唐纳德·特朗普被选进白宫，奥巴马政府最终还是接受了这件躲不过去的事，而且宣布在“跛脚鸭”阶段的最后日子里，不再推动“跨太平洋伙伴关系”（TPP）。从美国的角度看，TPP已死。对于TPP其他11个伙伴国来说这一宣布令人失望，但属意料之中，因为特朗普和希拉里·克林顿都反对TPP。日本已经通过TPP法案。TPP在新西兰议会正等待通过。在加拿大，接手上届政府TPP工作的自由党正进行有关听证，不过虽然反对派因此得到更多在媒体上曝光的机会，但听证实际上只是一种拖延手段，为的是等华盛顿那边的事情更加明了。

由于美国不打算也不愿意批准今年2月签署的这份协议，除非改头换面，否则这份协议已经不可能继续朝前走。根据现有规定，12个初始成员中至少有6个成员（占全体成员GDP的85%）批准，协议才能生效。美国和日本占到成员国GDP的80%（其中美国占62%），因此美日两国都有否决权。没有美国，其他11国是否愿意继续推进TPP值得怀疑，因为许多成员国的主要目的就是获得排他性机会进入美国市场。

那么，美国和其他TPP国家的企业和出口商还有什么选择呢？多数其他TPP成员不会在一棵树上吊死。澳大利亚、新西兰、新加坡、马来西亚、越南、文莱和日本是谈判中的区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP）协议方。RCEP包括东盟10国和日本、中国、韩国、印度、澳大利亚、新西兰。智利、秘鲁和墨西哥是新成立的太平洋联盟（PA）成员，该联盟致力于拉美地区的贸易自由化。同加拿大一样，墨西哥也是美国的北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）伙伴。不过作为NAFTA成员近来可谓提心吊胆，因为特朗普扬言要修改或废除这份实施了20载并对3个伙伴国都有益的协定。

TPP谈判被指责是在幕后秘密进行的，实际上RCEP也是如此。虽然最后协议达成之后，TPP文本已经公开，但RCEP的条款依然模糊不清。人们普遍认为，根据东盟国家与东盟集团6个主要贸易对象国之间的双边协议，RCEP降低贸易壁垒的雄心和效果都比不上TPP。不过，除了货物贸易，RCEP还包括服务贸易、投资、知识产权、竞争政策、争端解决和技术合作，而且它纳入了世界第二大经济体中国。除了敏感产业不可避免地成为例外，以及部分产品需要循序渐进，这份协议完成的时候，会形成一个涵盖全球45%人口、GDP总量达22万亿美元、贸易额占全球40%的优惠贸易区。这将是世界上最大的贸易集团，而美国只能站在圈外看着。

对在该地区开展业务或出口的美国公司来说，要打入RCEP圈子，就会产生更多外包业务。正如新加坡亚洲贸易中心的评论：

“希望保持竞争力的公司，特别是在出口市场开展业务的公司，现在必须加倍努力。没有了贸易优惠，这些公司在亚洲或欧洲的竞争对手面前就会处于劣势。特朗普一直抱怨的工作外包会变得更多。想利用亚洲RCEP之类政策获益的公司必须在亚洲设点，以便为这些增长迅速的重要市场提供商品和服务。”

当然，这一结果与特朗普想要的恰恰相反。

TPP本应（与RCEP和太平洋联盟一道）成为通往更大的亚太自由贸易区（FTAAP）的路径之一。这个庞大的区域性协议将整合并放大其各个组成部分的益处。中国一直把FTAAP作为终极目标来推动，亚太经合组织（APEC）甚至同意由中国和美国共同主持“战略研究”，探讨TPP和RCEP的兼容互补之道。虽然FTAAP会把中国纳入一个更广、想必也更严格的条约，但美国仍愿意先关注TPP，它可以是任何更大型贸易协定的组成部分。通过这种手段，可以获得先动优势，为FTAAP设置规矩。从投资争端解决，到知识产权、环境和劳工标准，许多美国产业就可以在诸多领域受益于贸易壁垒的降低，受益于规则的更加透明。但此战略不复存在了，至少在可预见的未来是如此。

这里存在的一个风险是，美国会被人看成是背弃了亚洲，而中国将推动RCEP的完成，使之成为区域内更广泛贸易的模板。西半球国家面前将出现一个一分两半的太平洋。

对在亚洲开展业务的美国公司来说，重要的是保持在该地区的积极存在，当新贸易集团出现时对它充分加以利用。如上所述，这也许意味着公司必须使它们的存在本土化。现有双边协议，比如韩国与美国、加拿大、智利签署的自贸协定，对此会有帮助。随着TPP垮台，加拿大有望恢复与日本的双边自由贸易谈判，该谈判在日本加入TPP谈判时中断了（日本已经与智利达成协议）。有TPP谈判奠定的基础，也许美国和日本是时候考虑达成一个双边协议。不过，贸易政策由特朗普制定，很难想象这会是被优先考虑的事。

由于增长放缓，中国自己正面临经济挑战。北京在寻找促进经济增长的办法，比如“一带一路”倡议和增加国内需求。特别是，如果特朗普仍不断威胁要破坏中国对美国的出口，那么推动RCEP取得成功（也许通过作出一些让步来提供契机），就可以成为刺激经济活动的另一种手段。在美国对亚洲的经济承诺出现问题之际，它还可以确立中国对东盟的领导。

最后，从长期看，华盛顿需要重新确认其在亚太地区的贸易存在。虽然来自美国大选的反对声音增多，但供应链是相互交织相互依存的，无法独自运行。短期内，TPP胎死腹中使美国的出口和西方在亚洲的利益受挫，使美国和TPP其他各国公司、工人和消费者受挫。它将需要很长的时间，才能评估并最终弥补这一损失。

With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, the Obama Administration has finally accepted the inevitable and has announced that it will cease efforts to push the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) forward in the waning days of the Lame Duck session. From a U.S. perspective, the TPP is now dead. For the eleven other TPP partners, this announcement is a disappointment, although not an unexpected one given the opposition to the TPP demonstrated by both Trump and Hillary Clinton. Japan has already passed TPP legislation and there is legislation pending in the New Zealand Parliament. In Canada, the Liberal Party, which inherited the TPP from its predecessors, has been conducting hearings on the treaty. However, while opponents received ample airtime, the hearings were really just a way to “rag the puck” until it became clearer what would happen in Washington.

