当两国官方关系冻结或受阻时，二轨外交被认为可以创造改善关系的机会。二轨外交参加者作为非正式、私人的代表，可以更自由地探讨对于评估双方利益、优先顺序和首选解决方案来说十分重要的各类问题、事态和选择。这些讨论也许传递到官方渠道，被加以研究考虑。希望缓解紧张或寻求制定争端解决方案的国家，可以选择使用这种办法，而它的成果也许会是双方都接受的下一步方案。二轨外交的结果喜忧参半，但它是一次成功的尝试，为正式会谈议程提供了实用而具体的议题。从这方面看，拉莫斯和傅莹2016年8月的香港会晤值得称赞。

2016年8月10日至11日，菲律宾前总统、特使菲德尔·瓦尔德斯·拉莫斯在香港与他的老朋友傅莹女士（全国人大外事委员会主任委员）和吴世存教授（中国南海研究院院长）友好会晤。

为了改善关系、管控争议、探索公开合作领域，菲律宾新政府2016年8月派出由前总统拉莫斯率领的代表团，前往香港与中国代表会面。此次非正式会谈非常重要的几个原因是：1）这是仲裁裁决后菲律宾的首个重要举措，表达出希望与中国接触的意愿；2）菲律宾派出的代表团立场平衡，代表着不同的对华观点；3）中国代表团由高级别人士组成，他们要么曾经有相关经验，要么仍然与菲律宾保持着关系；4）选择香港反映了会晤的非正式性，及对会晤期间妥协的希冀；5）关注实际的非争议性问题，表明双方有兴趣在共同关心和有共同利益的事务上开展工作。

菲方代表团由德高望重的政治家率领，他是建立博鳌论坛的主要支持者之一。其他成员包括得奖记者、前美国广播公司北京站站长仙沓·罗马那，他在中国工作和生活了近30年，是菲律宾最重要的中国专家。此外还有拉莫斯时期前旅游部长、内政和地方政府部长拉斐尔·阿鲁南三世，他是“西菲律宾海联盟”主要召集人，对中国在南海的强硬行动予以直言不讳的批评。中国代表团由全国人大常委会外事委员会主席傅莹率领，她曾担任中国驻菲律宾大使（1998-2000年）。另外还有中国南海研究院院长吴士存，他此前多次前往马尼拉参加学术交流。

会晤后，双方发表了一份概述7个可合作领域的联合声明：1）鼓励海洋生态保护；2）避免紧张局势和促进渔业合作；3）缉毒与反走私合作；4）打击犯罪和反腐合作；5）改善旅游机会；6）鼓励贸易和投资便利化；7）鼓励就共同关心和感兴趣的问题进行二轨（通过智库）交流。这些领域对双方有着极大共同利益和吸引力，反映了菲中地方上的需要和现状，它包含双方都可接受的平台，锚定未来更高层次的合作。联合声明所概述的领域不仅可以增加国内支持，还有望对整个地区产生溢出效应。

这些倡议源于国际、地区、双边法律协定和国家实践。南海的海洋保护和渔业合作源于国际海洋法公约（UNCLOS）的若干条款和本地区国家现有的实践（如中越北部湾渔业合作协定，共同成为中西太平洋渔业委员会等地区渔管机构的成员，2010年的东盟-中国海事协商机制备忘录，2007年的东盟-中国海上运输协定）。国际海洋法鼓励南海这类半封闭海洋的接壤国在保护跨界和高度回游鱼种方面进行合作（第5章第63条1、2，第64条1）。应对非传统安全挑战的合作，也与海洋法规定相维系，例如有关打击海盗（第5章第100条）、缉毒（第5章第108条）和搜救支援（第5章第98条2）。通过这些合作，可以获得宝贵经验，如印尼-马来西亚-新加坡马六甲海峡联合巡航，亚洲地区反海盗及武装劫船合作协定等。此外，菲律宾和中国也签有许多双边文件（如2007年的关于扩大深化农渔业合作的协议备忘录，2001年的打击跨国犯罪合作备忘录，2001年的打击贩毒合作协议，等等）。这些都可以通过精心筹备去实施或激活。

