升级北美自贸协定（NAFTA）的谈判于9月30日完成，根据公布的文本，“美国-墨西哥-加拿大协定”（USMCA）存在一些隐藏的意外。最未让人料到的是“32.10条款”，即美国要求加入的“非市场”条款。该条款严重限制了加拿大和墨西哥——从技术上来说也包括美国——与“非市场”经济体达成自由贸易协定的能力。该条款要求，任何有意达成类似协定的缔约方都应通知其他缔约方其开始谈判的意图，并且按要求提供关于它们目标的尽可能详尽的信息。此外，在签署新协定至少30天之前，缔约方应当向其他方提供完整的协议文本，以便其他方评估对USMCA的影响。最重要的是，任何一方如与非市场经济体达成自由贸易协定，其他两方可终止USMCA。

简单来说，这意味着加拿大与中国或墨西哥与中国达成的任何贸易协定，美国都有事实上的否决权。假设加拿大与中国开启了正式谈判并达成了最终协议文本，美国将有权审查所有协议条款并对任何条款提出反对。这将意味着加拿大不得不和美国及中国同时展开谈判，并事实上在加中谈判桌上给了美国一个位子。考虑到加拿大和美国在中国市场存在一些直接竞争利益，这种做法尤其恶劣。如果加拿大决定不顾美国的反对推进协议，则可能被从USMCA驱逐。鉴于加拿大有和美国维持良好经济关系的巨大经济利益（美国是加拿大75%出口的目的地），不可避免的结果就是加拿大放弃和中国的贸易协议。

为什么我们说这一非市场条款是单独针对中国的？“32.10条款”允许任何缔约方单方面定义何为非市场经济体。如果在USMCA生效之日，一方决定某一特定国家属于非市场经济体，则这一决定就是决定性的，除非与其他缔约方存在一个既定的自由贸易协定。这就是越南的“出狱”卡，因为加拿大和墨西哥都和越南存在协议，即“全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”（CPTPP）。而中国没有类似既定安排，并且已经被美国商务部定义为非市场经济体。如果该协定被美国国会和加拿大、墨西哥立法机关批准，在USMCA明年生效时中国肯定还在名单之上。非市场经济体存在多种定义方法，包括通过WTO，但在本案中实际上唯一的裁决人就是美国商务部。显然，“32.10条款”只有一个目标——中国。

USMCA谈判完成后美国官员已经直言不讳，白宫国家经济委员会主任拉里·库德洛声称，北美如今已形成统一阵线来和中国打交道。同时在加拿大，非市场条款已经引发了评论者的严厉批评。在未询问利益攸关方情况下，该条款被出其不意地抛给了加拿大人。负面反应迫使总理特鲁多公开表示，尽管存在非市场条款，加拿大仍试图和中国寻求密切贸易关系。中国驻渥太华使馆则将“32.10条款”称为美国的“霸权举动”。

在加拿大，这一条款的支持者认为，提高和中国贸易的透明度，以及回应美国对中国商品利用加拿大和墨西哥作为对美倾销商品后门的担忧，已足以证明“32.10条款”的合理性。中国出口到北美的钢铁被引用作为一个具体案例。不过，要解决贸易转移问题有很多不那么严苛的方法。限制伙伴方和第三国自由谈判的能力好比用大锤打苍蝇。

特鲁多政府已经试图淡化非市场条款的重要性，并辩称任何缔约方只要提前6个月通知都可以退出USMCA，因此非市场条款并不比USMCA其他条款有多更限制性。这是虚伪的。“32.10条款”是对主权的空前侵蚀，在任何其他贸易协定中都从未有过。

有鉴于此，一个开放性问题就是特鲁多政府如何推进和中国更密切的贸易关系。一些专家指出，非市场条款的明确表述特指“自由贸易协定”。加拿大是否可以和中国谈判比自由贸易协定更低的协议？这一协议得绕开商品贸易，或者达成一个行业贸易协议。不过，除非一个贸易协议实质上覆盖所有商品贸易，否则将是WTO不允许的。如果是WTO允许的，则就是一个换了名字的自由贸易协定。在这些情况下，要避免触发“32.10条款”将非常困难。当然，前提是中国同意在这些条件下和加拿大谈判。

可以确定的是，由于其他谈判方也会和加拿大、墨西哥一样受到美国胁迫，这绝不会是美国达成的包括这一条款的最后一个贸易协定。美国商务部长威尔伯·罗斯公开表示，他希望USMCA“毒丸”在和日本及欧盟的未来谈判中被复制。在USMCA中塞入货币操纵一章是朝着同一方向的又一举措。虽然欧盟和日本不会如加拿大和墨西哥那样愿意向美国让度主权，但由于它们认同很多美国对中国经济政策的担忧，因此它们可能达成一个类似的妥协方案。值得记住的一点是，美国向其贸易伙伴推行非市场条款的另一面，是中国坚持所有签署的双边协定都必须包括给予中国市场经济地位的承诺。中国和新西兰、瑞士、澳大利亚和新加坡的情况就是如此（后两个国家和美国有双边自贸协定）。

这引发了中国是否是市场经济体的问题。自2001年中国加入WTO以来，其推进开放政策，并且可以明确地说部分中国经济是按照与其他WTO成员类似的原则来运行的。不过，接受巨额补贴的国有企业持续的主导性角色导致了产能过剩问题，由此引发海外市场倾销指控，这是非市场经济体的特点之一。不过，中国已再次表达了其对进一步开放和对多边贸易体系的承诺。

中国和加拿大是否有办法走出这一困局？这主要看中国准备在多大程度上接受市场经济体的全部原则——完全按照和其他WTO成员一样的经济原则来运作。并且，相较于中国和加拿大之间可能进行的谈判，这将更多取决于美中关系的走向。

The conclusion of the updated NAFTA on September 30, known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), revealed a few hidden surprises when the text was released. Among the most unexpected was Article 32.10, the “non-market” clause demanded by the United States. This article severely limits the ability of Canada and Mexico — and technically the United States — to enter into a free trade agreement with a “non-market” economy. It does so by requiring any Party intending to enter into such an agreement to inform the other Parties of its intentions to begin negotiations and, if requested, to provide as much information as possible regarding their objectives. Furthermore, no later than 30 days before signature of the new agreement, the contracting Party shall provide the other Parties with its full text so that they may assess its impact on the USMCA. Most important, entry by any Party into a free trade agreement with a non-market economy allows the other two Parties to terminate the USMCA.

