to deal with different political forces to advance peace and stability conducive for commerce and development in his city.

Although he is clearly an outsider in Philippine national politics and has no actual foreign policy background, his actions suggest a fair understanding of evolving regional dynamics. If crossing the Rubicon means reducing dependence on U.S., especially for external security, it can be argued that many of the country's Southeast Asian neighbors have long began advancing towards this direction. Diversifying arms suppliers, partnering with other countries to produce arms at home, and expanding military linkages with multiple security partners are among the key steps they have taken to enhance their respective national security in an increasingly multipolar world order.

Indonesia has been conducting joint naval exercises with China, India, U.S., and Australia, aside from hosting a multilateral naval exercise (Komodo); Malaysia with China, India, Japan, U.S., and Australia and; Vietnam with France, Japan, and U.S. Indonesia, and Malaysia; and Thailand had procured Chinese (e.g. surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles and air search radars) and Russian arms and Vietnam had long been buying Russian arms (and now can buy U.S. arms as well). Thailand is buying 3 Chinese submarines, and Malaysia is about to purchase Chinese littoral mission ships. Russia, another country with which President Duterte wants to establish strong relations, had transferred amphibious tanks and Yakhont supersonic missiles to Indonesia, and Jakarta also expressed interest to acquire Russian Kilo-class submarines. Duterte's announcement that he may procure Chinese (or even Russian) arms should therefore come as no surprise – many regional states have Chinese and Russian assets, along with Western-made weapons, in their respective arsenals. Similarly, considering joint naval exercises with China also jives with increasing regional practice.

However, in crossing the Rubicon, President Duterte must proceed with caution – he must feel the stones. Domestic public sentiment, economic demands and priorities, and international reaction, notably by East Asian neighbors, will be key considerations for him. The Filipino public welcomed his visits to key economic partners, China and Japan, and will be looking forward having the multi-billion dollar investments and credit facilities translated on the ground the soon. Domestic peace, order, and stability, coupled with good economic fundamentals (e.g. investment grade rating, fast growing GDP), will allow the country to corner more investments that will create jobs and sustain its improving economic performance. China is an emerging outbound investor with a demonstrated financial, technological, and engineering capacity to accomplish major infrastructure projects, such as railways, which can have a transformative impact on Philippine economic development. China's entry into the global infrastructure market, in fact, compelled traditional players like Japan to rewrite part of their financing conditions to keep up with competition from more flexible Chinese lending terms. That the U.S. was not active in this sector encouraged Duterte to seriously consider the Chinese offer, particularly when the regional context is considered- China is already building Southeast Asia's first high speed train in Indonesia (Jakarta-Bandung railway), constructing a port and industrial park in Malaysia (Kuantan), and building a network of railways that would link Kunming and Singapore, beginning with the section in Thailand.

Disputes over West Philippine Sea (WPS) had dominated bilateral relations during the previous Aquino Administration, and Duterte seems uninterested in continuing with this policy. If disputes can be managed well, Philippines can focus on its domestic priorities, while contributing to easing of regional tensions. However, this cannot be taken as a suggestion of his lack of interest in pursuing national interests in WPS. Visits to fellow ASEAN states with which China also has disputes over SCS, namely Vietnam, Indonesia and Brunei, and Japan, with which China also has some disputes with over features and waters in the East China Sea, and the fact that “South China Sea” appeared 8 times and “disputes” 4 times in the Joint Philippines-China Statement after his China visit indicates the high importance set by the President on this issue. Duterte's trip to China was said to be largely economically–motivated, but he promised that Filipino fishermen will be able to resume fishing in Bajo de Masinloc – a promise that he delivered. Duterte seems cognizant of the pressing livelihood and needs of small-scale fishermen affected by the disputes and wants to bring them immediate relief while the larger politico-security aspects of the disputes are being discussed. This pragmatic approach was warmly received. Duterte also seems to realize that ASEAN remains divided on SCS and that individual ASEAN claimant states had, in fact, been pursuing quiet diplomacy with China while supporting multilateral forums for managing the dispute. In this sense, it can be said that he is feeling the stones.

Duterte's presidency can be situated in a continuing trend to carve an autonomous space from major power rivalry, manage intractable disputes that seems difficult to be resolved in the immediate term, and benefit from economic engagement with the world's second largest economy. However, such efforts by former Philippine leaders had checkered results. President Ramos was able to defuse the tensions arising from 1995 Mischief Reef incident, but this feature is now under Chinese occupation. President Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) engaged China for infrastructure deals that were later discontinued because of corruption and irregularities. She also entered into a joint marine seismic undertaking with China and Vietnam that were later considered as compromising the country's national interests in WPS, although the concept of joint resource development itself is encouraged by UNCLOS and enjoys substantial state practice, including from regional states (e.g. Malaysia-Thailand and Malaysia-Vietnam offshore energy cooperation, Vietnam-China fisheries cooperation over Tonkin/Beibu Gulf).

Duterte brought home $24 billion of investments and credit facilities from his successful state visit to China and this includes funding for infrastructure projects. The GMA experience may have left a deep imprint on Duterte and this was reflected in item 24 of the Philippines-China Joint Statement post-visit: “… Both sides agree that infrastructure cooperation which are jointly undertaken will be subject to proper procurement process, transparency and in compliance with relevant domestic laws and regulations and international practices.” His tough talk against corruption and anomalies in state transactions may be put to test in the flurry of deals about to take place. As for joint development in WPS, he seems uninclined to pursue the same saying that he would need consent of Congress and the Filipino people. This demonstrates his respect for the executive-legislative separation and interdependence of powers and approval of his constituency.

In sum, Duterte realizes that he needs to lead his country to cross the Rubicon – almost every other Southeast Asian state had already crossed it. Regional states have long been diversifying both their economic and security partners to spread risk and to avoid getting entangled in big power tussles. Moreover, Philippines has been increasing its trade with neighboring East Asian states, while territorial and maritime disputes continue to pose a challenge to this burgeoning economic relations. Transnational security challenges such as drug trafficking, smuggling, piracy and cross-border crimes also create natural spaces for cooperation with neighboring coastal states. This would explain the greater emphasis he is according to the country's immediate neighborhood. However, crossing the Rubicon must be done with caution and moderation. Uncertainties and ambiguities may be necessary for freedom of action and maneuverability, but freefalling to one side should be avoided.