韩国7月初决定允许美国部署“末段高空区域防御系统（萨德）”。一直以来，美国都试图将其盟国纳入更广的对抗朝鲜导弹的反导系统，但由于中国强烈反对，韩国迟迟未参与正式讨论。

鉴于“萨德”雷达的探测距离，目前各方就它的技术范围仍未形成共识，而且它是影响安全环境的双刃剑。许多美国分析人士称，反导系统升级只是防御性的，有助于美国保护自身及盟国的安全利益，且该系统的技术制约使它不可能瞄准俄罗斯或中国。如美国分析人士所说，北京需要一个友善的后院半岛，与韩国关系闹僵不符合中国的利益。

但另一方中国分析人士却认为，“萨德”并不能够对付当前或未来来自朝鲜的威胁。他们认为，“萨德”雷达的真正目标是将中国（和俄罗斯）置于美国监视之下，甚至形成美韩日三国联盟的实战基础。除了让朝鲜加速发展其武器，中国分析人士认为“萨德”还会使南北朝鲜隔阂加深，降低统一的可能性。同时他们警告“萨德”会给中韩、俄韩关系带来持久的破坏。

这一问题的核心是，对于如何看待韩国的作用和关乎朝鲜半岛安全与稳定的决定，中美之间存在分歧。美国和韩国认为“萨德”是对付越来越可能的朝鲜核威胁的战术性保障，而中国把“萨德”看成是美国方面的战略举措，是更大的遏制方略的组成部分。

选自：环球网

首尔对中国在该地区其他问题上的立场一向表态谨慎，其中最引人注目的，就是在涉及到中国的海洋主权争端上不得罪各方。韩国需要与中国保持良好关系有两个主要原因，而且它要避免把北京推向与韩国自身安全或与对付朝鲜不相干的领域。

第一个原因是，中国已经成为对韩国经济福祉至关重要的国家。去年第四季度起，中国超过日本，成为继美国之后的韩国第二大贸易伙伴。第二个原因是，无论现在与平壤打交道，还是将来朝鲜半岛发生任何诸如统一的巨变，韩国都需要北京的外交实力来对付朝鲜。2013年，中国明显把中朝关系从“特殊”降到“正常”，这使首尔与北京交好更为可行。

萨德落户韩国星州郡（资料图）

韩国官员坚持认为，“萨德”是一个双边问题，只与美韩应对或阻止朝鲜进攻的防御能力有关，“萨德”的部署决定不应让中国参与。而且，在韩国领土部署“萨德”的决定既已作出，许多韩国人就认为这个问题与联盟一样，属于国内议题（在韩国，联盟问题一向被当作属于外交政策的内部事务）。

部署“萨德”的决定以及选址东南部的星州郡，在韩国国内激起了人们对决策程序和标准的热议。韩国民调机构STA今年7月进行的调查显示，45.8%的受访者认为“萨德”的部署“减少了军事有效性，加剧了与中国和俄罗斯的冲突，从而有碍国家利益”。

这与今年早些时候颇有不同。在朝鲜进行四次核试验之后，当时首尔峨山政策研究院的一份民调显示，74%的受访者赞成部署“萨德”。而民调机构RealMeter在7月13日公布的调查显示，支持者的比例为44.2%。而韩国盖洛普8月初的民调显示，支持“萨德”的人数占56%。这表明，韩国人在评判“萨德”时，非常在意对“朝鲜威胁”的感受。

7月份STA的调查还显示，大部分韩国受访者（60.2%）某种程度上都认为，看似草率公布的部署“萨德”决定是迫于美国的压力。这种感觉让韩国人对美国盟国的作用展开更广泛、更深入的讨论。这类讨论一度被认为是按党派划界的，但实际上它引起的分歧要微妙得多。

在7月25日的东盟地区论坛会议上，以及中国外长王毅与韩国外长尹炳世举行的会晤中，王毅对（部署“萨德”的）决定表示了遗憾，称这一决定“损害中韩互信”。他对尹炳世外长提出，韩方应认真维护与中国的双边关系。在7月24日的会谈中，王毅还要求韩国撤销其部署“萨德”的计划，并暗示该计划将给中韩关系带来持久影响。

由于韩国不断在中美之间调整自己的位置，这种替换其实象征着更大的问题。正如暨南大学陈定定指出的，即使中韩关系没有因为“萨德”彻底变坏，对“萨德”的争执也提醒人们两国之间长期存在结构性的紧张。

现在，决定已经作出，选址也已完成，要逆转是不可能的。首尔不想示弱，尤其是朝鲜还在继续加强其弹道导弹能力。北京在直接影响“萨德”的部署方面选择无多。

虽然外交上模棱两可，韩国面对中美之争已经作出战略抉择，那就是支持它的长期盟友美国。部署“萨德”的决定及其后续，使韩国在东北亚的立场变得明确。韩国需要处理它与最强大盟友和前（也可以说是现在）地区宗主国之间的关系。不过，这两个大国也必须调整对韩国的期望。对中美两国来说，一个走投无路的韩国不会成为重要的桥梁，只会是难以相处的伙伴。

In early July, South Korea decided to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The United States has been seeking to link its ally into a broader missile defense system against North Korean missiles, but South Korea had been slow to enter formal discussions due to vociferous Chinese objection to the system.