上月晚些时候，有消息说拉莫斯要访问北京，但行程无声无息被取消了。对此可以有多种猜测。也许是日程安排使会晤遇到困难，也许是仔细评估后认为首次行程显然已达到目标，因此下一步会谈可以提升到官方级别。无论如何，拉莫斯和傅莹8月会晤达成的部分共识，很可能成为计划中菲律宾总统杜特尔特年底前对中国进行首次国事访问的谈话要点。有意思的是，杜特尔特总统已经任命拉莫斯与傅莹香港会晤的菲方成员仙沓·罗马那为菲律宾新任驻华大使。

菲律宾总统罗德里格·杜特尔特10月18号开始至21号对中国进行国事访问。图为18日晚杜特尔特抵京，外交部长王毅机场迎接。（来源：中新社）

菲中关系源远流长，覆盖面广泛，有许多互利机会。近几年，南海问题制约了双边关系，但争端的存在没有必要阻碍两国在其他方面发展多方位关系。尽管仍存在巨大障碍，但菲中关系不必被领土和海洋争端所拘泥和定义。马来西亚和越南等其他南海沿岸国家的经验表明，未决争议没有必要影响经贸关系的发展扩大，也没必要波及到政治与安全领域。应该鼓励各国更好地处理紧张局势和争端，避免殃及互利关系。会晤提出的7个倡议涵盖了广泛的经济、环境和非传统合作领域，双方可以进一步释疑，培养对话与合作的习惯。这些领域的成功可以带动其他方面的合作，让双方为未来解决更复杂的问题作好准备。菲律宾与中国是邻国，冲突对双方都不利。有必要让双方不断了解彼此的利益和关切，找到改善关系的办法，加深信任。尤其在关系出现紧张和挑战时，要保持公开的沟通渠道。落实拉莫斯与傅莹的建议是朝正确方向迈出的一步，它有助于把象征性会面的意见转变为可行的政策建议，推动菲中整体关系积极向前发展。

Track II diplomacy has been credited with creating openings for improving relations when official state-to-state interactions are frozen or constrained. As unofficial and private representatives, Track II participants are freer to discuss and explore various issues, scenarios, and options that are important in assessing the interests, priorities, and preferred solutions of both sides. These discussions may then be passed on to official channels for appropriate scrutiny and consideration. States seeking to relieve tensions or establish resolutions to disputes may resort to this approach and its outcome may shape the next steps that both sides can undertake. Track II diplomacy's results remain mixed, but it takes only one successful attempt to provide concrete and specific agenda items for formal talks. It is within this lens that the Ramos-Fu August 2016 meeting in Hong Kong could be appreciated.

On August 10-11, 2016, Philippine Former President and Special Envoy Fidel V. Ramos met in Hong Kong with his old friends - Madam Fu Ying (Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress) and Professor Wu Shicun (President, China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies) - in a friendly atmosphere.

In an effort to improve relations, manage disputes, and explore areas open for cooperation, the new Philippine (PH) government dispatched a delegation in August 2016 led by former PH President Fidel Ramos to meet with their Chinese counterparts in Hong Kong. The informal meeting is important for several reasons: 1) it was the first major PH step to signal intentions to engage China (PRC) post-arbitration award; 2) PH sent a balanced delegation representing a diverse viewpoints regarding the PRC; 3) The PRC delegation consisted of high level members who had prior experience/continuing linkages with PH; 4) Hong Kong's (HK) choice of venue reflected the informality of the meeting while promoting mid-way compromise, and; 5) focused on pragmatic, non-controversial issues indicating an interest to work on matters of mutual concern and benefit.

PH delegation was led by a respected statesman, who is one of the leading proponents for the establishment of the Boao Forum. Other members include: 1) an award-winning, journalist, and former ABC Beijing Bureau Chief Chito Sta Romana, who worked and lived in China for 3 decades, and who is one of the country's foremost China experts and; 2) former Secretary of Tourism and Interior & Local Government under Ramos Rafael Alunan III, who is a lead convenor of the West Philippine Sea (WPS) Coalition and a vocal critic of China's assertive actions on WPS. PRC delegation; but, on the other hand, was led by Standing Committee and National People's Congress Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Fu Ying, who previously served as PRC Ambassador to PH (1998-2000) and; 3) National Institute for South China Sea Studies President Wu Shicun, who has gone to Manila in the past for some academic exchanges.

