王杰先生于2019年7月9日在香港举行的“中美经贸关系：现状与前景”论坛上致词。

长期以来，美国全国商会（US Chamber of Commerce）一直对密切的中美关系、巨大的双向商业利益及其所带来的机遇给予支持，对当前中美关系的现状与发展趋势，商会和我们的会员感到十分担心。我们完全同意中国国际经济交流中心理事长曾培炎所说的，贸易逆差并不是美中关系的核心挑战。然而，严重的问题仍然存在，正如特朗普政府的“301条款”报告所突出列举的。自从2010年以来，美国商会在一系列报告中也强调，中国靠补贴及国家干预、强制技术转让、盗用知识产权、市场保护等方式实现产业本地化的政策，正给美国企业、工人和美国的竞争力带来越来越大的风险。

美国商界，无论是美国商会（AmCham）、美中贸易全国委员会还是美国全国商会，在很长一段时期以来一直都警告说，对于一系列领域内的不公平贸易与监管规则和做法，美国及其他发达经济体都在酝酿反弹，这并不单单是美国人的叙事。

需要说明的是，对于中国近期所采取的，以及传闻将来准备采取的一些行动，美国商界和全国商会是受到鼓舞的。美国企业能够并且将继续发挥中美关系的桥梁作用，这是毫无疑问的。尽管我们的观点与美国政府“301条款”报告的多数判断结果是一致的，但是，我们对中国市场的巨大商机仍然非常乐观。任何一方都承受不起双向关税，或者其他使这场冲突扩大的危险举动。

美国全国商会和我们的成员对关税的不断升级感到震惊，并且极其反对。这种做法威胁着税收管理改革的成效，损害美国的实力和全球经济，破坏全球贸易框架。你们当中的一些人可能已经知道，几周前，我们的执行副总裁兼国际事务负责人迈薄伦在全国广播公司财经频道（CNBC）谈了各种问题，引起了总统的兴趣。当然，总统打来电话，反应非常强烈。我提起这些只是想说明，美国全国商会在这些问题上是如何积极表态的。

然而，正如我们今天上午听艾德温·福尔纳博士所说的，中美商业关系长期以来一直被视为两国更广泛关系的压舱石，但如今却出现了日趋严重的裂痕。在当前形势下，商界十分担心，中美之间的利益重叠范围似乎越来越小。就这个问题，请允许我强调三点。

首先，无论旗号是“中国制造2025”，还是努力实现高质量增长，或者数字化，人们对中国模式的扩张都感到十分担忧。这种模式已经使全球经济的某些领域非商品化，并且正在向较高附加值的领域转移。要知道，对大多数美国公司和工人来说，问题不在于他们必须要与中国竞争，而在于竞争的条件是什么。

其次，鉴于经济政策对国家安全利益的影响，双方对国家安全的担忧正在迅速加深。最近，特朗普政府采取了考虑已久的措施，来解决中国电信巨头华为在美国和国际网络系统扮演重要角色所带来的国家安全与外交政策问题。从美国企业的角度来看，这些行动应该在贸易谈判之外解决，除非这些谈判关注的是解决美国贸易代表办公室“301条款”报告所列述的技术转让、知识产权保护、市场准入等核心问题。

与此同时，中国政府在这期间转而着手深化其正在进行的技术全球化运动，它制定了一份不可靠的美国公司和个人清单，宣布了技术安全管理制度，并提出有可能限制稀土的出口。它还颁布一系列新的网络监测措施草案、技术与采购标准、数据安全限制以及隐私标准，这些对美国任何行业的公司在中国市场的贸易和投资都有重大影响。双方冲突的升级和扩大，又进一步损害了相互信任，增加了两国企业面临的风险。

尤其是，中国近期的网络和数据措施，正在伤害开放市场和改善监管取得突破性进展这一潜在前景，而这一前景本来是可以通过贸易谈判实现的，其中包括云计算市场准入、更自由的数据流动、更自由的全球贸易和跨境服务。

