最近在广岛举行的 G7 峰会和随后在克什米尔举行的 G20 旅游会议，凸显了这两个集团言论的鲜明对比。G20峰会的口号是“同一个地球、同一个家庭、同一个未来”，而G7的好斗态度可以概括为“我们必须脱离中国”。

对于东南亚国家联盟（东盟）成员国来说，脱钩是不现实的。虽然该地区可以受益于生产和投资从中国转移到本国，但中国经济与西方经济完全脱钩，可能导致贸易转移、生产成本上升和长期福利下降。

目前，美国和欧洲经济与中国脱钩的行动似乎仅限于能源、半导体、信息和通信技术、采矿和矿产等行业。但脱钩预计将影响几乎所有行业，包括机械、机械设备、电气元件和汽车。

鉴于东盟经济体对美国、欧盟、中国和东亚的依赖程度相同，东盟必须保持中立，不选边站队，并且加强合作。通过利用其日益增长的经济和政治影响力，这些成员国可以促进和平、促进合作，加强与国际社会的接触。

美中地缘政治竞争加剧的背景下，东盟国家也必须深化区域经济一体化。过去二十年，内部贸易占东盟成员国贸易总额的比重一直徘徊在 22-23% 左右。可以肯定的是，它们对世界其他地区的出口在此期间有所增加。但东盟国家在全球贸易中的份额，在 2000 年至 2022 年间几乎没有增长，仅从 6.4% 增长到 7.8%。

进入21世纪以来，东盟内部贸易停滞，存在三种可能的原因。首先，该地区肤浅的一体化模式。由于东盟制造的大多数产品，是替代品而不是互补品，因此成员之间增加贸易的范围本质上是有限的。

其次，更严格的原产地规则和非关税措施可能成为贸易壁垒。这些法规和程序旨在确保健康、安全和环境保护，但它们的制定和实施可能无意中阻碍贸易和投资。

最后，应该认识到，东盟不是自给自足的地区。这些成员国严重依赖日本、韩国和中国等国家的投资和技术。东盟作为一个集团运作，但它不是关税同盟，意味着成员国可以自行与其他国家或者集团接触。这种灵活性使得成员国能够追求自己的利益，并寻求多样化的伙伴关系和协议，同时保持东盟共同体的凝聚力和活力。

由十个东盟国家、中国、日本、韩国、澳大利亚和新西兰组成的“区域全面经济伙伴关系”（RCEP）就是一个很好的例子。RCEP 约占全球 GDP的三分之一和世界贸易和投资总额的四分之一，是世界上最大的自由贸易区，其目标是通过降低90% 的产品的关税，促进贸易一体化。

另外一个代表性案例是“全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”（CPPTP,以前称作“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”。 2018 年以来，四个东盟国家——新加坡、越南、文莱和马来西亚——加入了 CPTPP。该协定约占全球 GDP 的 13%，旨在降低98% 的产品的关税。

“印度洋-太平洋经济繁荣框架”(IPEF) 是美国拜登政府于 2022 年 5 月发起的新组织，也寻求促进区域伙伴关系。但是，该协议因其排他性和分裂性而受到批评。除美国、日本、韩国、印度、澳大利亚和新西兰外，七个东盟国家——新加坡、泰国、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、越南和文莱——已加入IPEF。但柬埔寨、老挝和缅甸被排除在外。

这种排斥可能加剧东盟成员国之间的经济差距，激化地区紧张局势，抵消现有大型区域贸易协定（如 RCEP）的好处。一些评论家认为，IPEF在很大程度上只具有象征意义，旨在吸引美国选民，而不是实施有利于成员国的有效政策。同样，印太地区的贸易部长最近在底特律召开会议，讨论一系列旨在加强半导体和关键矿物等必需品供应链的措施。但是，他们达成的协议，除了减少对中国的依赖外，缺乏明确的政策目标。

中国与西方之间不断升级的竞争，使得东盟国家陷入两难境地，承受不起与任何一方脱钩的后果。2000 年至 2022 年间，欧盟成员国与欧洲之间的贸易增长了两倍多，从 1105 亿美元增至 3423 亿美元。东盟与美国的贸易额，从 1351 亿美元飙升至 4522 亿美元。同期，东盟对美国的出口几乎翻了两番，从 879 亿美元增至 3567 亿美元。

与此同时，东盟与中国的贸易额在2022年达到9753亿美元，比2000年增长23倍。在此期间，东盟国家对中国的出口增长17倍，从222亿美元增加到4081亿美元。

此外，东亚、美国和欧盟都是东盟国家外国直接投资的重要来源地。2021年，东亚国家占该地区外国直接投资总额的33% ，而美国和欧盟分别占22%和15%。

鉴于这些经济联系的深度，敦促东盟国家与中国脱钩是非常不公平的。这也是缺乏远见的行为，因为脱钩会破坏集团内部的贸易和经济发展，加剧整个地区的政治不稳定。

全文翻译自报业辛迪加（Project Syndicate），原文标题“ASEAN Between the U.S. and China”（2023）

The recent G7 summit in Hiroshima and the subsequent G20 tourism meeting in Kashmir underscored the stark contrast between the two groups' rhetoric. While the G20 emphasized its “one Earth, one family, one future” motto, the G7's combative attitude could be summarized as “We must divorce China.”

