互联互通是中国和东南亚的共同利益，“海上丝绸之路”正是为达成这一目标而不断努力的体现。陆地和海上联通对贸易与安全至关重要。为数众多的东盟内部、东盟与中国之间有关互联互通的会谈、协议和承诺，都说明它的重要性。缅甸、老挝和越南与中国陆地接壤，越南、柬埔寨、泰国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、文莱和菲律宾是南海沿岸国家，毗邻泰国湾。东盟对华贸易发展迅速，预计将从2014年的3665亿美元增加到2020年的1万亿美元，而互联互通将是实现这一目标的关键。此外，地理上的接近使（毒品、武器、人口和水货的）贩运走私和（过度捕捞、海盗、气候变化对粮食和生存安全的不利影响等）地区公共事务管理的漏洞增加。这些地理风险凸显了双方互联互通的特点，那就是推动双向贸易和商务、旅游、人文交流，携手应对共同关心的问题。

东南亚对中国周边外交至关重要。所以对中国外交政策来说，管理和解决地区关切，如南海争端，始终是一个挑战。中国不断增加在南海的存在和力量投射，使海上军事强国担心其海空军在这一战略航道长期享有的航行飞越自由被剥夺。而且，中国对外威胁的日益增加，迫使处于军事劣势的沿岸国家为对抗或阻止中国在有争议海域的挑衅行为而扩大与域外强国的安全合作。地理上连接中国与东南亚沿海各国的海洋，成为领土争夺和海洋权利声索的对象，使域外大国的介入进一步复杂化。然而，尽管存在争议，（陆地与海洋的）毗邻实际上可以用来促进互利关系，这正是改善关系、保持地区和平与秩序的基础。“海上丝绸之路”在这方面大有可为。

2013年，中国国家主席习近平在印尼议会的演讲中提出构建21世纪“海上丝绸之路”。它是连接中国与欧亚、中东和非洲的更广的“一带一路”倡议的海上部分，表明中国有浓厚兴趣加强加快与东南亚国家的全方位互联互通，包括在海洋领域。选择在印尼这个区域领导性、战略上连接太平洋和印度洋的国家正式宣布“海上丝绸之路”，表明中国对东南亚地区和海上互联互通的高度重视。

有中国对地区互联互通的倡导以及东南亚国家的支持，人们可能期待出现更好的良机。“海上丝绸之路”可以锚定以往众多双边和地区的互联互通草案、建议、协议（如2004年的“运输合作谅解备忘录”、2007年的“东盟-中国海上运输协议”，及其他姊妹港口协议）和经济联系（如海关程序协调），进而获得整个地区的响应。2003年，菲律宾推出“强大的共和国海上公路计划”，意图贯通这个岛国的汽车摆渡和公路。2014年，印尼提出成为“海洋轴心/支点”的构想，它包含五大支柱：海洋文化、资源、联通、外交和成为两洋战略桥梁。在东南亚大陆，也有一系列连接东盟与中国的铁路公路建议（如新加坡至昆明铁路）。从这个有利角度来说，“海上丝绸之路”恰与该地区的联通意愿吻合。

有几个因素会使“海上丝绸之路”加强互联互通的成功机会提高。其中包括：

1）“海上丝绸之路”的灵活性。它可以容纳所有类型互联互通项目，除实物基础设施外，与一些误解相反的是，它还超越“海上”这一概念；

2）中国展示出的金融能力（2015年成为资本净输出国）、技术和基础设施能力（世界最大水坝、第一辆磁悬浮列车、最长的高铁运输网、最高的桥梁、海拔最高的铁路线）；

3）巨大的地区基础设施融资缺口；

4）强大的地区支持（所有10个东盟成员都是亚投行意向创始成员，亚投行与丝绸之路基金同为“一带一路”的主要融资机构；

5）全球性燃料和基建原材料价格低企。中国占世界钢铁产量的50%，占水泥产量的60%，这也是为什么中国承包商能够在海外基础设施项目竞标中击败外国同行。

其他一些进展也利好“海上丝绸之路”。如中国在地区基础设施市场日益扩张，亚投行与现有多边发展银行（世界银行、欧洲复兴开发银行、亚洲开发银行）逐渐联合融资。这些项目的稳步推进，中国与接受方和东道国的良好工作关系，亚投行与其他主要国际贷款机构维持的互补及伙伴关系，都将提升“海上丝绸之路”的成功率。“海上丝绸之路”和更广的“一带一路”的物质成分（如土地、天空、海洋、能源、互联网和电信）似乎得到更多关注，但实际上它的覆盖面更广，包括了农业、林业、渔业、金融一体化、贸易便利化、电子商务等领域的合作，以及设立经济区。事实上，落实“海上丝绸之路”不能只看亚投行的融资项目，也要看中国进出口银行、中国国家开发银行和中投公司等国家政策银行和主权财富基金的融资项目。