第三，民粹主义是不会消失的。政策制定者们无法跟上技术变革的步伐，而这将加剧而不是缓和民粹主义。即使技术进步扩大了受益者之间的差距——一边是美国和中国，另一边是国际社会中的其他国家，也依然如此。例如，普华永道预计，美国和中国将瓜分全球人工智能领域暴利的70%。在中美冲突里，技术起到了推波助澜的作用。双方都感到愈发脆弱与焦虑。未来几年里，美国任何地方都可能有10%到50%的就业岗位被自动化取代。

要知道，正如福尔纳先生所说，早在特朗普当选总统之前，美国对中国态度就已经开始转变。特朗普卸任后，这个趋势几乎肯定还会继续下去。需要提醒的是，是布什政府提出的新签证政策，这被看作是出口管制限制，尤其是专门针对中国，针对在美国的大学里获取技术。当时，身为布什政府副国务卿的罗伯特·佐利克回应了人们对中国在各领域所作所为的担忧，他在2005年美中关系全国委员会发表有关“负责任的利益攸关方”演讲。而正是奥巴马政府的国防部长阿什·卡特，是他委托国防创新试验小组（DIUx）撰写了有关中国投资美国新兴技术的报告。是奥巴马政府的官员们在即将离任时声称，美国外资投资委员会的出口管制亟需改革。是奥巴马政府的贸易代表迈克尔·弗罗曼开始瘫痪WTO的上诉机构，因为美国担心上诉机构正在削弱WTO处理国家补贴、公共债券等重大问题的能力。

因此我认为，至少就美中关系而言，2016年11月特朗普总统的当选并不是历史的新起点。我同意福尔纳博士另一个关于美国国会情绪变化的观点，即自从中国加入WTO以来，我从未见过美国国会在对华问题上如此干劲十足。我的意思不是说，那是一种好现象。两党在国会的关注点不是由反贸易、强硬反华的“老卫队”引导，而是由参众两院亲贸易、支持商界的议员引导，比如约翰·康宁、马克·沃纳、黛安娜·范斯坦、汤姆·科顿、马可·卢比奥、克里斯·范·霍伦、德文·努涅斯，等等。

这在过去20年的中美关系里是前所未有的。而拿出解决方案，实行有效的管理，需要双方都拥有强有力的领导。

中国新的《外商投资法》提供了一个解决问题的机会，一个解决强迫技术转让问题的可喜机会。对于美国公司来说，这项新法规的价值并不取决于中方表面的做法，而在于美光、亨茨曼化工和杜邦以及其他类似公司的问题能否迅速得到解决。

更广泛地说，美国商界担心，为了在全球化经济中培育本土冠军企业，政府在中国这种规模的市场中进行过度干预，而这会不断助长美国和其他政策制定者的零和以及对抗性反应，因为中国在国内按社会主义方式竞争，在国外按资本主义方式竞争。随之而来的不确定性和不稳定性，对商业规划、两国经济增长与全球前景都会产生不利的影响。

对于美国全国商会和美国企业来说，放弃努力并接受孤立主义，或者采取推动脱钩的下下策，都不是办法。目前迫切需要在商业领域采取建立信任的措施，避免两国灾难性决裂，因为它的后果将是严重和持久的，没有哪个国家的经济可以幸免于难。中美关系进一步恶化不符合两国利益，它会侵蚀两国和各国的增长与就业，使所有国家的蛋糕变小，变得更不安全，更不繁荣。好消息是，双方已经进行了数月的紧张谈判，会谈共有十一轮之多，在不到两年时间内还有不少于八次的高层互访，以及大量深夜和清晨的电话。莱特希泽大使和刘鹤副总理对双方彼此的需要都有深刻的理解。他们不是从零开始，而是可以根据100多页的文本着手工作。对商界来说，谈判提供了最好的机会，来解决那些不断快速侵蚀中美关系基石的严重问题。

如果能达成一项全面、高标准、可核查和可执行的协议，就可以为经济和商业关系在某些方面重建信心与信任奠定基础。任何成果能否持久，部分取决于关键承诺的深度和广度，但更取决于这些成果的可核查与可执行。虽然一个积极的成果肯定不能解决两国关系中的所有问题，但强有力的、持久的协议有可能使许多领域的双赢合作重新凸显，并有望为抗衡中美关系中的零和一面打下根基。

最后我想说，至关重要的是，我们不能允许两国的政治阻碍专业的谈判者取得进展。未来同样重要的是，两国政府要找到前进的路径，任何一方都不应诉诸关税这样的大规模行动，来迫使另一方注意两国关系中存在的问题。

Mr. Jeremie Waterman made the speech at the ‘U.S.-China Trade & Economic Relations: What Now, What Next’ Forum in Hong Kong on July 9, 2019.