For the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), decoupling is not an option. While the region could benefit from production and investment shifting away from China to ASEAN countries, a full economic decoupling between the Chinese economy and the West could also result in trade diversion, higher production costs, and reduced welfare over the long term.

The push to decouple the American and European economies from China currently seems to be limited to sectors such as energy, semiconductors, information and communication technology, mining, and minerals. But decoupling is expected to affect nearly every industry, including machinery, mechanical appliances, electrical components, and automobiles.

Given that ASEAN economies are equally dependent on the United States, the European Union, China, and East Asia, the bloc must maintain neutrality, refrain from taking sides, and strengthen cooperation. By leveraging their growing economic and political influence, member states could promote peace, foster cooperation, and increase engagement with the international community.

Amid the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the US and China, ASEAN countries must also deepen regional economic integration. Over the past two decades, intra-ASEAN trade as a share of members' total trade has stagnated at around 22-23%. To be sure, members' exports to the rest of the world have increased over this period. But ASEAN countries' share of global trade barely increased between 2000 and 2022, growing from 6.4% to 7.8%.

There are three possible explanations for the stagnation of intra-ASEAN trade since the turn of the century. The first is the region's model of shallow integration. Because most ASEAN-made products are substitutes rather than complements, the scope for increased trade between members is inherently limited.

Second, stricter rules of origin and non-tariff measures could act as trade barriers. While these regulations and procedures are aimed at ensuring health, safety, and environmental protections, their design and implementation can inadvertently impede trade and investment.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that ASEAN is not a self-contained region. Member states rely heavily on investment and technology from countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China. And while the bloc functions as a united group, it is not a customs union, which means that member states may engage with other countries or blocs on their own. This flexibility enables members to pursue their own interests and seek diverse partnerships and agreements while maintaining the cohesion and vitality of the ASEAN community.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes all ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, is a case in point. Representing roughly one-third of global GDP and one-quarter of the world's total trade and investment, the RCEP is the world's largest free-trade area, and its aim is to foster greater trade integration by reducing tariffs on 90% of product lines.

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (previously known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership) is another example. Since 2018, four ASEAN countries – Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia – have joined the CPTPP, which accounts for roughly 13% of global GDP and aims to reduce tariffs on 98% of product lines.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a newly established grouping launched by US President Joe Biden's administration in May 2022, also seeks to foster regional partnerships. But the agreement has faced criticism for being exclusionary and divisive. In addition to the US, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, seven ASEAN countries – Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei – have joined the IPEF. But Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have been left out of this new framework.

Such exclusions could exacerbate economic disparities between ASEAN members and heighten regional tensions, offsetting the benefits of existing mega-regional trade agreements, such as the RCEP. Some critics have argued that the IPEF is largely symbolic and intended to appeal to American voters rather than implement effective policies that benefit its members. Likewise, trade ministers from across the Indo-Pacific recently convened in Detroit to discuss a series of measures aimed at bolstering supply chains for essential goods, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. But the agreement they reached lacks clear policy objectives beyond reducing dependency on China.

Given that they cannot afford to decouple from either side, the escalating rivalry between China and the West puts ASEAN countries in a difficult position. Trade between the bloc's member states and Europe more than tripled between 2000 and 2022, from $110.5 billion to $342.3 billion. Similarly, ASEAN's trade with the US surged from $135.1 billion to $452.2 billion. ASEAN exports to the US nearly quadrupled from $87.9 billion to $356.7 billion over the same period.

At the same time, trade between ASEAN and China reached $975.3 billion in 2022, an astounding 24-fold increase from 2000. ASEAN countries' exports to China increased by a factor of 18 during this period, from $22.2 billion to $408.1 billion.

Moreover, East Asia, the US, and the EU are all significant sources of foreign direct investment in ASEAN countries. In 2021, East Asian countries accounted for 33% of total FDI in the region, while the US and EU accounted for 22% and 15%, respectively.

Given the depth of these economic ties, urging ASEAN countries to decouple from China is deeply unfair. It is also short-sighted, because decoupling would undermine trade and economic development within the bloc, fueling political instability across the region.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2023.www.project-syndicate.org