中国和美国股市的表现很少被放在一起比较，但它们共同述说着在当今这两个全球最大经济体和资本最充裕的市场上，过去几十年来投资者们的收益情况。让股价长期稳定上行，是中国监管机构和中国股市开放支持者的重要目标，关心资本成本、资本收益和股价之间关系的管理层和各方股东也渴望知道其结果。而美国提供了最好的例子，它说明在坐拥一个强大实体经济的情况下，这种市场和政策如何有助于在长时间范围内提高福利。

2017年3月31日，美国大公司标准普尔500指数创下当月、当季、事实上也是有史以来的新高。然而近日收盘价却比3月初以来有所下跌，行情显示系统显示，一季度最后一个月结束以来，获利回吐者和做空者在近5个月里首次试图控场，这是熊市的一个迹象。

进入第二季度，法国巴黎银行（BNP Paribas）等做市机构预测说，西方发达国家股市纠偏期已经近在眼前。其他金融行业公司，如富达（Fidelity），曾经对其投资者汇报说长线将看涨，然而本季黄金价格大涨, 说明投资者要避险，要赶在风暴出现之前逃离纸船，把挖来的宝藏存放进保险库。

而且，相对微观经济（公司一级）表现前景来说，西方国家股票似乎已经被高估（包括近来股价持续不断地上涨），考虑到美联储和银行行长们2016年12月对美国经济的谨慎预测，这一判断看来是有据可寻的。美联储预计，到2020年，美国GDP增幅最多达到2%，而在更长时间里，随着失业率和通货膨胀数字在今后5年里内有上升（失业率4.5%或者更高，通胀率2%），预计利率每年也将上调5个基点。

虽然人们批评说，股市并没有反映平庸的经济基本面，但2009年以来对发达国家股票贪得无厌的欲望，导致出现了历时最久之一的多国牛市（上行）行情，也制造了发达国家投资者在这些年里斩获资本收益的机会。

令人惊讶的是，这一成果是在全球金融危机带来市场大崩盘不久后就开始出现的。2009年2月，市场在多方因素作用下触底反弹，机构显而易见地再次着手建仓。过去8年来，纳斯达克指数从低点大幅上涨，收益超过430%，标普500从低点上涨135%，道指30上涨227%，富时100指数本季也创造了历史纪录。机构交易商和个人财富创造者在这一时期内获得了巨大回报。

与此同时，东亚地区经济领袖中国的GDP增长指标仍保持为过去5年美国最高增长估计数字的3倍，中国官方数字是6.7%。而在这之前的37年里，中国GDP呈指数级增长，年均超过10%。不过同时，中国相对幼稚的股票市场却在短时间内出现了洗盘式振荡（见图1）。

与表1当中其他股票指数所反映的股票市场不同，由于有较大比例的内地公司上市，香港和中国一样，都没能重返全球金融危机之前的高点，比最高时仍分别低38.4%和46.4%。这使在危机前最高点买入的中国投资者的近一半投资账户荡然无存。即使那些在谷底买入的人，到今天有近100%的收益，但中国和香港又都从2015年高位大幅回落，而日本的股价已经恢复。

中国的经济增长，无疑靠的是实体经济转型政策，而不是资本市场实验的成败。但后者提供了一个规范平台，它有完整的公司和证券法，有公司管理（包括以国际标准为目标的会计框架），有供方和买方机构，还有相关技术和投资者多样性的基础。

看看过去5年里中国最大银行的重大资本和债务重组计划，看看中国诸多大企业的高负债率，以及比全年GDP高一倍多的整体经济负债率，就知道中国金融体系还没有强大到可以用可持续或有效的方式来支撑其脆弱的经济。况且，中国囤积外汇储备，购买大量美国国债，导致并不完善的经济出现结构性失衡，同时国内市场发展不足。

同时，中国还面临着外部压力。特朗普总统似乎认为，为了支撑对出口的依赖，同时继续吸引外国投资，中国政府有能力通过中国人民银行让人民币贬值。图2的确支持人民币对美元走弱的判断，当然，需要仔细观查，避免之后为此作出错误决策。人民币疲软也反映了中国经济的疲软，虽然中国人民银行批准将人民币汇率的每日波动范围定在上下2%。这里要说的是，主要在香港以及伦敦、新加坡进行的离岸人民币交易（如下图所示），可在一定程度上指导中国人民银行的汇率确定。一旦美元离岸人民币（USDCNH）因投机、国际结算或汇回被买入（也就是为换取出售离岸人民币而购买美元），透过香港进行的离岸人民币和在岸人民币套利交易，在岸人民币就会感到下行压力。据悉，中国人民银行曾经在这种情况发生时介入市场，虽然并不常见。