As long-standing supporters of close US-China ties and the vast two-way commercial gains and the opportunities to which they give rise, the US Chamber of Commerce and our members are deeply concerned about the current state and arc of the relationship. We fully agree with CCIEE Chairman Zeng Peiyan that the trade deficit is not a core challenge in the US-China relationship. There are significant challenges, however, as highlighted in the Trump administration's section 301 report. Since 2010, the US Chamber has highlighted in a series of reports the mounting risks to US businesses, workers, and US competitiveness of China's approach to localize industries through subsidies and state intervention, forced technology transfer, misappropriation of intellectual property, and market protectionism.

American business, whether AmCham, the US-China Business Council, or the US Chamber of Commerce, has long warned of a brewing backlash in the United States and other advanced economies against certain unfair trade and regulatory policies and practices across a range of areas. This is not just an American narrative.

To be clear, we in the American business community and at the US Chamber are encouraged by some of the recent actions that have been taken by China, as well as rumored actions that may be taken in the future. Rest assured that American businesses can and will continue to serve as a bridge in this relationship. There remains great optimism about significant commercial opportunities in the China market, notwithstanding our alignment with the majority of the administration's section 301 diagnosis. Neither side can afford two-way tariffs or other actions that are expanding dangerously the scope of this conflict.

The US Chamber and our members are alarmed by and deeply opposed to the escalating tariffs that threaten the benefits of regulatory tax reforms, jeopardize the strength of the US and global economies, and are eviscerating the global trading architecture. And as some of you may be aware, our executive vice president and head of international affairs, Myron Brilliant, speaking on various issues on CNBC a couple weeks ago, provoked the interests of the President. And the President, of course, called in and responded very vehemently, but I only mention that to show how the US Chamber is speaking out vigorously on these issues.

But as we heard from Dr. Edwin Feulner this morning, the commercial relationship, which has long been regarded as the ballast of the broader relationship, has significant and growing cracks. In the current climate, business is quite concerned that there appear to be diminishing circles of overlapping interests between the United States and China. Let me just highlight three points in this regard.

First, there are concerns about the expansion of the China model, which has commoditized certain sectors of the global economy, and which is now migrating into the higher value-added sectors, whether it be under the moniker of Made in China 2025 or efforts to achieve high quality, growth, or digitization. To be clear, for most American companies and workers, the issue is not that they have to compete with China. The issue is what the terms of competition are.

Second, national security concerns regarding the impact of economic policies on national security interests are rapidly accelerating on both sides. Recently, the Trump administration took long considered steps to address the mix of national security and foreign policy concerns posed by the role of Chinese telecom giant Huawei in the US and international networking systems. From the perspective of American business, those actions should be addressed outside of trade talks, unless those talks focus on resolving core concerns on technology transfer, intellectual property protection, and market access outlined in the USTR section 301 report.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government over the same period has moved to deepen its ongoing technology globalization campaign by developing an unreliable list of US firms and individuals, announcing a technology security management system, and proposing potential restrictions on rare Earth exports. It has also released a new barrage of draft cyber inspection measures, technology and procurement standards, data security restrictions, and privacy metrics all with significant trade and investment implications for US companies in its market, regardless of sector. The escalation and broadening of the conflict by both sides is further undermining trust and increasing risk for companies in both countries.

China's recent cyber and data methods in particular are undermining prospects for some of the potential groundbreaking market openings and regulatory improvements, which trade talks could otherwise deliver, including market access for cloud computing, freer data flows, global trade, and cross border services.

