On May 9, 2015, Russia staged the biggest military parade in its history on the Red Square involving more than 16,000 troops and hundreds of newest armoured vehicles, military airplanes and helicopters. The Victory Day Parade marked 70 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War Two, during which the Soviet Union suffered the heaviest casualties. Although the victory over Nazi Germany was an allied effort, many Western leaders shunned Moscow's military parade in protest at Russia's alleged involvement in Eastern Ukraine. This rupture between Moscow and the West underlined that the U.S.-Russian “reset” is rather over, whilst the Kremlin is willing to deepen its relations with the non-Western states and is tilting more towards China. And the parade in Moscow appeared to confirm this tendency.
Although it is highly unlikely that a new Russian-Chinese bloc will emerge in the Eastern hemisphere, a Sino-Russian rapprochement is to be expected, and Central Asia is the region to observe a greater cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Russia and China are already working together in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO was established initially in 1996 as the Shanghai Five to set the framework for strategic cooperation on matters related to security on border regions between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China. In 2001, the goals of the organisation were reformulated to include political, economic, and military cooperation.
The birth of the SCO was immediately regarded by many analysts and policymakers as a potential balancing tool of Russia and China to counter the growing American engagement in Central Asia. Yet, to date, such a view of the SCO has not materialised. Beijing remained reluctant to get engaged directly in the security matters of Central Asia notwithstanding its concerns with Islamic separatism in Xinjiang. In a similar vein, Moscow resisted the Chinese initiatives to turn the SCO into a more development and economic-based platform. In this respect, a Sino-Russian rapprochement may animate the SCO. In fact, Beijing may become the powerhouse of the SCO by guiding the organisation in a new direction. The enhanced cooperation between Russia and China may also foster new bilateral and multilateral initiatives.
Nonetheless, the points of friction between Russia and China remain. It is yet to be observed the impact of the Eurasian Economic Union and its tariffs on the level of trade and investment in the region, since China remains one of the principal economic partners of the Central Asian states and their main source of development finance. At the moment, official Beijing appears to understand Kremlin's vision of the role of Russia in the geopolitical system of axes. There is a widely accepted belief in Russia that the country is emerging as the world's greatest power and thus should be treated as an equal partner on international arena. For now, China is willing to accept these popular discourses and play an informal leadership, or rather co-leadership role in Central Asia.
As a result of such an approach, China is emerging as a much stronger and greater player in the Central Asian region, and perhaps beyond. Beijing acquired not only exclusive access to the Russian resources, but also Kremlin's political support to be more proactive in the Russian “near abroad.” The Silk Road Economic Belt and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are some of those exemplary initiatives spearheaded by China and endorsed by Russia. Yet, again, it remains unclear to what extent Russia will be willing to allow Central Asian states engage in the Chinese-led activities such as the Silk Road Economic Belt projects.
In turn, Central Asian states may exploit this Sino-Russian rapprochement in order to advance their own goals. Russia and China emerge as the convenient partners for the Central Asian leaders to cooperate with, since both Moscow and Beijing may act the guarantors of security from external threats and serve as the sources of funding for the Central Asian states. Yet, most importantly, neither Russia nor China is demanding democratic transformations from the Central Asian governments as the prerequisite for such support.
In the meantime, although many Western leaders boycotted the military parade in Moscow on May 9, President of Russia Vladimir Putin still enjoyed the company of important dignitaries to mark the Victory Day. Apart from the usual suspects, President of China Xi Jinping was amongst those guests to join the Russian president at the 70th anniversary parade. And for some period it appeared that, indeed, the parade was not about a military might and a balance of power, but about paying tribute to millions of civilians and soldiers who lost their lives in the Second World War.