There is still no consensus on the technical scope of the THAAD battery due to its radar ranges, and its effect on the security environment is equally divisive. Many U.S. analysts contend that this defense systems upgrade is merely defensive and aids U.S. protection of the security interests of itself and its allies, and that the technical limitations of the system make it unable to target Russia or China. As U.S. analysts have argued, it is actually counter to Chinese interests to turn cold on South Korea, when Beijing needs a friendly peninsula in its backyard.

Chinese analysts, on the other hand, argue that THAAD cannot deal with current or potential North Korean threats. They contend that the real purpose of the radar is to keep China (and Russia) under U.S. surveillance and even potentially form the practical foundations of a trilateral U.S.-South Korea-Japan alliance. In addition to expediting further weapons development in North Korea, Chinese analysts suggest THAAD will drive the wedge between the two Koreas further, decreasing the possibility of reunification. Moreover, they warn of the continued damage that THAAD will cause to the South Korea's relationships with China and Russia.

At the heart of this issue is the difference in how China and the United States view the role of South Korea and decisions related to the security and stability of the peninsula. Whereas the United States and South Korea see THAAD as a tactical bulwark against the growing credibility of a North Korean nuclear threat, China sees THAAD as a strategic move on the part of the United States, part of a larger pattern of containment.

Source:www.huanqiu.com

For its part, Seoul has been reticent to make any statements on China's posture elsewhere in the region. This has been most noticeable in its complicated balancing act with ongoing maritime territorial conflicts involving China. South Korea needs good relations with China for two main reasons, and shies away from pushing Beijing in areas it sees as not directly related to its own security or dealings with North Korea.

First, China has become an immensely important country for South Korea's economic well-being: China surpassed Japan to become South Korea's second largest trading partner, after the United States, since the fourth quarter of last year. Second, South Korea needs Beijing's diplomatic weight vis-à-vis North Korea, both in dealing with Pyongyang now and in the event of any changes on the Korean peninsula, such as reunification. China's apparent downgrade of relations with North Korea from “special” to “normal” relations in 2013 makes Seoul's courting of Beijing even more viable.

THAAD being deployed in Seongju county,South Korea.

South Korean officials maintain that the THAAD issue is a bilateral one pertaining exclusively to U.S.-ROK defensive capabilities to meet or deter a North Korean attack and that the decision to deploy THAAD should not include China. Moreover, now that the decision to deploy THAAD on South Korean soil has been made, many South Koreans have suggested that the issue has become an area of domestic debate just as much as it is an alliance one (alliance concerns in South Korea historically have been considered as much of a domestic issue as a foreign policy one).

In South Korea, the decision to deploy THAAD and the selection of the Seongju County in southeastern South Korea has provided new kindling wood to the hot domestic debate over the process and criteria of the final decision. In a July poll conducted by South Korean polling service STA, 45.8 percent of respondents believed that THAAD deployment will “hinder the national interest by reducing military effectiveness and aggravating conflict with China and Russia.”

This is a bit of a swing from earlier this year—following the fourth North Korean nuclear test—when a poll from the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies reported that 74 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD. A July 13 Real Meter survey put the level of support at 44.2 percent. But an early August Gallup Korea poll placed support for THAAD at 56 percent. What this shows us is that South Korean opinion about THAAD is extremely sensitive to the perception of the North Korean threat.

The July STA poll also showed that the majority of South Korean respondents—60.2 percent—believe to some degree that what seemed to be a rushed announcement regarding THAAD deployment was due to U.S. pressure. Part of this sentiment links to a much broader and deeper debate among South Koreans on the role of the U.S. alliance. This debate, which once was thought to cut along party affiliation lines, is actually much more nuanced in its divisiveness.

At a sideline meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang and South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se and at the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 25, Minister Wang expressed regret over the decision, citing the THAAD decision as, “[undermining] the foundations of trust between the two countries” and asked Minister Yun how South Korea would work to protect its bilateral relations with China. Last week [on July 24], Minister Wang asked South Korea to rescind its plans to deploy THAAD, suggesting it will have a lasting effect on Sino-South Korean relations.

The exchange is symptomatic of a much bigger issue, as South Korea continues to negotiate its place between China and the United States. As Dingding Chen of Jinan University points out, even though the China-South Korea relationship will not completely sour over this issue, the THAAD debate is a reminder of the longstanding structural tensions between the two countries.

Now that the decision, as well as site selection, have been made, reversal of the THAAD decision is unlikely. Seoul will not want to look weak, particularly as North Korea continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities. And Beijing has few options for directly influencing THAAD deployment.

Despite any diplomatic ambiguities, South Korea's strategic decision in regards to the Sino-U.S. rivalry has already been made in favor of its long-standing ally, the United States. The THAAD decision and its aftermath makes it clear where South Korea stands in Northeast Asia. South Korea will need to negotiate its relationship between its strongest ally and its former (and arguably current) regional suzerain. However, these two great powers will also need to recalibrate their expectations of South Korea. Rather than serving as an important bridge, a cornered South Korea will be a difficult partner for both.