特朗普当选美国总统可能带来孤立主义风险，并导致美国撤离亚洲。特朗普迄今的言论，例如他反对跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）、威胁对中国商品大规模加征进口关税，都意味着他可能放弃奥巴马的“重返亚太”战略,以及目前“友好”的美中关系。不过，说起来容易做起来难。美国脱离与亚洲的贸易将帮助而非损害中国，而对中国采取更加咄咄逼人的态度也很可能损害美国利益。

特朗普试图废止TPP计划的讽刺之处在于，这主要是出于提防中国未来从“后门”加入TPP并损害美国利益。不过，TPP胎死腹中却很可能令中国长舒一口气，因为这一贸易协定将妨碍中国与亚洲贸易伙伴的贸易关系。不仅如此，中国还能以其倡导的地区贸易协定对美国展开反击。中国已经朝这一方向迈出步伐，例如区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP），这一协定将囊括亚太地区主要贸易伙伴，包括日本、韩国、澳大利亚、新西兰、印度和东盟。这些国家占美国出口的比重高达1/4。如果美国背弃TPP，而RCEP顺利推进，则美国出口商将面临非常不利局面。此外，届时美国也将失去在亚洲推广其规则和价值的机会，例如更严格的劳工、环境和知识产权保护标准。与成功实施TPP相比，这种制度缺陷将令美国公司在亚洲市场更加缺乏保护。

同时，美国单方面提高对中国商品的关税将扰乱全球生产链。虽然中国看上去比美国更容易受贸易战攻击（因为中国从美国的进口额高于美国从中国的进口额），但两国如今都被深度整合进全球生产链，任何一方挑起事端都会令双方受损。考虑到亚洲经济将在RCEP之下进一步整合，特朗普在选战中的主要承诺之一——把制造业岗位带回美国——几乎不可能实现，因为工作岗位更可能留在地区整合程度更高、日趋由消费驱动经济增长的亚洲。如果中国积极展开报复，对美国来说情况将变得更糟。鉴于美国对中国的巨大外国直接投资（FDI），以及很多美国公司看重中国巨大的消费市场机遇，中国想要报复的话方式有很多。

从更广泛意义来说，鉴于亚洲的经济和人口规模，很难想象美国会主动后撤，坐视中国取代其在亚洲的位置。中国和东盟之间的生产和贸易结构正变得日趋互补：中国主要从东盟国家进口石油、天然气和其他原材料，而东盟国家则从中国进口电子产品和纺织品。中国和东盟国家之间的生产链关系也变得越来越紧密，而美国公司未必能参与其中。东盟如今已超过欧盟，成为中国第三大贸易伙伴。因此，通过贸易协议来进一步推进整合符合各方利益。

不过，如果中国主导亚洲的代价是失去美国市场，中国也无法完全满意。一个更加可能的情况是，美国（即便特朗普上台）仍会在东亚地区领导问题上和中国合作。话虽如此，如果特朗普信守其竞选承诺终止TPP并对中国高筑保护主义壁垒，那么中国将确立其在亚洲的地位，并将在亚洲之外寻找弥补美国市场损失的机会，比如说欧洲。

因此，最可能发生的情况是大致保持现状：特朗普政府虽然没有通过TPP和跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴协议（TTIP），但鉴于害怕报复，也没有出台针对中国的贸易保护主义措施。不过，即便在这种情况下，中国在地区自贸安排方面也有先发优势。在奥巴马政府晚期，针对美国对TPP流露出的犹豫态度，中国反应迅速，这意味着反贸易的特朗普上台之后，中国不太可能和美国妥协。在我们看来，欧洲可以成为中国的下一站。这非常合乎逻辑，因为在“一带一路”倡议下，中国已经规划并开始启动大规模投资来增强和欧洲的联通。

对欧盟来说，在TTIP阙如情况下，与中国建立更紧密的经济关系或许是唯一选项。考虑到RCEP可能达成，这一议题变得更为紧迫，因为RCEP成员国占欧盟对外贸易的比重达30%。如果欧盟不能与这一地区达成令人满意的贸易协议，那么欧盟企业可能面临贸易转移问题，并且在市场准入方面也将不如中国这样的本地区国家。事实上，欧盟在2007年曾启动与东盟国家的谈判计划，但其后陷入双边细节谈判，进展缓慢。截至目前，在东盟10国中，欧盟只与新加坡和越南达成了自由贸易协议。并且两份协议都尚未生效。在目前的特定时刻，鉴于亚太国家正迈向贸易和投资一体化，欧盟是时候加快速度并重估其战略了。目标应当是和亚太国家达成一个区域性协议，而中国将发挥重要作用。

无论如何，欧盟如果想放弃其长期（但日渐没有成效）的跨大西洋联盟转向中国，建立信任至关重要。这比铁路联通更加关键。不过，双方目前的互信程度很低，尤其考虑到欧盟委员会近期发出的反倾销呼声，以及中国去产能改革不力。不过，只关心国内、行为乖张、咄咄逼人的特朗普政府可能成为欧中信任感快速提升的催化剂。无论如何，特朗普时代的欧中贸易关系很可能改善。

全文翻译自：布吕格尔经济研究所（Bruegel）网站，原文标题Trump could give new impetus to EU-China relations。

Donald Trump's presidency threatens isolationism and could cause the United States to turn away from Asia. Trump's statements so far, from his dislike of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to his threat to impose massive import tariffs on Chinese goods, seem to indicate that he wants to undo Obama's pivot towards Asia and the current “cordial” US relationship with China. However, this is easier said than done. A US disengagement from trade with Asia would help, rather than harm, China, while a more aggressive approach to the bilateral relationship with China would risk undermining US interests.

