金正恩和文在寅在边境的板门店村举行会晤。

如果我们乐观看待上周有纪念意义的朝韩峰会的结果，那么，朝鲜领导人金正恩表现出的积极姿态对朝鲜半岛来说是好兆头。正如金正恩与韩国总统文在寅上周签订的协议所表明的，这些举措说明双方有望进行持续的多轨对话，更全面地进行南北交流（包括人道主义交往、旅游、家庭团聚和经济发展项目，如重启开城工业园），同时，就无核化的条件与进程、非军事区一带的安全与保障进行有序商讨，并就最终终止停战协定和结束朝鲜战争展开对话。

朝鲜下一个大的外交步骤是它计划即将与唐纳德·特朗普总统举行首脑会晤，大概5月或6月在新加坡或蒙古这样的“中立国家”举行。长期以来朝鲜一直把美国（不是韩国）当作与它对抗的魔鬼，其核计划的目标不是韩国，而是美国。朝鲜领导人认为，美国在韩国和半岛以外的军事力量对其政权的存在构成威胁。朝鲜过去几十年里不断开发核武器，最终在金正恩领导下掌握了核武器，这在今年年初之前把美朝关系推入了制裁、恫吓和拒绝对话的泥潭。

金正恩宣布他将停止核试验，并关闭丰溪里试验场，从而为即将到来的峰会预设了更加富有成效的基调。虽然中国科学家报告说该试验场已经坍塌，一些人因此认为这使金正恩提出的停止核试验打了折扣，但美国网站“北纬38度”的分析家认为，这个试验场仍然可以使用。金正恩表示愿把无核化问题摆上谈判桌，他最近还邀请美韩专家记者届时见证朝鲜核设施的关闭。

金正恩决定会晤外国国家元首，底气当然是朝鲜的核计划在他领导下取得了显而易见的飞速进展。朝鲜自觉有能力坐到谈判桌前，正是因为美国了解其武器所具备的能力，包括核武器和已经证明的远程导弹能力。从金正恩对他的党和军队的讲话可以看出，他对核试验和导弹试验取得的进展相当志得意满。这些成就不会因为停止试验而消失。

不过，停止试验甚至关闭试验场并不是永久性的。以往的协议或承诺都曾经被打破，如2012年的“闰日协议”，签署才几个星期就成了废纸。同样还有上世纪90年代的“框架协议”，虽然这份协议的解体速度慢一些。在奥巴马和朴槿惠执政期间，朝鲜完全没有与这些政府展开对话的意向。

尽管我们可以借鉴从前美国与朝鲜谈判的经验，但历史的比照（例如上面提到的协议）并没有让我们有足够的信息。因为首先，当时朝鲜并不满足于即有的核能力和军备；其次，当时地区的政治意愿与今天不同。而且金正恩掌权后朝鲜与外界的谈判几乎为零。所以，我们有可能看到朝鲜一种全新的、与金正恩的父亲截然不同的外交风格。金正日当权时期，朝鲜外交官力求迫使对方通过提供援助或放松制裁，来换取紧张局势的缓解。而到目前为止金正恩仍相当与世隔绝，并且完全无视制裁努力。

然而，由于朝鲜过去对美韩无核化目标有保留，对相互交往疑心重重，因此认清未来政治进程的艰难是明智的。首先，正如许多朝鲜问题观察家所指出的，对朝鲜来说“无核化”不仅意味着它要拆除核设施，放弃其武器和导弹系统（按美国的观点），也意味着美国要从韩国和日本拆除它的核保护伞。但据文在寅总统与金正恩会晤后透露，这一次朝鲜并没有要求从韩国撤走美军。这个要求不仅在美国，在韩国许多保守派人士当中也曾经是反复被提及的关键点。

其次，金正日在位时，朝鲜曾试图在两个盟友当中挑拨离间，特别是韩国进步派当政期间，因为进步派更愿意与朝鲜交往。朝鲜一向擅长观察对手的政治意愿，而文在寅和特朗普都非常渴望朝鲜半岛出现改变。不过，朝鲜与韩国之间的举动有可能最终导致首尔与华盛顿关系紧张。如果特朗普对金正恩在谈判中的出价不满意，或者首脑会晤失败，朝韩峰会所确定的措施就可能告吹，从而使美韩关系变得紧张起来。

文在寅渴望缓解与北方的紧张，同时增加人道主义交往，上周的协议为实现这些目标提供了路径。对特朗普来说，他是渴望做成一笔交易。特朗普这个“品牌”的内容之一（来自于他进入白宫前在商界和媒体的传统）是当“诱心人（closer）”，包括他骂金正恩是“火箭人”，是对全世界的威胁，穿插其间的，是他表示愿意运用“交易艺术”来解决这场长达数十年的冲突。

最后，中国有战略理由支持朝鲜与习近平、文在寅也许还有唐纳德·特朗普举行一连串峰会。正如阿莉丝·埃克曼所指出的，中国一直试图“在一个后同盟安全框架内重组亚太地区”，而任何使朝鲜半岛向着和平稳定迈出的步骤，都会削弱美国在东北亚地区军事存在的理由。而且短期内，与美国达成包括放松制裁或减少军演的交易，不仅有利于未来朝鲜半岛的稳定，也有利于未来中国与朝鲜的经济交流，这种交流对于北京虽是小买卖，但它却是中国对平壤施加影响力的一个源头，最近日益严厉的制裁已经让中国的这种影响力下降。美国应当好好地理解北京在朝鲜半岛实现和平的战略目标，并在与金正恩举行潜在会晤之前与北京和首尔合作，确保峰会取得可行的成果。

为迎接即将到来的“特金会”，美方谈判代表应当注意，倘若华盛顿的政治意愿仍然是专注于坚守这个前路漫长的进程，那么，放低期待并从以往朝鲜的谈判行为中汲取教训，才有可能导致半岛的持久改变。

Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in meet in the border village of Panmunjom.

