在中美两国政府发布首轮关税清单后，特朗普政府又升级了双方的贸易矛盾。美国谈判代表办公室公布了新一轮高达2000亿美元的加征关税清单，覆盖了大量美国民众的日用消费品。美国财长姆努钦称除了中方让步以外，并没有其他解决问题的办法，两国的谈判已经濒临破裂。这一表态无疑进一步加剧了外界对于这场贸易对抗的担忧。在解决中美经贸问题上，特朗普采用了和在朝核、北约类似的策略。特朗普的支持者们称之为“极限施压”，即利用美国在一些领域上的优势不断向对方施加压力，最终迫使对方让步。但事实上，这种策略与讹诈并没有本质区别。在经贸领域，该策略并不能通过威慑让对手放弃抵抗，与之相反，美国的经贸对手会采取报复行动，从而令局势不断升级。在这种局面下，美国也将承担相当大的代价。美国的一些政界和商界精英已经看到了这种风险。国会两党议员一致向财长姆努钦表达不满，众议院议长瑞安称，关税不应是解决问题的办法。近期，美国经贸代表团访问中国，希望延续和扩大两国之间的商业合作。

诸多研究表明，加征关税的做法无法解决中美两国经贸的不平衡问题。一些企业表示，为了避免用户流失，企业将垫付部分关税。另一些企业也可能采取转口加工的方式规避关税。无论采取何种方式，增加的成本都将由两国企业和消费者最终承担。这将削弱两国的消费能力和商业活力，拖慢经济增长。《金融时报》称，贸易战将摧毁特朗普所有的经济成果，特朗普不会不清楚这一点。但是，人们往往忽略了特朗普如今已经是一名政客，除了让美国再次伟大以外，特朗普更关注如何让自己更长久的掌握总统大权。中美贸易战有利于特朗普继续在国内推行反建制、反全球化的理念，使其在今年的中期选举和2020年大选中得利。这场经济冲突并不是中国与美国两个国家之间的贸易战，而是特朗普针对两国支持全球化、支持自由贸易、支持中美协作群体的一场战争。

首先，特朗普将利用这场贸易纷争让各界接受中国作为美国“战略竞争对手”的定位。中美关系今天的波折让人们难免记起四年前两国之间的良性互动。在奥巴马任内，中美在气候变化、宏观政策协调等领域保持着积极的合作势头，也能够通过对话手段妥善处理“网络安全”等新议题。这种中美在全球领域协作和及时处理矛盾的态势给了双方通过合作共赢迈过“修昔底德陷阱”的希望，愈发接近基辛格所述“中美共同演进”的理想目标。然而，这种建设性态势却不利于特朗普让美国选民相信他的“美国优先”经济民粹理念。中美两国存在的众多对话机制和合作默契也形成一股惯性，使美国内部存在将中国定义为“战略竞争对手”的担忧。特朗普无理、粗鲁、单边的贸易讹诈做法试图打破这种惯性和中美两国的合作习惯，让双方客观上形成高度对立的局面。这样，他就能够在即将举行的中期选举中继续向选民灌输危机感和紧迫感，将自己塑造为一位“战时总统”。

其次，特朗普有意借贸易战继续打压美国国内的建制派和全球化支持者。特朗普的主张和诉求并不能代表绝大多数的美国民众。特朗普上任后的一系列政策带有很强的保守色彩，新移民、跨国公司、知识精英等受益于全球化的人群并不在特朗普的考虑范围。这也导致特朗普胜选后主流媒体对其批评声不断，美国精英担心特朗普会将美国引入到一条更加封闭、守旧的道路。中美经贸关系是美国所主导的全球化中最重要的组成部分，进而成为特朗普攻击的目标。特朗普希望利用恶性的贸易竞争形成两国产业界的“脱钩”状态，改变美国跨国公司的运营布局，让更多跨国公司回流成为美国的本土公司。这种做法将使支持全球化的企业和利益集团受损，而反对全球化的人群将从中获益。

最后，特朗普将借此加强对跨国公司的控制。跨国大型企业是美国经济的支柱，在美国经济、政治等各领域拥有不可比拟的影响力，是美国政治中最强的游说力量。冷战后的美国历任总统均有重要产业集团支持的背景，在国际领域，这些政治强人在一定程度上也成为了跨国公司的代言人。但特朗普却有所不同。跨国公司在其竞选过程中采取观望态度，胜选后，美国科技巨头、金融企业等市值居于美国前列的公司也有意与特朗普保持距离。特朗普粗暴解雇前国务卿蒂勒森更让跨国公司加深了对于特朗普的担忧，因为后者被视为美国企业界最受尊敬的职业经理人之一。跨国公司的这些担忧和疑虑很有可能转化为对特朗普反对者的支持，这是特朗普十分担心的情况。在中美贸易冲突中，特朗普一方面将中国作为讹诈目标，另一方面也利用中国方面的反击措施来胁迫美国跨国企业。在后续谈判过程中，特朗普将利用跨国公司对于中国市场的需求和对中国方面报复措施的恐惧提出要求，从而在与跨国公司的博弈中占据主动。这将消除特朗普长期执政的潜在隐患。