With the U.S. unprepared and unwilling to ratify the agreement that was signed in February, it cannot go ahead unless it is revised. Under its current terms, it can only come into force if at least 6 of the 12 original members, comprising 85 percent of the combined GDP of all members (in 2013), agree to proceed. With the U.S. and Japan having a combined share of about 80 percent of combined GDP, this effectively gives both countries a veto (U.S. share is about 62 percent). Whether the remaining eleven would be interested in proceeding without the U.S. is debatable since gaining exclusive access to the U.S. market was the main priority for many member countries.

So where does this leave businesses and exporters in the U.S. and other TPP countries? Most of the other TPP players have another string to their bow. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and Japan are parties to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, which is currently under negotiation. RCEP includes all ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China, Korea, India, and Australia and New Zealand. Chile, Peru, and Mexico are members of the newly formed Pacific Alliance (PA), which is engaged in liberalizing trade in the Latin America region. And along with Canada, Mexico is a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner alongside the U.S. However, being a member of NAFTA these days is not very reassuring given what Trump has said about revising — or scrapping — the 20 year old agreement that has worked well for all three partners.

While the TPP was accused of being negotiated in secret, the same is true of the RCEP. And although the TPP text became publicly available after final agreements were reached, the terms of the RCEP remain vague. It is generally accepted that based on bilateral agreements between the ASEAN partners and the six countries with which the ASEAN bloc mainly trades with, that RCEP will be of lower ambition and benefit in terms of bringing down trade barriers in comparison to the TPP. However, in addition to the trade in goods, RCEP includes a trade in services, investments, intellectual property rights, competition policy, and dispute settlement and technical cooperation. The agreement also includes China, the world's second largest economy. Despite the inevitable carve-outs for sensitive sectors and long phase ins for some products, when the agreement is finalized, it will create a preferential trade zone for its members that will cover 45 percent of the world's population with a combined GDP of $22 trillion, while accounting for 40 percent of global trade. It will be the world's largest trade bloc—and the U.S. will be on the outside looking in.

For U.S. companies exporting to or operating in the region, it will likely lead to more outsourcing as companies seek to get inside the RCEP zone. As the Asian Trade Centre in Singapore has commented,

Companies hoping to remain competitive—and particularly those working in export markets—will have to work much harder now. Absent trade preferences, firms are at a disadvantage relative to competitors in places like Asia or Europe. The outsourcing that Trump has complained about is likely to accelerate. Firms that want to take advantage of benefits conferred through deals like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia will need to be located in Asia to provide goods and services to these faster growing, significant markets.

This, of course, is the opposite outcome for which Trump has been advocating.

The TPP is supposed to be one of the “pathways” (alongside the RCEP and the Pacific Alliance) to a much broader Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), a mega regional agreement that would combine and multiply the benefits of its components. China has been pushing the FTAAP as an ultimate goal, and APEC has even agreed to a “strategic study”, co-chaired by China and the U.S., to explore the ways in which the TPP and RCEP could be made compatible and mutually reinforcing. While the FTAAP would bring China into a larger, presumably higher-discipline treaty, the U.S. has preferred to focus first on the TPP, which would become a building block of any larger trade agreement. In this way, it would have the first-move advantage and set the bar for the FTAAP. Many U.S. industries would benefit from the lowering of trade barriers and more transparent rules in many areas, from investment dispute settlement to intellectual property rights to environmental and labour standards. However, that strategy is out the window—at least for the foreseeable future.

The risk is that the U.S. will be seen as turning its back on Asia. China will push to conclude the RCEP, making the RCEP a template for broader trade within the region. Countries in the Western Hemisphere will see a divide down the Pacific.

For North American businesses operating in Asia, it will be important to maintain an active presence in the region and to take advantage of new trade blocs if and when they emerge. As noted, it may mean that companies will have to localize their presence. Existing bilateral agreements, such as the FTAs that Korea has with the U.S., Canada and Chile will help. With the collapse of the TPP, Canada can be expected to revive its bilateral free trade discussions with Japan that were suspended when Japan joined the TPP negotiations (Japan already has an agreement with Chile). It may be time for the U.S. and Japan to consider a bilateral agreement after the groundwork that has been laid through the TPP negotiations. Although, with Trump setting trade policy, it is hard to imagine that this will be a priority.

China is facing its own economic challenges as its economy slows. Beijing is looking for ways to boost growth, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and by increasing domestic demand. Giving RCEP a push to reach a successful conclusion (perhaps by making some concessions to provide momentum) would be another way to stimulate economic activity, particularly if Trump follows through on threats to disrupt Chinese exports to the U.S. It would also establish Chinese leadership vis a vis ASEAN at a time when U.S. economic commitments to Asia are in question.

Ultimately, over the long term, Washington will need to re-assert its trade presence in the Asia Pacific region. The supply chains are too interwoven and interdependent to go at it alone, despite increased opposition rhetoric emanating from the U.S. election. For the immediate future, however, the still-birth of the TPP is a setback for U.S. exports, for Western interests in Asia, and for companies, workers, and consumers in both the U.S. and other TPP countries. It will take time to assess and, eventually, remedy the damage.