“海上丝绸之路”改变了中国投资格局，证明分歧未必阻碍投资。它推动了中国投资的多元化，使其从资源开采变为对基础设施和绿地的投资。关注社会问题和扶贫也成为突破点，已经获批的亚投行和世界银行共同资助的印尼全国贫民区改造项目就是例证。实践证明，争议不会成为“海上丝绸之路”的障碍。中国国家开发银行为雅加达-万隆铁路项目出资约3/4，为印尼国家银行、印尼人民银行、曼迪利银行提供10年期30亿美元贷款（2016年），批准为印尼的52个项目提供118亿美元贷款，涉及金融、电力、电信、农业等领域。中国进出口银行向宁平煤基尿素（化肥）厂提供融资（2013年），中国国家开发银行为永昂发电厂一期工程提供融资（2013年），这两个项目都在越南。要知道，印尼和越南在南海与中国存在捕鱼和海洋权利纠纷，它们能够得到贷款，说明只要高层政治关系稳固，中国愿意搁置争议，紧张局势也是可控的。中国在动荡和风险地区的投资，如撒哈拉以南非洲和中东，强化了良好政治关系的重要性，它们或许超越了对可行性和风险的考虑。

16年初，印尼雅加达至万隆高铁项目正式启动，图为两名当地人在开工仪式上与高铁列车模型合影。（选自：新华网）

“海上丝绸之路”虽然前景光明，但也面临几大挑战。中国在这一地区（包括部分在南海有主权要求的国家）资助和支持的基础设施项目取得进展，证明“海上丝绸之路”可以超越分歧前行，但本地区的政治和安全环境始终会给这些项目带来影响，因为争议影响着对中国的整体看法和信任。与“丝绸之路经济带”相比，“海上丝绸之路”推进较慢，或许可以猜到，是南海争议牵制了中国在这一地区的投资。另外要解决的，是它带给人的困惑和相关信息匮乏。亚投行成员地位等同于“海上丝绸之路”国家吗？东南亚国家中的保守主义（观望）、排外主义和对经济被别国控制的恐惧，也是“海上丝绸之路”要克服的挑战。“海上丝绸之路”大体是向西的，给人的印象是要绕道某些东南亚沿海国家。而交通、电力能源、电信和关键工业部门被认为是战略产业，外国的类似参与和控制总是会引起关注。中国以往在这一地区的项目受挫，包括涉及贪腐、无规则、质量和安全环保标准低劣，也影响人们对“海上丝绸之路”的看法。这需要给对方信心，需要释放善意，保持中国与东南亚国家的对话。不得不说的是，与迟到者和骑墙派相比，主动先行者总是有望享受到更好的条件和优惠。

Connectivity is a shared interest for China and Southeast Asia, and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) represents part of the continuing efforts to highlight this. Land and sea connections are important for trade and security. The long list of intra-ASEAN and ASEAN-China discussions, agreements, and undertakings related to connectivity demonstrate its importance. Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam share a common land border with China. Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines are littoral states of the South China Sea and the adjoining Gulf of Thailand. Burgeoning ASEAN-China trade is projected to increase from $366.5 billion in 2014 to a target of $1 trillion in 2020, and connectivity will be critical in facilitating this. In addition, geographic contiguity increases vulnerability to trafficking and smuggling (of narcotics, arms, human and contraband) and problems in managing regional commons (e.g. overfishing, maritime piracy, adverse effects of climate change to food and livelihood security). These geographic risks highlight the salience of connectivity for both sides in order to promote two-way trade, commerce, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and to cooperatively address issues of mutual concern.

Southeast Asia is important for China's neighborhood and periphery diplomacy; hence the management or resolution of regional concerns, such as the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, represents a continuing challenge for Chinese foreign policy. China's increasing presence and power projection in the SCS worries naval powers concerned about potential curtailment of their longstanding freedom of navigation and overflight for their naval and air force assets in the strategic waterway. Furthermore, China's increasing external threat has led militarily disadvantaged littoral states to expand security engagement with external powers in order to counter or deter Chinese assertive actions in the disputed sea. Hence, the sea that geographically binds China and maritime Southeast Asia also constitutes a space, which became the subject of competing territorial and maritime claims and further complicated the participation of extra-regional powers. However, while disputes persist, proximity and contiguity (by land and sea) can actually be used to foster mutually beneficial ties which can serve as foundations for improved relations and enduring regional peace and order. MSR can help in this regard.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the 21st Century MSR in an address in the Indonesian Parliament. MSR is the maritime component of the larger One Belt, One Road (OBOR, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative) that would connect China with Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa. MSR signals China's deep interest in enhancing and accelerating all-around connectivity with Southeast Asia, including on the maritime front. Choosing regional leader Indonesia, which also strategically links the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as the venue to officially announce MSR suggests the high importance attached by China to Southeast Asia and to maritime connectivity.