The irony of Trump's plan to dismantle TPP is that it is based on the belief that China would enter TPP through the back door at a later date and hurt US interests. However, China is probably relieved at the likely demise of TPP, a trade agreement that would hamper China's trade relationships with its most natural trading partners in Asia. Not only that, China would be able to strike back with its own regional trade arrangements with Asian partners. China has already moved in this direction by launching the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiative with all key Asia-Pacific trading partners: Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). These countries account for as much as one quarter of US exports. If the US reneges on TPP but the RCEP proceeds nevertheless, then US exporters will be put at a serious disadvantage. In addition, the US would miss the opportunity to promote its rules and values in Asia, such as strict labour, environmental and intellectual property protection standards. Such an institutional deficit will leave US firms less protected in Asian markets than they would be with a successful implementation of TPP.

Meanwhile, a unilateral increase in US tariffs on Chinese goods would disrupt the global production chain. Although China seems to be more vulnerable than the US because China imports less from the US than the US from China, both countries are now heavily integrated into the supply chain and any shock from either side would be reciprocally painful. With the potential further integration of Asia's economies under RCEP, one of Trump's key messages during his campaign – the repatriation to the US of manufacturing jobs –is not likely to happen because jobs might actually stay in a more regionally integrated and increasingly consumption-driven Asia. Even worse for the US would be if China were to actively retaliate. This could take many forms given the still relatively large stock of US FDI in China and the interests of US companies that aim to tap into China's huge consumer market.

More generally, given Asia's size in terms of both GDP and population, it is hard to believe that the US would just step back and watch China take its place in Asia. This is no longer as unlikely as Trump might have thought when making such statements. The production and trade structures of China and the ASEAN bloc are increasingly complementary: China mainly imports oil, gas and other raw materials from the ASEAN countries, whereas they import electronics and textiles from China. There is also a growing production chain linking China and ASEAN countries in which US companies are not necessarily involved. The ASEAN bloc is now China's third largest trading partner, surpassing the European Union. As such, Asia's further integration through trade agreements is in the interests of all partners.

However, China would not be completely satisfied with the idea of dominating Asia at the cost of losing the US market. A more practical possibility would be for the US – even under Trump – to cooperate with China in regional leadership among East Asian countries. Still, if Trump does keep his promises (no TPP, and barriers against China and perhaps others), China could cement its position in Asia and look beyond Asia to make up for the loss – namely, to Europe.

So, the most likely scenario is that many elements of the status quo hold: the Trump administration does not conclude TTP or TTIP successfully, but also does not impose protectionist measures on China because of the rebound effect on the US. Nevertheless, even in such a scenario where the US does not advance on regional trade agreements, China would have a first-mover advantage to China. Indeed, China's rapid reactions to US hesitation over TPP during the last years of Obama's administration sends a clear signal that China is unlikely to compromise with the US under a trade-adverse Trump. To our mind, Europe could be the next stop for China. This would be all the more logical given the hefty investment that China has planned –and started to carry out – for a much better connectivity with Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative.

As for the EU, closer economic relations with China might be the only call left in the absence of TTIP. The issue is more urgent against the backdrop of the potential RCEP agreement, whose members would account for about 30 percent of the EU's external trade. If the EU cannot proceed with a favourable trade agreement with the region, its firms would also face trade diversion and enjoy less market access compared with other countries in the region such as China. In fact, the EU launched a plan to negotiate with the ASEAN countries in 2007 but the talks have moved to specific bilateral negotiations and progressed very slowly. Until now, out of the 10 ASEAN members the EU has only concluded free trade agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Neither agreement has yet come into force. At the current juncture, with Asia-Pacific countries moving towards trade and investment integration, it is the time for the EU to speed up and rethink its strategy. The aim should be to reach a regional agreement with Asia-Pacific countries in which China plays an important role.

In any event, for Europe to move away from its long – although increasingly fruitless – transatlantic alliance towards China, it is vital to build real trust. This is even more important than railway connections. However, trust is currently at a low level, after the recent antidumping calls by the European Commission and China's lack of reform to sectors over capacity. However, an inward looking, erratic and/or aggressive Trump administration might be the catalyst for a rapid increase in trust between the EU and China. In any case, the chances are that EU-China trade relations will improve under Trump.

This article was originally published on Bruegel.