经济在放缓，其他发展中经济体提供着有竞争力的劳动力成本，而朝鲜是中国身旁的一根刺。所有这些，都促使投资者对人民币施加下行压力，更何况中国为保持出口竞争力也希望人民币走弱。这些只是相当中庸地支持了特朗普的观点，而没有断然予以否认。

外国投资商、外交人员和外国政府应发挥关键作用，推动对中国金融领域的进入，促进与之合作。中国的政府政策、企业和投资者要让自己走上增长轨道。中国股市需要稳定和增长，如果方向确立，多变的现状和目前出现的建立头寸迹象就有可能指向较长期的增长。我们可以乐观地回顾一下1929年美国大萧条时市场作出的深度调整，以及随之而来的近一百年的牛市。拿到中国情况下来说，这就是对看涨的解释，它不是不可能的，前提是中国不是像在赌博，而是通过长期金融规划，加倍提高其公司、创新、管理、监管质量，促进投资。

就像现在，目前的中国股市，也许正为国内热衷创造财富的人提供新的手段。中国各大城市已经到了买不起房的时代，在北京这种最受欢迎的地区，已经存在限制购买多套房的政策，甚至政府也因为房价、交通和北京向六环的过度扩张而打算将办公地点进行历史性搬迁，它有可能一下子打破中央网络，预示或推动姗姗来迟的政治改革。

随着中国大大降低门槛，并争取多方支持，中国投资者将随着房地产市场降温而转向股市，这是因为可执行的选项并不多，同时会有境内外机构资金流动，因为如果发达国家市场下跌投资者会重新调整投资组合使其进入增值轨道。

由于经济增长极其缓慢，国内投资者似乎失去了信心，好比在过去一年里，市场始终是在缓慢地爬升。但如果中国和该地区的经济持续增长（中国已经大量投资于这一地区的基础设施项目，例如对有未来消费前景的领域进行分散投资），那么中国将在西方股市有可能进入冷却期之际，再次成为一个有吸引力的地方。

The performance of Chinese and U.S. shares are rarely compared side-by-side. Together though, they tell the story of the gains that have been available to investors over the past decades, in what are now regarded as the two largest economies—and most capitalised stock markets—in the world. The possibility of a long-term, stable upward trajectory in share prices is a crucial goal for Chinese regulators and proponents of liberalisation of the Chinese share markets. If the relationship between cost of capital, capital gains and share prices are of any concern, management and shareholders of all kinds will also be desirous of this outcome. The U.S. provides the prime example of how such markets and policies, in conjunction with a strong real economy, have contributed to improved welfare over the long-term time horizon.

On the 31st of March, 2017, the S&P500 index of shares in the U.S.' leading firms posted a new record high for the month, the quarter, and indeed, all time. Near term, however, a lower closing price than at the start of the month of March was recorded. The ticker tape therefore shows both profit takers and short sellers in tentative control from the end of the final moon cycle of Q1, 2017, for the first time in five months, a clue to a bear market.

As we enter Q2, some market making institutions, like BNP Paribas, have already predicted that shares in the developed west are due a corrective period imminently. Other finance sector companies, e.g. Fidelity, have reported to their investors of a longer term bullish outlook. The quarter, however, has also seen gold prices thrive, suggestive of investors going into safety—leaving the paper boat and stocking the vaults with mined treasure before the storm occurs.

Moreover, the notion that western shares seem overvalued relative to microeconomic (firm-level) performance projections—encompassed by the recent continuation moves upwards in share prices—is plausible given the macroeconomic (national economy) predictions of the Federal Reserve Board and Bank presidents for the U.S. economy in December 2016, which were modest. The Fed projected a maximum of 2% gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 2020, and in the longer run, accompanied by unemployment and inflation figures set to rise marginally over the next few years to 4.5% or more and 2% respectively, running alongside predicted interest rate hikes of about 5 basis points per annum.

While being criticised for their failure to reflect mediocre changes to fundamentals, the insatiable appetites for developed country shares from 2009 have led to one of the most persistent series of multilateral bull market (upward) swings, and thus opportunities for developed country investors to make capital gains in recent history.

Surprisingly to some, this success story began soon after the significant global financial crisis (GFC) market collapse. In the aftermath, institutions clearly began building positions again, from February 2009 when the market bottomed out in a lot of cases. The last eight years have generously lent the NASDAQ gargantuan gains of over 430% from the lows, the S&P500, 135% from the lows, and the Dow-Jones 30, 227%, the FTSE100 also boasting new record highs this quarter. Institutional traders and individual wealth builders have thus been able to enjoy dramatic returns over this period.