In plain English this means that the U.S. has a de facto veto over any free trade agreement entered into by Canada and China or Mexico and China. Assuming Canada and China launched formal negotiations and arrived at a final text, the U.S. would have the right to review all terms of the agreement and object to any provision. That would put Canada in the position of having to negotiate with the U.S. and China at the same time and in effect gives the U.S. a seat at the Canada-China negotiating table. This is all the more egregious considering that Canada and the U.S. have some directly competing interests in the China market. Assuming Canada decided to proceed with an agreement despite U.S. objections, it would be expelled from the USMCA. Given the economic stake that Canada has in maintaining good economic relations with the U.S., the destination for 75% of its exports, the inevitable outcome would be the abandonment of the trade agreement with China.

How can we say with certainty that the non-market clause is directed exclusively at China? Article 32.10 allows the definition of non-market economy to be determined unilaterally by any of the Parties. Should that Party determine, on the date of the signature of the USMCA, that a given country falls into the category of non-market economy this becomes definitive — unless there is an existing free trade agreement with one of the other Parties. This is the “get out of jail” card for Vietnam because both Canada and Mexico have an agreement with Vietnam through the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). No such arrangement exists for China, which has already been labelled a non-market economy by the U.S. Department of Commerce. China is certain to still be on this list when the USMCA is signed next year, assuming it is passed by the U.S. Congress and the legislatures of Canada and Mexico. Non-market economy status can be determined in various ways, including by the WTO, but in this case the sole arbiter is, in effect, the U.S. Department of Commerce. It is clear that there is only one target of Article 32.10 — China.

This was made abundantly plain by U.S. officials after the conclusion of the USMCA, with National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow proclaiming that North America was now a united front in dealing with China. Meanwhile in Canada, the non-market clause has provoked significant negative comment (here, here, and here). There was no consultation with stakeholders and the provision was sprung on Canadians by surprise. The negative reaction led Prime Minister Trudeau to state that Canada still intends to pursue close trade ties with China — despite the non-market clause. The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, for its part, has denounced Article 32.10 as a “hegemonic action” by the U.S.

Defenders of the measure in Canada have argued that greater transparency regarding trade with China and the need to address U.S. concerns about Canada or Mexico serving as a back-door for dumped Chinese products reaching the U.S. were sufficient justification for Article 32.10. Chinese steel coming into North America is cited as a concrete example. However, there are many far less draconian methods to deal with trade diversion. Curtailing a partner's ability to negotiate freely with third countries is using a sledgehammer to kill a fly.

The Trudeau government has tried to downplay the significance of the non-market clause by arguing that any Party can withdraw from the USMCA with six months' notice and therefore the non-market clause is no more limiting than any other USMCA provision. This is disingenuous. Article 32.10 is an unparalleled intrusion on sovereignty, a feature not found in any other trade agreement.

Given this, it is an open question how the Trudeau government thinks it can move forward to pursue closer trade ties with China. Some experts have pointed to the explicit language in the non-market clause referring specifically to a “free trade agreement.” Could Canada negotiate something less than an FTA with China? This would require an agreement skirting trade in goods, or perhaps a sectoral trading arrangement. However, unless a trade agreement covered substantially all trade in goods, it would not be WTO compliant. If it is WTO compliant, it would be a FTA by another name. Under these circumstances it would be difficult to avoid triggering 32.10. Of course, this presupposes that China would agree to negotiate with Canada under these circumstances.

This will almost certainly not be the last trade agreement with the U.S. containing such a clause, assuming that the negotiating partners can be strong-armed like Canada and Mexico. U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has been open about wanting what he describes as the USMCA “poison pill” to be replicated in future negotiations with partners such as Japan and the EU. The insertion of a chapter on currency manipulation in the USMCA is a further measure in the same direction. While the EU and Japan may be less willing to surrender sovereignty to the U.S. than Canada and Mexico, because they share many of the U.S.' concerns over China's economic policies they may nonetheless reach a similar accommodation. It is worth remembering that the flip side of the U.S. pushing a non-market clause on its trading partners is China's insistence that any bilateral agreements it signs must contain a commitment to accord China market economy status. This was the case with New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore (the latter two countries also having bilateral FTAs with the U.S.)

This begs the question of whether China is a market economy. Since China joined the WTO in 2001 it has pursued a policy of opening up, and parts of the Chinese economy can clearly be said to operate on principles similar to those of other WTO members. However the continued dominant role of heavily-subsidized State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has led to overcapacity problems, and consequent accusations of dumping on overseas markets, one of the characteristics of a non-market economy. Yet China has continued to insist on its commitment to both further opening up and the multilateral trading system.

Is there a way out of this box for China and Canada? Much will depend on the extent to which China is prepared to accept the full disciplines of a market economy – operating on essentially the same economic principles as other WTO members. And that will depend more on what happens in U.S.-China relations than in any negotiations that may take place between China and Canada.