If we're optimistic about the outcomes from last week's monumental inter-Korean summit, the positive overtures North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seems to be making bode well for the Korean Peninsula. As indicated by last week's agreement, signed by Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, these moves may spell hope for a sustained multi-track dialogue that looks more holistically at inter-Korean exchanges (including humanitarian exchanges, tourism, family reunions, and economic development projects like restarting the Kaesong Industrial Complex), with parallel, sequenced discussions around the terms and process of possible denuclearization, the safety and security around the DMZ, and talks to finally end the Armistice Agreement and end the Korean War.

The next big diplomatic step for North Korea is its planned summit with President Donald Trump, which may happen in May or June in a “neutral” country like Singapore or Mongolia. North Korea has long seen the United States— not South Korea— as its adversarial bogeyman. The nuclear program is aimed not at South Korea, but the United States, whose military forces in South Korea and off the peninsula are considered a threat to the regime's existence by North Korean leaders. North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons over the past few decades — finally a credible threat under Kim Jong-un — had, prior to the beginning of this year, driven U.S.-North Korean relations into a quagmire of sanctions, bluster, and refusals to talk.

Kim Jong-un's announcement that he would cease nuclear tests and close the Punggye-ri test site lends more momentum to the upcoming summit. While Chinese scientists have reported the site has collapsed — which some suggest undercuts the value of Kim's offer to stop testing — analysts at 38 North, a U.S.-based site, argue that the site is still viable. Kim has stated that he is willing to put denuclearization on the table, and recently invited experts and journalists from the United States and South Korea to be present when the country shuts down the facility.

Kim's decision to meet with foreign heads-of-state is certainly supported by North Korea's rapid and demonstrable advancement of its nuclear program under his rule. North Korea feels empowered to sit at the negotiating table precisely because the United States understands the extent of its weapons capabilities, including nuclear weapons and a demonstrated long-range missile capability. Looking at Kim Jong-un's statements to his party and military, he seems very confident and satisfied with the progress they've made on both nuclear and missile testing. Those accomplishments don't go away when tests stop.

However, stopping tests and even closing the test site will not be permanent measures. Earlier agreements or promises to denuclearize have been broken, such as the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, which was shattered just a couple of weeks after being signed. The same could be said for the Agreed Framework in the 1990s, though it's unravelling at a slower pace. North Korea could not talk with the Obama and Park administrations.

While we might learn from past experiences of U.S. negotiations with North Korea, historical comparisons (such as the agreements above) don't give us enough information, because 1) North Korea wasn't comfortable with its existing nuclear capability and arsenal, and 2) the regional political will was different then. Moreover, North Korea's negotiations with the outside world have been almost nil under Kim Jong-un, so we could be seeing a North Korean diplomatic style that is drastically different from his father's. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korean diplomats sought to extract aid or sanctions relief in exchange for easing tensions. Kim Jong-un has remained quite isolated until now and has virtually ignored sanctions.

But, because of North Korea's past reticence toward U.S. and ROK goals on denuclearization and its suspicion about exchanges, the political process ahead will be difficult. First, as has been noted by many Korea watchers, “denuclearization” to North Korea means not only dismantling its nuclear facilities and giving up its weapons and missile systems (the U.S. view), but also the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea and Japan. However, at this time, North Korea is not demanding the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, according to President Moon after his meeting with Kim Jong-un. This demand has been a sticking point not only with officials in the United States, but also among many conservatives in South Korea.

Second, North Korea, under Kim Jong-il, has historically attempted to play the two allies off against each other, particularly during progressive South Korean administrations, which have tended to be more amenable to engagement with Pyongyang. North Korea has been pretty apt at reading the political will of its adversaries, and both Moon and Trump are eager for change on the Korean peninsula. However, the moves North Korea has made with South Korea may end up causing tension between Seoul and Washington. If Trump is not satisfied with the offers Kim puts on the table — or if the summit falls through — the plans laid out at the inter-Korean summit may unravel, which could strain U.S.-ROK relations.

Moon is eager to ratchet down tensions with the North and increase humanitarian exchanges, and the agreement last week provides a way forward. For his part, Trump is eager to make a deal. Part of Trump's “brand” — drawing from his legacy in business and media prior to entering office — has been as a “closer.” Part of this brand includes his framing of Kim Jong-un as a “rocket man” and a threat to the world, interspersed by Trump's stated willingness to apply his “art of the deal” to the decades-long conflict.

Finally, China has strategic reasons to support North Korea's succession of summits with Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and perhaps Donald Trump. As Alice Ekman points out, China has long been attempting to “reorganize the Asia-Pacific region in a post-alliance security framework,” and any steps toward a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula undercut U.S. reasons for its military presence in Northeast Asia. Moreover, in the nearer-term, U.S. deals that include sanctions relief or scaling back military exercises bode well not only for peninsular stability, but for China's economic exchanges with North Korea —which are only a small outlet for Beijing, but a source of Chinese leverage over Pyongyang that has been curtailed recently by increasingly strict sanctions. The United States would do well to understand Beijing's strategic goals for peace on the Korean Peninsula, and work with Beijing and Seoul in advance of a potential meeting with Kim Jong-un to ensure viable summit deliverables.

In anticipation of the upcoming Trump-Kim summit, American negotiators should note that being a bit more cautious with expectations and drawing lessons from past Korean negotiating behaviors could lead to lasting change on the peninsula, provided political will in Washington remains focused on sticking with the long process ahead.