Meanwhile, East Asia's economic leader, China, has maintained GDP growth standards more than three times higher than the current and highest predicted U.S. growth outcomes over the next few years, according to the official Chinese figure of 6.7%. This comes off the back of exponentially rising GDP growth averaging above 10% over the last 37 years. Concurrently though, the performance of China's relatively infantile stock markets have shown the volatility of a whipsaw in short time windows (See figure 1).

Unlike the stock markets reflected by the other indices listed in table 1, Hong Kong, with its large proportion of mainland Chinese companies listed, along with China have both failed to usurp their pre-GFC highs and indeed sit 38.4% and 46.4% lower than those mountaintops, respectively. This will have left investors in China who bought at the highest point pre-crisis facing almost half of their investment accounts being wiped out. Even though those who bought at the low will be nurturing gains of almost 100% today, China and Hong Kong are both also down substantially off their 2015 highs, whereas Japanese shares have recovered.

The Chinese growth story has undoubtedly been based on policies that have transformed the real economy and not the success or failure of the capital markets experiment. However, the latter provides a regulated platform, complete with companies and securities laws, corporate governance (including accounting framework that aims for international standards), supply and buy side institutions, associated technology and a diverse investor base.

China's financial system does not yet appear robust enough to prop up the fragile economy sustainably though, or efficiently if we take into account the major recapitalisation and debt restructure projects the largest banks have required over the last fifteen years in addition to China's high debt ratios in many important companies, and in the economy at large—more than double annual GDP. Moreover, the hoarding of foreign exchange reserves and purchasing of vast swathes of U.S. treasury securities by China betrays structural imbalances in the imperfect economy and a lack of internal market development.

At the same time, China is under external pressure—President Trump seems to take the view that the Chinese government, through the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has the ability to devalue the Chinese yuan RMB currency, in order to prop up its dependence on exports and continue to attract investment from outside. Figure 2 does support the notion of a weakening yuan against the USD, certainly, a bit of scrutiny is needed to avoid post propter ergo hoc policy decision making. The weakening yuan also reflects the weakening Chinese economy, although granted the People's Bank does set the rate and limit changes to a 2% daily range. The point being made here is that offshore trade (shown below) in RMB (so-called CNH trade vs. onshore CNY trade), mainly in Hong Kong, also London and Singapore, will to some extent inform the PBOC's rate setting. If the USDCNH is being bought (buying dollars in exchange for selling Chinese offshore yuan), speculatively or for international settlement or repatriation reasons, the downside pressure on the yuan will be felt by the onshore currency through arbitrage traders in Hong Kong playing the gap between CNH and CNY. The PBOC has been known to step in when this happens, although uncommonly.

The economy is slowing down, and other developing economies offer competitive labour costs, while North Korea is a thorn in China's side. This will exert downside pressure on the yuan from speculators in addition to China's desire for a weaker yuan in attempts to maintain export competitiveness. These points only offer mild moderation to Trump's view though, they do not categorically negate it.

Foreign investors, diplomats and governments should play a key role in promoting their access and cooperation in the Chinese financial sector. Chinese government policy, companies and investors must align themselves towards a growth trajectory. Stability and growth is what the Chinese stock market needs. The volatile patterns and current building up of positions as they appear could point towards longer term growth if this direction can be established—recall optimistically that deep market corrections were seen during the 1929 U.S. Great Depression, and from these followed a near 100 year bull market. This is a very bullish interpretation to transpose onto the Chinese case, granted, but not an impossible vision, if China can improve the quality of more of its companies, their innovation, their management, governance, and promote investment not as akin to casino gambling, but part of a long-term financial plan.

As it stands currently, the Chinese stock market may now provide a new recourse to wealth creation enthusiasts in China. In the municipalities, this is an era of property unaffordability and there exists policy restrictiveness on buying multiple properties in the most popular of built-up areas like Beijing—even the government seems to be moving its offices in part due to property prices, traffic and overexpansion of Beijing to a sixth ring road now—in a historic relocation which has the potential to break up networks in the centre, at a stretch, a possible sign or catalyst of long overdue political reform.

With a much lower entry point and the multilateral support China seeks, Chinese investors will switch to stocks as the property market cools, given the lack of viable options and the institutional flows from inside and outside of China which may both lead and follow as investors seek to realign their portfolios on an upward trajectory, assuming a falling set of developed markets.

While domestic investors seem to have lost confidence due to the painfully slow growth, over the last year for instance, the market has been creeping higher. If economic growth in China and the region can be sustained—China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in the region, for instance, in part to spread bets into areas with future consumer trend prospects—China may make an attractive proposition again when western stock markets continue what could be the start of a cooling off period.