Third, populism isn't going away anywhere. The inability of policymakers to keep up with changes in technology will exacerbate, not moderate, populism, even as technology advancements are widening the gap between the beneficiaries – the United States and China on one hand, and the rest of the international system on the other. For example, Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that the US and China will enjoy a combined 70% of the global windfall of artificial intelligence. Technology is acting as an accelerant in the US-China conflict. Both sides feel increasingly vulnerable and anxious. Anywhere from 10 to 50% of US jobs could be displaced by automation in the coming years.

To be clear, changes in attitude towards China in the United States began to take hold long before President Trump was elected to office, as Mr. Feulner remarked. And they are almost certain to continue after he leaves. As a reminder, it was the Bush administration that advanced new visa and deemed export control restrictions, specifically focused on China and access to technology at US universities. It was then Bush administration Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoelick who, responding to growing concerns about Chinese behavior across a variety of areas, delivered his “responsible stakeholder” speech before the National Committee on US-China Relations in 2005. It was Obama administration Defense Secretary Ash Carter who commissioned the DIUx (Defense Innovation Unit Experimental) report on China's investments in the US emerging technologies. It was Obama administration officials who argued, as they were leaving office, that CFIUS export controls require urgent reform. And it was Obama administration USTR Michael Froman who began the process of starving the oxygen from the WTO appellate body over concerns that the appellate body was undermining the organization's ability to deal with critical issues, including state subsidies and public bonds.

So what I would say is history did not begin anew in November 2016 when President Trump was elected, at least in terms of US-China relations. To echo another Dr. Feulner point about changing sentiment in the US Congress, I have not seen the US Congress this energized about China, and I don't mean that in a good way, since prior to China's WTO accession. Bipartisan concern in Congress is being led not by an old guard of anti-trade, anti-China hawks, but by pro-trade, pro-business members of Congress in both houses like John Cornyn, Mark Warner, Dianne Feinstein, Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio, Chris Van Hollen, Devin Nunes, and others.

This is unprecedented over the last 20 years of US-China relations. Solutions and effective management will require strong leadership on both sides.

China's new foreign investment law provides an opportunity to address concerns, a welcome opportunity to address concerns about forced technology transfer. The value of a new law for US companies will be defined not by outlying practices, but by whether cases such as Micron, Huntsman Chemical, and DuPont, and others like them, can be quickly resolved.

More broadly, the US business community is concerned that excessive government intervention in a market of China's size, with the aim of creating domestic champions in a globalized economy, will continue to fuel the zero-sum, antibody response by US and other policymakers to China's approach of competing as socialist at home and capitalist abroad. The ensuing uncertainty and instability are bad for business planning, growth in the two economies, and global prospects.

For the US Chamber and American business, giving up and accepting isolationism, or worst yet, pushing for decoupling, is not an option. Confidence building measures in the commercial arena are urgently needed to stave off a catastrophic divorce by our two countries, the fallout of which would be severe, lasting, and leave no country's economy untouched. Further deterioration of relationships is in neither countries interest, as it will erode growth and jobs in both countries and around the world, thereby leaving all with a smaller pie, less security, and less prosperity. The good news is that the two sides have engaged in months of intense negotiations: eleven rounds of talks, no less than eight reciprocal high-level visits in less than two years, and numerous late night and early morning phone calls. Ambassador Lighthizer and Vice Premier Liu He have a keen understanding of the demands of the other. They are not starting from scratch and have well over 100 pages of text from which to work. For business, negotiation provides the best opportunity to address the serious concerns that are continuing to rapidly erode the substrate of US-China relations.

If an agreement could be reached that is comprehensive, high-standard, verifiable, and enforceable, it can provide the basis for rebuilding confidence and trust in certain facets of the economic and commercial relationship. The durability of any outcome will depend in part on the scope and depth of key commitments, but even more so on their verifiability and enforceability. While a positive outcome would surely not address all concerns in the relationship, a strong and enduring agreement has the potential to allow for areas of positive-sum cooperation – and there are many – to return to prominence and hopefully take root to counterbalance the zero-sum aspects of the relationship.

Let me say in closing: it's critical that we do not allow politics on both sides to get in the way of progress made by professional negotiators. And it's equally critical going forward that the two governments find ways to make progress, without either side resorting to large-scale actions, like tariffs, to get the attention of the other that something is wrong in the relationship.