After the meeting, both sides released a joint statement outlining 7 proposed areas for cooperation: 1) encouraging marine preservation; 2) avoiding tension and promoting fishing cooperation; 3) anti-drug and anti-smuggling cooperation; 4) anti-crime and anti-corruption cooperation; 5) improving tourism opportunities; 6) encouraging trade and investment facilitation; 7) encouraging Track II (via Think Tank) exchanges on relevant issues of mutual concern and interest. These areas enjoy strong shared interest and affinity, reflect local needs and conditions in PH and PRC, and comprise of agreeable platforms from which higher level cooperation in the future can be anchored upon. The areas outlined will not only promote domestic support but hopefully allow for regional spillover.

These proposals can anchor on international, regional and bilateral legal instruments and state practice. Marine preservation and fishery cooperation in SCS can stem from several pertinent Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions and existing regional state practice (e.g. PRC-Vietnam Fisheries Cooperation in Beibu/Tonkin Gulf, shared membership in regional fisheries management organization like the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, and the 2010 ASEAN-PRC MoU on Maritime Consultation Mechanism, 2007 ASEAN-China Maritime Transport Agreement). UNCLOS encourages states bordering semi-enclosed seas, like SCS, to cooperate in the conservation of straddling and highly migratory fisheries stocks (Art 63 (1-2) & Art 64 (1) Part V). Cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges can also be hinged on salient UNCLOS provisions, such as those pertaining to suppression of maritime piracy (Art 100 Part V), drug trafficking (Art 108 Part V), and search and rescue assistance (Art 98 (2) Part V). From such cooperation, valuable lessons can be drawn, mechanisms like the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Malacca Strait joint patrols, and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Moreover, PH and PRC also signed numerous bilateral instruments (e.g. 2007 MoU on Broadening and Deepening Agriculture and Fisheries Cooperation, 2005 MoU on Maritime Cooperation, 2001 MoU on Cooperation in the Crackdown on Transnational Crimes, 2001 Pact on Cooperation Against Illicit Traffic and Abuse of Narcotic Drugs) that can be elaborated upon for implementation or reactivation.

Late last month, news came out that Ramos will pay a visit to Beijing but the trip was cancelled without notice. Several speculations can be made with respect to this. Scheduling challenges may have posed difficulties for attending the meeting, or it could be that, after careful assessment, it became apparent that the first trip was already able to achieve its aim; therefore, further talks can now be elevated to an official level. Regardless, it is highly likely that some of the consensus agreements proposed in the August Ramos-Fu meeting may shape part of the talking points for the planned first state visit of PH President Rodrigo Duterte to China before the year ends. Interestingly, President Duterte had appointed Mr. Chito Sta Romana, a member of the PH delegation in the Ramos-Fu Hong Kong Meeting, as PH's new ambassador to PRC.

Philipine President Rodrigo Duterte started a state visit to China from Oct. 18 to 21. This is a photo of China's Foreign Minister WANG Yi meeting Duterte at the airport in Oct. 18 evening.（Source: China News Service）

Philippines-China relations has a long history, is broad and comprehensive and offers a lot of opportunities for mutual gain. In recent years, the SCS issue constrain relations, but the presence of such disputes need not prevent the two sides from cultivating other aspects of their multi-faceted relations. Although it remains a big hurdle, PH-PRC relations need not be defined or get fixated to territorial and maritime disputes. The experience of other SCS littoral states, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, demonstrates that the unresolved disputes need not impede the development and expansion of commercial/economic ties and while this may not necessarily spillover to political/security aspect, it may encourage states to better manage tensions/disputes so they would not adversely affect mutually beneficial ties. The 7 proposed items represent the breadth of economic, environmental and non-traditional areas for cooperation that both sides can pursue to address mistrust and develop habits of dialogue and collaboration. Success in these areas may invite cooperation in other dimensions and may prepare both sides in resolving more complicated issues in the future. PH and PRC are neighbors, and conflict will not play in either party's favor. It is imperative for both sides to continue knowing one another's interests and concerns, find ways to improve relations, deepen trust, and maintain open lines of communication especially when relations are being strained/challenged. Implementing the Ramos-Fu proposals is a step in the right direction. It can help translate inputs from the symbolic meeting to actionable policy suggestions that can contribute in building momentum for positive PH-PRC overall relations.