With China championing regional connectivity and Southeast Asia supporting the same, better traction is expected. MSR can anchor on numerous prior bilateral and regional deliberations, proposals and agreements on connectivity (e.g. 2004 MoU on Transport Cooperation, 2007 ASEAN-China Maritime Transport Agreement, sister port agreements) and economic linkages (e.g. harmonization of customs procedures) to get regional buy-in. In 2003, the Philippines launched the Strong Republic Nautical Highway, an integrated system of RORO (roll-on, roll-off) ferries and highways to link the archipelagic country. In 2014, Indonesia came up with the Maritime Axis/Fulcrum doctrine which encompasses 5 pillars – maritime culture, resource, connectivity, diplomacy and strategic bridge between two oceans. In mainland Southeast Asia, there was a proposal to link ASEAN with China through a series of highways and railways (e.g. Singapore-Kunming Rail Line). From this vantage point, MSR taps into regional connectivity aspirations.

Several factors can increase the chances of MSR's success in terms of promoting connectivity. This includes:

1) MSR's flexibility – it can accommodate all types of connectivity projects beyond physical/hard infrastructure and, contrary to some misconception, actually goes beyond “maritime”;

2) China's demonstrated financial factor (just became a net capital exporter in 2015), technological and infrastructure capacity (world's largest dam, 1st maglev train, longest high speed rail network, highest bridge, highest altitude railway);

3) huge regional infrastructure financing gap;

4) strong regional support (all 10 ASEAN members are provisional founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which together with the Silk Road Fund, constitute the key financing vehicles for OBOR), and;

5) low world price environment for fuel and construction materials. China accounts for about 50% of the world's steel and about 60% of the world's cement production, which can help explain why Chinese contractors can outbid their foreign peers when competing for infra projects abroad.

Several developments also bode well for MSR. This includes China's expanding footprint in regional infrastructure market and gradual co-financing of AIIB and established multilateral development banks (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank). Steady progress of these projects, good working relations with recipient and host states, and continuing complementation/partnership of AIIB and other international lending institutions will enhance the success of MSR. The physical infra component (e.g. land, air, sea, energy, internet and telecoms) of MSR and the larger OBOR seem to be getting much of the limelight, but it actually covers a broader gamut including cooperation in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, financial integration, trade facilitation, e-commerce and the setting up of economic zones. In fact, in the implementation of MSR, one has to look not just at projects financed by AIIB, but also by Chinese policy banks and sovereign wealth funds, like China Export-Import Bank (CEIB), China Development Bank (CDB) and China Investment Corporation.

MSR changes the complexion of Chinese investments and proves that differences do not necessarily hinder investments. MSR promotes diversification of Chinese investments away from resource extraction and into infra and greenfield investments. Wading into social issues and poverty alleviation is also becoming a thrust as evidenced in the approved AIIB-WB co-financing of the National Slum Upgrading Project in Indonesia. Disputes also proved not to be an impediment to MSR. CDB funded about ¾ of the project cost of Jakarta-Bandung Railway; extended $3 billion 10-year loans to Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Mandiri (2016); and approved $11.8 billion in loans to fund 52 Indonesian projects covering finance, electricity, telecoms, agriculture, etc. CEIB financed the Ninh Binh coal-based urea (fertilizer) plant (2013), while CDB financed the Vung Ang Power Plant Phase 1 (2013) – both taking place in Vietnam. It must be remembered that both Indonesia and Vietnam are at loggerheads with China over fishing and maritime disputes in the SCS, but the fact that they were able to get funding suggests that China is willing to sideline disputes so long as high level political relations remain strong and tensions can be managed. Chinese investments in volatile and risky regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East reinforces the importance of good political relations, and it may override viability and risk considerations.

Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project in Indonesia kicked off in early 2016, the image shows two local people taking pictures with the train model at the openning ceremony.（Source:Xinhuanet）

However, despite the promising prospects for MSR, several challenges remain. While the progress of Chinese-funded and supported infrastructure projects in the region (including in some SCS claimant states) suggests that MSR is moving despite the disputes, the regional political and security environment will continue to impact such projects as the disputes affect the overall perception of and trust in China. Compared to the Silk Road Economic Belt, MSR is proceeding slower, and it can be surmised that the SCS disputes moderate regional Chinese investments. Confusion and lack of information about MSR also needs to be addressed. Does AIIB membership equate with MSR inclusion? Conservatism (i.e. wait-and-see), perception of exclusion, and fear of economic domination on the part of Southeast Asian states represents other challenges that MSR has to hurdle. The general direction of MSR is westward, creating an impression that it bypasses certain maritime Southeast Asian states. Transport, power and energy, telecoms, and key industrial capacity are also considered strategic industries, so foreign participation and control of the same always raises concern. Prior setbacks of Chinese projects in the region – in light of involvement in corruption, irregularities, poor quality, safety and environmental standards – also affect views towards MSR. This requires reassurance, demonstration of goodwill and continuing China-Southeast Asia dialogue. Having said that, active first movers seem poised to enjoy better terms and privileges than latecomers or fence sitters.