On economic issues with China, US President Donald Trump has adopted a strategy similar to the one he employed against the DPRK and NATO, which his supporters describe as 'maximum pressure', i.e., imposing pressure on the other party until the other side is forced to accede to the US' demands. As a matter of fact, the strategy is little different from blackmail. But in economic relations, this strategy is unlikely to deter an opponent. On the contrary, the counterparty is more likely to retaliate, thus escalating tensions. As such, the US will have to pay a formidable price in the impending trade war. Some American political and business elites already see the risk; Congressmen of both parties expressed their discontent to Secretary Mnuchin, while Speaker of the House Paul Ryan denounced the tariff measures. Recently, a US trade delegation visited China, hoping to extend and expand business cooperation between the two countries.

Many studies have shown that imposing tariffs will not eliminate trade imbalances. Some companies have already expressed willingness to take on the burden of some tariffs to avoid losing consumers. Some others may turn to entrepot trade to avoid tariffs. No matter which approach they choose, however, the increased cost will ultimately be borne by companies and consumers in both countries, which will weaken their consumption power, dampen business vitality, and hinder economic growth. Trump is aware of this. However, he is a politician. He cares more about holding onto his presidency than about making America great again. A trade war with China allows him to continue selling his anti-establishment and anti-globalization ideas at home, so that he can secure a more favorable position in this year's mid-term election and in the presidential election in 2020. The economic conflict is not a trade war between China and the US per se. Rather, it is a war waged by Trump against groups of people in both countries that support globalization, free trade, and cooperation.

First, through the trade disputes, Trump sold everyone on the idea that China is America's 'strategic rival'. The setbacks today make it very hard for people to remember the stable interactions between the two countries in previous years. During the Obama presidency, China and the US cooperated positively on climate change, and were able to properly handle emerging issues such as cyber security by engaging in dialogue. Collaboration on issues of global concern and a readiness to address contradictions in a timely manner gave both countries the hope of avoiding the Thucydides Trap through win-win cooperation, and of moving closer towards the ideal goal of 'co-evolution' described by Henry Kissinger. However, such a constructive posture does not serve Trump, who wants to sell American voters his populist America First philosophy. The various dialogue mechanisms and collaborations created inertia against changes in polices towards China, and as a result there was an internal concern over defining China as a strategic rival. Trump's unreasonable, rude, and unilateral trade blackmail is an attempt to break the inertia and habit of cooperation, and create knee-jerk opposition towards China instead. By doing this, Trump will be able to continue imbuing American voters with a sense of crisis and urgency in the upcoming mid-term elections and present himself as a 'war-time president'.

Second, Trump also intends to continue assailing the American establishment and supporters of globalization. His ideas and demands do not actually reflect those of the majority of Americans. The policies Trump enacted after his election have a strong conservative flavor, and he does not consider the interests of new immigrants, multinational companies, intellectual elites, and other beneficiaries of globalization. This has led to constant criticism from the mainstream media since he won the election, as American elites worry that Trump may lead the US onto a more closed and conservative path. China-US economic relations is the most important part of US-led globalization and is thus an easy target for Trump. He hopes to 'decouple' the industrial circles of the two countries through vicious trade competition, and to change American multinational companies' operational strategies and bring them back to the US to be local American companies. The move will harm enterprises and interest groups that support globalization while benefiting those that oppose it.

And last, Trump will take this opportunity to strengthen his control over multinational companies. These companies are the pillars of the American economy and together form the most powerful lobbying force in America, wielding unmatched influence in both the economic and political fields. American presidents after the Cold War all enjoyed the support of important industrial groups, and became the spokesmen of these multinational companies internationally. But Trump is somehow different. Multinational companies adopted a wait-and-see attitude during Trump's campaign. After he won the election, American market leaders in technology and finance deliberately distanced themselves from him. The President deepened worries among multinational companies with his brutal dismissal of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, one of the most respected professional managers in the American business community. The worries and misgivings may well translate into support to opponents of Trump, which disturbs him. In the coming negotiation process, on the basis of his assessment of multinational companies' need of the Chinese market and fear of Chinese retaliation, he will reach for the upper hand against multinational companies so that he can remove the obstacle they pose to his rule.